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PREFACE 
This project was initiated in December, 1977 when Dr. John F. 
Rooney handed me a carton of papers dealing with contemporary profes-
sional baseball player signings. My original plan was to analyze only 
a portion of the data for a paper to be presented the following April 
at the annual meeting of the Association of American Geographers. I 
became so engrossed with the subject that I soon decided to thoroughly 
examine the entire data set for a masters thesis. A two-month tour of 
many of the major league ballparks during the summer of 1978 further 
aroused my curiosity for the subject. The intertwining of baseball and 
geography has since become a personal labor of love. It is hoped that 
others might find this thesis interesting and informative. 
I must thank Dr. Rooney for making the data available and for 
his invaluable expertise as my major adviser. Thanks are also extended 
to Dr. Stephen W. Tweedie and Dr. George 0. Carney for their interest 
and timely advice. 
I am indebted to Gayle Maxwell and her cartography staff for their 
professional work on the maps included in this thesis. I am likewise 
greatly appreciative of the work done by the typists Jean Schwab and 
Sharon Hair. Also, many thanks to Miles Bogh for his computer 
programming assistance and constant encouragement. 
Finally, sincerest thanks go out to my family who were so 
supportive during my graduate residency. 
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CHAPTER I 
THE RESEARCH PROBLEM 
Introduction 
Any successful business establishment requires a continual 
replenishing of youth within its employment structure to remain 
competitive with its rivals. Aside from the obvious necessity of 
filling the vacated positions of retired or released personnel, young 
employees are often the ones expected to revitalize a business with 
their enthusiasm and seemingly unlimited potential. In no business 
is this more apparent than in professional sport and in few profes-
sional sports is this more vividly exemplied than in Professional 
Baseball. 
Professional Baseball brings more young athletes into its system 
each year than any of America's other major professional sports com-
bined. Baseball's 26 major league clubs annually sign approximately 
1,000 amateur prospects to professional contracts. The competition 
for these "first-year players" is so intense that over 50 percent of 
them are divided among the clubs via a draft selection system. And, 
that is just the beginning of the competitive process. Once signed, 
a first-year player is normally assigned to a minor league team in his 
major league club's "farm system. 11 (A major league club normally 
controls a minimum of four minor league teams, rarely more than six.) 
l 
In the minor leagues a prospect is given the opportunity to develop his 
talent with the aid of professional coaching while competing against 
teams of comparable skill. During and after a playing season those 
athletes exhibiting the most potential are advanced to a higher level 
of competition. The disappointing prospects are released with little 
hope of ever again playing in Professional Baseball's circuit. By 
releasing the failures the system is prepared to embrace another 1,000 
new prospects the next year and the process repeats itself. Obviously, 
each step up Professional Baseball's competitive ladder becomes more 
difficult for most athletes to attain. By the time every inferior 
player is culled at some point during a minor league carrer, approxi-
mately 10 percent of his year's class of prospects will have performed 
at the major league level, and probably only one-half of these can 
expect to become everyday regulars. Yes, in Baseball, it is truly 
only the strong who survive. 
The Scope of the Investigation 
The scenario depicted in the introduction is of great interest to 
devotees of baseball. The sanctity and preciseness of Organized 
Baseball's record-keeping system has created a situation wherein the 
careers of professional baseball players are probably as well docu-
mented as any single group of men in America, save our Presidents. 
There is, however, one specific player characteristic typically 
2 
ignored by baseball fans that is grist for the sports geographer's mill -
a player's amateur origin. By examining the origins of many players 
one can begin to determine the player production capacities of various 
areas. That, in the broadest sense, is the purpose of this study. 
3 
This research is based upon a 100 percent sample of athletes 
(13,985 in all) who signed first-year player contracts with Professional 
Baseball from 1965 through 1977. Information concerning a player's 
origin (his address when the contract was signed), the player's 
subsequent degree of success as a professional, and, the major league 
club with whom the player signed are examined in order to achieve four 
primary objectives. 
l. To discover what areas (country, state, county, and metro-
politan area) show a propensity to produce quality amateur baseball 
players (those signing with Professional Baseball's clubs) and, 
conversely, what areas are poor producers of baseball talent. 
2. To determine the relative successful productivity of an 
area's baseball player production. That is, what proportion of an 
area's professional signees subsequently advanced into the major 
leagues? 
3. To discover any ongoing areal production or major league 
club signing trends from an annual analysis of the data. 
4. To individually evaluate every major league club's signing 
and administrative strategy. 
In addition, information pertaining to the history of professional 
baseball player acquisitions and Professional Baseball's amateur 
free-agent draft and scouting industry is included. 
It must be noted that this research is not without its limitations. 
The most obvious weakness concerns the loosely defined explanatory 
variables cited in Chapters V and VI. This thesis is more descriptive 
in nature than it is analytical. Therefore, at this point no compre-
hensive quantitative testing of these variables has been attempted. 
From this current lack of testing it is not meant to be impled that 
analytical techniques are not necessary in the analysis of factors 
influencing baseball player production. It was decided, however, 
4 
that this unprecedented analysis of Professional Baseball's contemporary 
players would deal most specifically with the determination of the 
location and spatial distribution of the sampled players, thus leaving 
the significant task of more rigorously defining and analyzing the 
.Proposed explanatory variables for future research. 
Research Justification 
This research should benefit both the baseball establishment, 
those geographers concerned with sport and society, and sports 
aficionados everywhere. It is hoped that Professional Baseball's 
clubs might consider the results of the areal productive capacity 
analyses during their scouting and signing process. Baseball's 
scouting industry may react to these findings to become an even more 
efficient system than it is at present. Clubs might choose to realign 
the distribution of their scouts or their scouting territories. While 
a scout must continue to evaluate each prospective player chiefly by 
that player's potential, the significance of the player's origin and 
its productive history should not be ignored. Moreover, it may be 
helpful for clubs to know how other clubs have operated in the past. 
By more fully recognizing a rival club's most successful scouting 
territory, a club may choose to greatly increase its involvement in 
that area as well. And, those clubs that have not experienced 
competitive success in recent years may find it useful to compare 
their scouting and administrative strategies with those of the 
consistently successful organizations. 
From an academic perspective the findings will add to an already 
vast knowledge of this continent's cultural geography. Baseball has 
long been considered a vital part of the American sports culture, but 
geographic aspects of the sport have rarely been recognized as sub-
stantive research material. While identifying the varying degrees of 
importance or support that communities manifest toward the game may 
seem trivial, from a synthesis of such seemingly inconsequential facts 
emerges an increasingly comprehensive understanding of the spatial 
differences of our society. 
Lastly, it must be added that a personal fondness for baseball 
was a very important factor in choosing to initiate this project. The 
author is only one of the hundreds of thousands of individuals who 
find it immensely pleasurable to annually follow baseball's events. 
Therefore, besides accommodating the game's management and the 
academicians, there are numerous others who may find this research 
helpful in more fully appreciating and understanding baseball's 
complexities. 
Review of the Literature 
5 
An enormous amount of literature has been devoted to the game of 
baseball but very little has been directly related to its geographic 
aspects. The earliest published work examining baseball from a quasi-
geographic perspective was authored by Lehman in 1940. 1 Lehman investi-
gated the origins of 1,034 highly successful professional baseball 
players who had performed at various times between 1912 and 1939. By 
the use of a per capita statistic it was shown to what degree states 
and densely populated urban areas had produced ballplayers. This 
study 1 s main objective was not, however, to review the aggregated 
origins of these players. Instead, Lehman, writing as an educator 
rather than a geographer, attempted to reveal the influence that 
environmental factors had upon the development of a very complex 
physical skill by adults. As he was working during a period when the 
question of environmental determinism and the effects of heredity 
were hotly debated, Lehman was only secondarily interested in the 
actual geographic differences in baseball player origins'. 
It was nearly three decades later when a geographer first pub-
lished research involving the origin of athletes. Rooney looked upon 
an area 1 s rearing of skillful athletes in the same manner as economic 
geographers previously had regarded the spatially varied production of 
agricultural or mineral products. Using a statistical technique 
identical to Lehman 1 s, Rooney was able to regionalize the United 
States with regard to its production of major collegiate football 
players who performed between 1961 and 1967. 2 
Rooney widened his geography of sport research in a book published 
in 1974. The major collegiate sports of football and basketball were 
given greatest attention, but also included was a data summary from 
one season of Professional Baseball 1 s 20 major league player rosters 
(1968). 3 Additional research involving major league baseball was in 
the form of a cartographic presentation of baseball 1 s diffusion process 
in the United States. Nine maps (one for each decade) were used to 
display how the origins of Baseball 1 s major league participants had 
changed between 1871 and 1958. 4 Rooney concluded with a brief discus-
sion of America 1 s minor sports, high school athletic participation, and 
6 
encouraging comments to other sports-minded scholars of geography to, 
in effect, 11 come out of the closet 11 and readily examine sport from a 
geographic perspective. 
While the number and depth of geographic analyses of baseball is 
limited, other social scientists - particularly sociologists, econo-
mists, and historians - have dealt with baseball quite extensively. 
Haerle, a sociologist, examined the careers of 335 former major 
leaguers who had played baseball at some time during the first half 
of the 20th century. Haerle found almost no influence on future base-
ball playing performances exerted by the variables of an athlete 1 s 
region of origin or city size of birth. He reported that a majority 
of the successful ballplayers had engaged in farming or sports-related 
jobs during their upbringing and, that the level of a player 1 s educa-
tion was negatively related to the performance level of his profes-
sional baseball career. 5 In another sociological article, Scully 
reported the general racial attitudes of fans and Baseball 1 s manage-
ment as well as describing the inter-league and individual team roster 
differences with regard to the proportion of black and white players. 
His study of team rosters during the 1960 1 s concluded that the 
National League clubs had far surpassed the American League in the 
hiring of blacks throughout the decade. 6 
Some of the most scholarly baseball literature has been written 
by economists. Gregory pioneered this trend when he devoted a book to 
the subject of baseball from an economic viewpoint in 1956. Gregory 
meticulously investigated the different values and monetary rewards of 
professional players in addition to detailing the legal aspects of 
Organized Baseball. 7 Also in 1956 Rottenberg authored an article 
7 
which analyzed Professional Baseball 1 s player labor market. 8 In some 
instances the work done by both Gregory and Rottenberg, while being 
exceptionally comprehensive, is obsolescent due to the advent of more 
individual freedom and significantly higher salaries for players in the 
contemporary game. 
Andreana and Davis have completed more recent, and yet partially 
out-of-date, economic investigations of Professional Baseball. 
Andreana's report in 1965 concerning Baseball's uneven competition 
and its supply of players is especially significant to this thesis. 
Andreana considered the unequal distribution of talent to be Baseball's 
fundamental problem. His position of questioning the merits of an 
amateur free-agent draft which was about to become operative is par-
ticularly interesting now that the draft process has been in place for 
15 years. 9 Similarly to Andreana, Davis examined the competition in 
Baseball's player market from the early 1900 1 s through 1971. Davis 
had the advantage of reviewing the effects of the amateur draft after 
it had operated for six full years. He judged the draft to be a highly 
positive, but not perfect, step toward club equality. lO 
Baseball 1 s most voluminous research has been done by historians. 
The literary work of three men - Allen, Seymour, and Voigt - was 
particularly valuable in tracing the history of Professional Baseball's 
various types of player acquisitions. Allen authored a relatively 
comprehensive history of baseball in a book released in 195o. 11 
Despite its pretentious nature, Allen's book proved to be an important 
guide for other baseball historians to follow and improve upon. Both 
\ 
Seymour and Voigt have published their baseball narratives in two 
volume sets. Seymour's initial work is centered around the historical 
8 
development of the game during the l800 1 s. 12 Seymour's second volume 
records Baseball's history from 1900 through 1930. 13 Voigt's first 
14 
volume also traces the evolution of baseball during the 19th century. 
Voigt 1 s second book covers 20th century baseball history through the 
l950's. 15 (Because these three historians write about the same sub-
ject from similar perspectives their narratives are often quite compar-
able. When a citation is made involving an incident reported by all 
three men an attempt has been made to cite the most detailed account.) 
Various other baseball related literature cited during this 
research is too numerous to individually review here. Personal cor-
respondence was extremely helpful in acquiring the sentiment of various 
individual club administrators, especially that with Paul Snyder, 
scouting director for the Atlanta Braves Baseball Club. And, while 
often not specifically cited, The Sporting News was an indespensible 
source of information about all phases of the game. 
A review of a brief portion of the literature that employs or 
describes the location quotient statistic used extensively in this 
research is also appropriate. Rooney has used the identical method 
repeatedly in his sports research in order to assess the relative 
player producing capacities of various areas although he simply refers 
to it as a per capita measurement. Rooney contends that the error in 
measurement is minimal when the total population base is used as a 
comparative figure (versus using an age or sex structured population 
base). 16 Hence, this method is followed in this research for reasons 
of computational and comparison ease. 
The first use of the location quotient and the coinage of its 
9 
name was by Florence, Fritz, and Gilles. In 1943 these three individuals 
10 
used the method to measure the degree of localization of various United 
States industries. 17 Alexander summarized the ways in which the 
location quotient and other similar measurements could be derived in 
an article devoted to reviewing numerous methods of measuring the 
location of manufacturing. 18 And more recently, Smith has described 
the location quotient computation plus its advantages and drawbacks 
in examples involving data related to industries in England and Japan. 19 
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CHAPTER II 
THE HISTORY OF PROFESSIONAL BASEBALL 
AND ITS ACQUISITION OF PLAYERS 
Introduction 
It may seem to be a trivial matter but since the invention of the 
game of baseball, a supply of baseball players has been essential. 
As baseball evolved, from a simple game to a gentleman's sport, and 
then to a highly competitive and organized professional sport, the 
supply of players became an increasingly talented and valuable commodity. 
As the game was refined a team could successfully compete only if it 
had skilled players at every position, thus necessitating each club to 
acquire the best talent available. To fully appreciate the evolution 
of baseball and the history of its methods of player acquisition, a 
brief historical review of Organized Baseball is in order. 
Baseball in the 19th Century 
The Formative Years 
During baseball's earliest formative years only the socially elite 
were given the opportunity to play the game. The first organized base-
ball team about which anything is known was the Knickerbocker Baseball 
Club of New York. The Knickerbockers, comprised of socially elite New 
13 
York City businessmen, were established in 1845 through the efforts of 
Alexander Cartwright. Cartwright was the principal force behind base-
ball's earliest existence and many consider him to be the actual 
inventor of the game. Other men of a similar social class soon began 
organizing clubs in response to the example set by Cartwright's 
Knickerbockers, so that by the early 1850's eight ball clubs in the 
New York City area were firmly established and enjoying the game of 
baseball. 1 
In 1859 25 gentlemen's clubs in the New York metropolitan area 
agreed to form a permanent body entitled the National Association of 
Base Ball Players. Initially these clubs clung to the idea of base-
ball as a gentleman's sport, despite the fact that baseball's popul-
larity had spread among people from all walks of life. Retaining this 
14 
gentlemanly approach enabled the Association to maintain an elitist-
amateur position toward the sport. However, the inevitable profession-
alism became apparent by the 1860 1 s. Triggered by a post-Civil War 
baseball mania, an increase in the number of Association members, and 
the fierce interest to provide a winning team for their respective 
towns, clubs modified their elitist policies and subtly invited 
11 ringers 11 to join their teams in order to improve their chances of 
winning. The pattern for commercial baseball was now set. The 
charging of gate admission became customary, often with the receipts 
being divided among players, routinely those not of "gentleman 
stature. 112 
It is reported that the first time a player was actually paid for 
his baseball playing services was in 1860 when the Brooklyn Excelsior 
club secretly began to pay its star player. This was against 
15 
Association policy, but by 1866 the practice of under-the-table payments 
became well documented. These payments were not believed to have been 
large and there is no report in the literature that suggests teams or 
individuals were fined or suspended due to such payments. Another 
common form of payment was the provision of jobs outside of baseball to 
outstanding players. The players were paid salaries ostensibly for 
their work, but in reality the players earned their pay for playing 
baseball. 3 
True Professionalism 
With a phenomenal increase in Association memberships (by 1868 
nearly 350 clubs were members 4), it was obvious that the United States 
had begun its love affair with baseball. The fact that fielding a 
good baseball team could become a profitable venture substantiated 
the American spectator 1 s interest. The next logical step was for the 
sport to become truly professional and this came to pass in 1869. The 
first all-salaried professional club was formed by a former expert 
cricket palyer and previous member of the Knickerbockers, Harry Wright. 
Wright 1 s Cincinnati Red Stockings found immediate success by winning 
56 games without a defeat in their first year of operation. In 
addition to their impressive winning achievements, the Red Stockings 
were equally as successful from a financial standpoint. Thus, other 
cities and clubs soon began to subscribe to the theory of fielding 
all-professional teams as well. 5 
This push toward professionalism is evident from the reports of 
the National Association 1 s next few conventions. Twenty pro clubs 
were able to dominate the amateurs during the 1870 proceedings and by 
16 
the next year 10 of these all-pro clubs met to form their own organiza-
tion, the National Association of Professional Baseball Players. The 
Professional Association suffered from many problems, not unlike those 
that other professional sport organizations would encounter over the 
next century. These included the problems of designing reasonable 
schedules, having clubs too geographically dispersed, arranging a 
sensible championship format, and dealing with teams widely varied with 
respect to talent. These difficulties were made even more complex due 
to the numerous turnover of clubs that were involved in this Associa-
tion during its short lifetime. 6 
Acquiring the Players 
The professionalization of baseball further accelerated the 
competitiveness between the various clubs so that the acquisition of 
the best talent available was of supreme importance to each team. 
Highly organized scouting systems, an essential facet of contemporary 
professional sport, were not yet on the scene, but even at this early 
stage the most rudimentary form of a player development system was in 
evidence. It is reported that by 1867 the Brooklyn Excelsiors had 
many teen-aged boys involved in an organized baseball training system. 
This was done in hopes that the most skilled youngsters might someday 
replace the older members of the Excelsior parent club. Some clubs 
held amateur tryouts and hand-picked the most talented players. Other 
clubs depended upon newspaper reporters and/or noted citizens know-
ledgeable of the local talent for suggestions and recommendations 
regarding likely prospects. 7 
The failure of financially unsuccessful teams helped to introduce 
by the 1870's the practice of selling players. Managers of penniless 
clubs that were planning on disbanding began to sell their best 
players to other clubs so as to lessen their financial difficulties. 
In 1875 a shifting of two players between the National Association's 
two Philadelphia clubs initiated a tactic that Professional Baseball's 
management would use often over the next century. 8 
The stealing or pirating of both amateur and professional talent 
was a less accepted but significant method of acquiring talented ball-
players. While on tour professional teams would frequently play 
exhibition contests versus a small town's own best amateur or semi-
professional team. Before leaving town the pro club would often take 
possession of the most impressive local players in order to solidify 
their own roster. The local players in question were no doubt elated 
by the turn of events but this practice tended to make local fans 
scornful of the professional game and its management. 9 
Some professional players, given the proper financial inducement, 
were not above jumping from one club to another. This action, termed 
"revolving, 11 threatened the integrity of early professional baseball. 
This practice was legally eradicated in 1879 when the baseball club 
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owners agreed to include a clause in every player's contract that would 
prevent professional players from bargaining freely in the market-
place.10 This clause, called the "reserve clause, 11 was instituted as 
part of Professional Baseball's National Agreement. This agreement 
marked the true beginning of Organized Baseball as it reserved a club's 
rights to specific players and set forth the principle of safeguarding 
a club's territorial rights. 11 
The reserve clause became the rock upon which Organized Baseball 
rested. The clause said, in effect, that a club owner could employ a 
player for one year and hold in reserve the right to renew the man 1 s 
contract the following year. The player was put in a position where 
he either accepted the contractual terms or chose not to play profes-
sional baseball. The club owned him, totally and incontrovertibly 
in perpetuity. This clause was to remain unchanged for nearly an 
entire century before the players and management agreed to some 
revisions in 1976. 
The Major Leagues 
The National Association of Professional Base Ball Players that 
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was formed in 1871 endured through the 1875 campaign. Evils of gam-
bling, revolving, problems of franchise instability, and a lack of 
competitiveness brought about a need for reform. In 1876 eight of the 
larger city clubs voted to establish a new 11 major league. 11 Hence, 
the National League of Professional Baseball Clubs was born. In 
essence, this National League is the one still in existence today. The 
name chosen by this organization was significant. Prior to this time 
all baseball clubs had been united as player associations. In 1876 
the National League players became subordinate to the dominant club 
owners, evidence of the increasing importance of Professional Baseball 1 s 
management. 12 
The National League dominated Professional Baseball throughout 
the remainder of the century despite serious challenges by other organ-
izations. The American Association was the first competing league. 
The Association became a recognized major league in 1882 and remained 
in contention through the 1891 season. The Union Association, emerging 
for only the 1884 season, helped to expand the number of major league 
clubs to 34, the most clubs until then or thereafter to play in the 
major during one season. Finally, in 1890 a union of pro players, 
entitled the National Brotherhood of Professional Baseball Players, 
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established their own league which lasted for one year. An outgrowth 
from management's refusal to discuss player grievances, the Brotherhood 
or Players League was able to persuade a majority of the National 
League players to jump to this new league. 
Despite these challenges, especially the latter one involving a 
revolt of its own players, the National League managed to remain the 
dominant major league. After an 1891 settlement was reached with the 
Brotherhood in which the Nationals reacquired total control of their 
players, the Nationals forced the American Association into a merger. 
By virtue of the merger the National League absorbed the Association's 
best players and most profitable locations so that the National League 
was in complete control of major league baseball during the next 
decade. 13 
The Minor Leagues 
The available literature does not specifically clarify how a 
league gained major league status during the late 1800's but any league 
operating within the framework of Organized Baseball and not recognized 
as a major league was regarded as a minor league. By 1877 three minor 
leagues were in existence and major clubs soon learned that the minor 
clubs could act as a valuable supplier of professionally tested 
players. Cooperative gestures were made by the majors (mostly by the 
National League) toward aiding minor league development but the minor 
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leagues were not always treated fairly. The competition among the 
major leagues created a fluctuating number of teams and a need for an 
immediate supplier and disposer of players. Thus, the minor leagues 
were at the mercy of the major league clubs. An agreement in 1883 made 
it necessary for all major clubs to legally purchase minor players with 
the money going to the minor club involved. However, the major leagues 
would ignore this agreement whenever possible and instead successfully 
11 raid 11 minor league rosters, the minor leagues not receiving just com-
pensation for their developmental tasks. Despite this vulnerability 
to the majors, the minors grew to include at least 20 separate leagues 
that operated successfully during the remainder of the century. 14 
Baseball in the 20th Century 
A Period of Stabilization 
The National League's major league monopoly was challenged soon 
after the turn of the century. The challenger was the American League, 
a descendant of the Western League, which had been proclaimed the 
strongest minor league during the l890's. The American League became 
a recognized major league in 1901 when its eight clubs successfully 
raided the National League of nearly half its players. This was made 
possible due to the fact that the American League clubs ignored the 
reserve clause and instead offered substantially higher salaries and 
an opportunity for disgruntled players to flee from a league that had 
ignored player demands since the Brotherhood debacle. The American 
League, by disregarding the National Agreement's policy on territorial 
rights, also moved into prime market areas which further threatened 
the existing National League clubs. 15 
The National League suffered financially during 1901 and 1902 and 
was prepared to seek a peace with the upstart American League prior to 
the 1903 season. The American League clubs insisted upon remaining 
fully intact, thus scuttling any merger propositions brought forth by 
21 
the National League magnates. In the end the two leagues came to terms 
by legally awarding players to each club and agreeing to recognize the 
reserve rights of each other 1 s clubs. Also agreed upon was a settle-
ment of territorial rights which was to have far-reaching results. In 
the next half century these two rival leagues would experience no fran-
chise shifts and it would be nearly 60 years before either league would 
increase its total number of clubs. 16 
The 1903 geographic alignment of the two major leagues is displayed 
in Table I below. 
TABLE I 
MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL 1 S GEOGRAPHIC ALIGNMENT, 
1903-1953 
American League National League 
Boston Boston 
Chicago Brooklyn 
Cleveland Chi ca go 
Detroit Cincinnati 
New York New York 
Philadelphia Philadelphia 
St. Louis Pittsburgh 
Washington St. Louis 
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The two major leagues were now at peace but the many minor leagues 
were not as yet satisfied. The minors had been the chief victims of 
the conflict between the American and National Leagues as their rosters 
had been ruthlessly raided. In 1902 many of the minor leagues united 
together into a cohesive organization, the National Association of 
Professional Baseball Leagues, in order to stablize the entire minor 
league structure, as well as pressuring the majors to recognize the 
minor clubs 1 player protection rights. After the American and National 
Leagues had reached their own joint settlement, the majors joined with 
the National Association to sign a new Major-Minor League Agreement. 
This agreement provided the protection necessary to keep the minors 
afloat. A hierarchical classification system that the minors had 
proposed earlier was accepted by the majors. An especially important 
provision dealt with the creation of a draft selection system. This 
system enabled the majors to purchase certain selected minor league 
players with the monetary compensation determined by a player 1 s minor 
league classification. This system also allowed the higher classified 
minor league clubs to select lower classified players .. The Major-Minor 
League Agreement has undergone revision since 1903 but this basic 
agreement continues to be a key governing instrument of Organized 
Baseba 11. 17 
Since 1903 only once has there been a serious threat of a third 
competing major league - that by the Federal League. It endured only 
two seasons, 1913 and 1914, suggesting to other interested parties 
that there was virtually no chance of successfully competing with the 
American and National Leagues. In addition, Organized Baseball came 
to be regarded by the United States• Federal Courts as a sport rather 
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than a business, thus upholding professional management 1 s right to 
include the reserve clause in every player 1 s contract. This meant that 
a professional player 1 s freedom would continue to be extremely limited 
until 1976 when management was forced to revise certain provisions of 
the reserve clause. 
The Development of Farm Systems 
The often cited Black Sox scandal, the supreme command of Major 
League Commissioner Kenesaw Mountain Landis, and Babe Ruth 1 s heroics 
with the powerful New York Yankees received much of the attention of 
the baseball writers during the l920 1 s; yet, a more obscure event ulti-
mately may have been the most significant for contemporary Organized 
Baseball. The development of farm systems, where a major league club 
came to own or control a chain of minor league clubs and its players, 
revolutionized Organized Baseball. A farm system represented a type 
of vertical integration where a major league club nurtured its own 
chosen crop of untried but potentially talented players in hopes that 
a few of the more gifted ones would advance through the ranked classi-
fication system and eventually become major leaguers. The object of 
the system was for the major club to assure itself of a steady flow of 
young, inexpensive talent. By maintaining an efficient minor league 
farm system major league clubs would no longer need to depend upon 
expensive purchases of unfamiliar players from an unreliable source 
(the independent minor clubs). 
The person most responsible for the shift to the major 1 s ownership 
or control of minor clubs was Branch Rickey. His revolutionary idea 
changed the role of major league clubs from one of solely a consumer 
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of talent to one of an explorer, developer, and then consumer. The 
idea of creating a farm system was generated out of necessity. Rickey's 
task during and following World War One was to form the National 
League's financially destitute St .. Louis Cardinal club into a pennant 
contender. Following the strategy of the wealthier clubs, that of 
purchasing the best prospects from the independent minor league clubs 
at relatively high prices, was out of the question. Rickey resolved 
that the most logical plan for the Cardinals was to personally scout 
and sign the most impressive amateur players to low paying Cardinal 
contracts. The Cardinals could then develop these youngsters in their 
own minor league teams. 
With Rickey's organizational genius and keen eye for judging 
talent the St. Louis farm system was a spectacular success. During 
the 1920's the Cardinals developed into one of the strongest National 
League clubs both from a performance standpoint as well as financially. 
At its peak before World War Two the St. Louis Cardinals farming empire 
was comprised of 32 clubs containing between 600 and 700 players. 18 
The large stockpile of Cardinal-owned players enabled the Cardinals to 
become a totally independent club. From 1919 through 1943 the St. Louis 
club did not purchase a single player from some other source. Mean-
while, the club enjoyed the luxury of being able to sell their discards 
to needy clubs for very handsome prices. This provided even more· 
incentive for other clubs to imitate Rickey's farm system. 19 
The point most relevant to this research is that Rickey's system 
established the role of the major league club as an amateur talent 
seeker. With fewer independent minor clubs the majority of amateur 
players were to be scouted and signed directly by the major league clubs. 
Thus, it became apparent during the 1930's that those major league 
clubs with the best organizational scouting and developmental systems 
would have an advantage when their players began advancing into major 
league competition. 
The development of this vertical integration within Organized 
Baseball came not without protest. Commissioner Landis was adamantly 
opposed to farm systems and the major league clubs' increasing control 
of Baseball, but even his supreme power failed to halt their advance-
ment. In the mid-1930's Landis proposed a common draft for players in 
hopes that each major league club would gain a more equal access to 
promising talent. This proposal was met with contempt and suggestions 
of socialism by the most powerful owners and ultimately not endorsed. 
It would be some 30 years later before a similar plan, the amateur 
free-agent draft, would be established by the major league club 
owners. 20 
World War Two's Influence 
During World War Two Organized Baseball continued to exist but 
its quality declined due to the paucity of manpower caused by the 
armed services' utilization of major leaguers. The majority of men 
that remained in the United States to play professional baseball were 
physical culls and athletes of extraordinary youth or old age. The 
Washington Senators club exploited a new source of player talent 
during the war, a source that has since grown considerably. The 
Senators found that they could employ competitive light-skinned Latin 
American ballplayers to play for both their minor league teams and 
the parent Washington club. Although this was primarily a stop-gap 
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measure of war time necessity, the action taken by the Senators opened 
the eyes of club management elsewhere so that the Spanish-speaking 
players were to be given more opportunity to play in the United States 
in the years to follow. 21 
Immediately after World War Two Organized Baseball experienced an 
enormous surplus of talent. With many professional ballplayers 
returning from the armed services, major league baseball 1 s quality 
rapidly became equal or superior to its pre-war era. Also, gradual 
acceptance of the Negro ballplayer, who traditionally had been banned 
from the majors and forced to play in segregated professional leagues, 
was to be an increasing factor in advancing both the quality and 
quantity of available talent. 
The post-war revived minor leagues reached their peak in 1949 
when nearly 42 million spectators watched 464 teams compete in 59 
different minor leagues. This meant that over 9,000 young men were 
playing under Organized Baseball's umbrella, a participatory figure 
that has never again been matched. An increasing involvement with 
other sports, the impact of television providing a new form of enter-
tainment for the American society, and the fan's lack of acceptance 
of the black ballplayers in many of the southern minor league cities 
are commonly regarded as significant factors in the decline of the 
minors since the 1949 peak. In contrast, by the 1960 1 s there was an 
annual average of only 20 leagues, and in 1973 11 million fans watched 
approximately 2,500 players involved in a 136 team-18 minor league 
organization, a decline to less than 30 percent of the minor's peak 
year totals. 22 (Similar figures to 1973 are reported for 1979.) 23 
26 
The Bonus-Baby Era 
The 1950's and early 1960's came to be known as Baseball's bonus-
baby era. The major league teams found themselves in direct competi-
tion with each other for player talent as they had all assumed the 
burden of scouting for the best available amateur talent. When this 
task had been part of the independent minor league clubs' duties 
competition for players was less obvious and more localized. The 
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minor clubs normally had scouted only their own geographic areas, doing 
as best they could with local talent. A major club in the l950's found 
it necessary to hire at least 10 scouts and extend its scouting terri-
tory throughout the United States and foreign countries in order to be 
competitive. 
A club had to be prepared to better another club 1 s bonus offer to 
the amateur ballplayer who, before signing a professional contract, was 
free to negotiate with any interested club. The first instance of a 
player receiving a substantial bonus for signing. his first professional 
contract occurred in 1941. The manpower shortage during World War Two 
postponed the escalation of this practice but by the 1950's bonus pay-
ments were quite common. In fact, BaseballJs traditionally tight-fisted 
management grew to be incredibly loose with its bonus money. Consider 
these facts: l95l's total bonuses of an estimated 4.5 million dollars 
nearly equalled the aggregate major league salaries for the year; an 
exceptionally talented amateur player could expect to receive at least 
50,000 dollars for signing his pro contract, and; an entire lowly 
classified minor league could have been operated for what a few untried 
youngsters were collecting in bonus payments. 24 
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The practice of paying these huge bonuses came to be regarded as 
a necessary evil by Baseball's management. As it grew progressively 
costlier for clubs to lure talented athletes into professional baseball 
the practice tended to favor the wealthier clubs. They could afford 
to offer the highest bonuses and some of these clubs increased their 
advantage by signing more players than their syst6ns required so as to 
stockpile the talent away from rival clubs. Throughout this period 
numerous rules were put into effect in an attempt to limit such advant-
ages but these frenzied bonus-baby years continued until December of 
1964 when Baseball's club owners finally agreed to shift to an amateur 
free-agent draft. 
Recent Developments 
The bonus-baby era was also a time when some major league owners 
recognized an opportunity to increase their profits by moving their 
franchises to more favorable urban markets. The first shift in the 
major's geographical alignment took place in 1953 but the most influ-
ential movement occurred when the National League's two New York clubs 
moved to California prior to the 1958 season. This move set the stage 
for Baseball to increase the total number of major clubs. Expansion 
and franchise shifts became commonplace during the l960's and l970's 
so that by 1979 the majors were comprised of 26 teams, two of which 
were located in Canada's largest cities. Table II on the following 
page shows Baseball's 1979 major league alignment. 
The enlargement of the majors from 16 clubs to 26 within a period 
of less than two decades had its effects upon the quality of play. The 
baseball owners justified expansion as a means to bring major league 
ball to neglected urban areas. It soon became evident, however, that 
the enlargement of the leagues was not in response to a surplus of 
player talent. The expansion clubs began with discards from the 
established clubs and, with no immediate help from their newly formed 
farm systems, evolution toward a competitive balance was slow. 
TABLE II 
MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL'S GEOGRAPHIC ALIGNMENT, 
1979 
American League 
Baltimore 
Boston 
California (Anaheim) 
Chicago 
Cleveland 
Detroit 
Kansas City 
Milwaukee 
Minnesota (Minneapolis-St. Paul) 
New York 
Oakland 
Seattle 
Texas (Dallas-Ft. Worth) 
Toronto 
National League 
Atlanta 
Chicago 
Ci nci nna ti 
Houston 
Los Angeles 
Montreal 
New York 
Philadelphia 
Pittsburgh 
St. Louis 
San Diego 
San Francisco 
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A final event in 1976 had a pronounced effect upon the player's 
salary structure and reinforced the competitive advantage of the 
wealthier club owners. An arbitrator's decision was upheld by a 
Federal court whereby Baseball was forced to modify its sacrosanct 
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reserve clause system. In response to the decision the players and 
management reached a settlement which allows the veteran contemporary 
ballplayer, once he has fulfilled the terms of his standard player 
contract, an opportunity to become a free-agent. The professional 
free-agent puts his services for sale on the open market by placing 
his name in Baseball's annual re-entry draft. Each player in this 
draft may be selected by a maximum of 13 major league clubs. A 
selected player then has the freedom to negotiate a contract with all 
of the interested clubs and chooses the offer most to his liking. As 
a consequence, veteran player salaries have escalated dramatically and 
the lesser spending club owners have found it increasingly difficult 
to field pennant contending clubs. 26 
While the adroit use of professional free-agent acquisitions has 
helped many clubs become pennant contenders, the owners all agree that 
a club cannot afford to depend solely upon these infrequent, expensive 
acquisitions. As in Branch Rickey's days, the development of younger 
players through a healthy farm system remains the most efficient 
process by which to become competitive. 27 
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CHAPTER I I I 
A FREE-AGENT DRAFT AND THE SCOUTING INDUSTRY 
Baseball's Amateur Free-Agent Draft 
Why a Free-Agent Draft? 
Baseball's decision to shift to an amateur free-agent draft grew 
directly out of the bonus chaos of the 1950's and early 1960's. The 
proposal of a draft system was not, however, the first step taken by 
management to limit the size and number of bonuses. One of the more 
drastic pre-draft measures was a rule in 1961 that made it possible 
for each club to protect only one bonus player not on its major league 
roster. All of a club's other bonus players became subject to an un-
restricted minor league draft whereby another club could acquire any 
unprotected bonus player's rights for $25,000, payable to the original 
signing club. Most clubs could not afford to protect the potentially 
talented but unpolished players on their major league rosters so a 
great number of bonus players soon found themselves playing for someone 
other than their original signing club. Between 1962 and 1964 over 
150 first-year bonus players were forced to move to other clubs via 
the minor league draft. The 1961 rule did little to discontinue the 
bonus as, in fact, bonus payments to individual players continued to 
escalate. The best amateurs in the early l960's were receiving at 
least $100,000 to sign a professional contract and a conservative 1961 
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estimate determined that bonuses had cost the major league clubs $12 
· 11 . l m1 1 on. 
By season's end in 1964 most clubs were of the opinion that 
changes were necessary. Despite the strong opposition of wealthy 
clubs (the Los Angeles Dodgers, St. Louis Cardinals, New York Mets, 
and New York Yankees) a new rule was adopted that established the 
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amateur free-agent draft. The reasons that the great majority of clubs 
favored an amateur draft were simple. It was believed that the draft 
would give lesser successful teams (those normally lower in the stand-
ings) a more equal chance to sign the best available amateur talent. 
Furthermore, an amateur draft would help to diminish the size and 
importance of the bonus payments. 
The amateur free-agent draft began in December of 1964 and the 
process continued virtually unchanged through the 1970's. Two drafts 
are held annually. The most important draft (that with more eligible 
talent) occurs each June after the spring high school and collegiate 
seasons have ended. Another selection process is held in January 
which permits those athletes who have become eligible with the new 
year to be chosen. The January and June drafts have two separate 
phases. The 11 regular phase" can include all of those players who 
have never before been drafted while the 11 secondary phase" involves 
only those players who were selected in a previous draft but remain 
unsigned. 
The draft system permits the clubs to draft the negotiation rights 
of only those amateur players who meet certain requirements. Only 
amateur players that are at least high school graduates are eligible 
to be drafted. Any athlete at a junior college or not affiliated with 
the National Collegiate Athletic Association whose playing season is 
not in session can be selected without restriction. The NCAA member 
schools and the major league clubs agree that those players involved 
in NCAA competition must have completed their junior season or be a 
minimum of 21 years of age in order to be drafted. Finally, only 
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those players native to or residing in the United States are draft 
eligible. Foreign players remain free to negotiate with any interested 
club. Those eligible American players who are not selected in the 
draft but wish to play professional baseball are also free to negotiate 
with any club. These players, known as 11 free-agents, 11 have little or 
no bargaining leverage despite their freedom as they are free only 
because all of the clubs are skeptical of their potential talent. 
A club 1 s draft selection order is determined by an inverse ranking 
of the previous season 1 s won-loss percentages for all of the clubs. 
Each club receives one selection per round, the number of rounds 
dependent upon the available supply of talented players. Once drafted, 
a player can negotiate only with the club that has drafted him. If the 
club fails to sign a drafted player within six months, the player can 
then return his name into the draft pool and hope to be selected by 
another club in the next draft 1 s secondary phase. The secondary draft 
phase was established to ensure that clubs bargain honestly with those 
players drafted during the regular phase. Besides the player 1 s bargain-
ing leverage created by the secondary phase, the six month period 
between the two drafts gives those undecided athletes extra time to 
decide whether to sign a professional contract or choose some other 
career alternative. Because many of Baseball 1 s draft selections are 
recent high school qraduates this additional opportunity is thought to 
be necessary. 
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The secondary phase may be helpful for the undecided player, but 
its existence has created a less than efficient solution to Baseball 1 s 
bonus payment problem. The threat of losing a drafted player, unhappy 
with the original drafting club's offer, to a more generous club in the 
secondary phase or tp an interested college has helped to continue the 
practice of offering sizeable bonus inducements. The enormity of the 
bonuses has declined however, as a result of the establishment of the 
draft. Whereas the most sought after player in 1964 received a bonus 
of $200,000, the number one man in the 1965 draft signed his first 
professional contract for only one-half of that amount. Moreover, the 
total number of players receiving substantial bonuses has declined to 
a more reasonable amount since 1964. 2 
A Comparison With Other Professional 
Sport Drafts 
Organized Baseball's shift from a laissez faire, bonus-crazed, 
search and sign behavior to a structurally governed amateur free-agent 
draft was significant, but not a precedent setting event in professional 
sports. Professional Baseball has been the most conventional and 
conservative of America's popular team sports and its deliberate 
conversion to an amateur draft selection system is a fine example of 
this sport's tradition-bound nature. For comparison sake, a brief look 
at America's other major professional team sports and their amateur 
player drafts is appropriate. 
The National Football League held its first annual 11 Selection 
Meeting, 11 or college player draft, in 1936, 16 years after the league's 
founding. This organization's draft is probably the most publicized 
of any of the amateur athlete procurement proceedings in the United 
States. The early acceptance and longevity of the NFL draft has no 
doubt influenced other sports to imitate their system. The NFL cur-
rently prides itself on the fact that its college draft acts as a most 
significant team equalizer. 3 
The National Basketball Association has held an annual amateur 
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draft since the league's inception in 1946. The NBA attempted to give 
its members the unique advantage of allowing each club to choose one 
player from within a 75-mile radius of its home arena in lieu of a first 
round draft selection. This territorial concept helped to keep locally 
popular college or, in some cases, high school players perfonning in 
nearby urban markets. A bitter dispute between the New York and 
Philadelphia clubs over the rights of Princeton's All-America Bill 
Bradley finally halted this practice of territorial advantage after the 
1965 draft. 4 
The National Hockey League did not choose to engage in an amateur 
draft until after their 1967 season. The NHL's situation prior to 
their first draft was unique in that their six clubs were very much 
involved with the funding of amateur player development programs and 
semi-professional junior-league hockey. With so few major league clubs 
and their great financial interest in the developmental programs, an 
amateur draft was not considered necessary to equalize NHL talent or 
stabilize bonus payments. But, with the rapid expansion of the NHL in 
1967 there came an immediate need for competitive balance. Thus, the 
decision to establish professional hockey's universal amateur draft. 
Because of even greater expansion and another professional league to 
contend with during the next decade, the NHL clubs virtually ignored 
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the developmental programs so that soon, despite the increased impor-
tance of inter-collegiate hockey, the NHL found the amateur talent base 
exceedingly thin on drafting day. 5 
A few observations mentioned in a recent article comparing the 
drafts of the NFL, NBA, and Organized Baseball are fitting for this 
comparison discussion. The point is made that both the NFL and NBA 
clubs are more certain of a drafted player 1 s potential than are 
Baseball's clubs. This is especially true of the early round selections 
for the three sports. Professional football and basketball clubs are 
frequently able to judge an amateur's potential against other mature 
college competition. Baseball clubs are at a decided disadvantage when 
judging talent. Baseball depends highly upon the high school athlete 
who 1 s caliber of opposition is often-times suspect. Also, the nature 
of the sport makes baseball talent judging more difficult. It is 
believed that it takes longer for an athlete to develop all of the 
skills necessary to become successful in baseball versus most other 
team sports. Thus, even the best collegiate baseball player may 
possess a weakness that will not become apparent until he opposes 
better professionally trained players. This difference in maturation 
and developmental time between the three sports is obvious when one 
studies the trends of the various drafts• subsequently successful 
athletes. Whereas professional football and basketball team rosters 
consist mainly of early round draft choices, the major league baseball 
clubs commonly find some of their best talent in the draft 1 s later 
rounds or even on free-agents. 6 
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The Professional-Collegiate Conflict 
There was once a time when a professional baseball club was 
assured that it could sign any talented high school graduate that it 
desired. All that was necessary was a nice bonus offer and some 
effective cajoling and a prospect was as good as signed. That is no 
longer the case. The contemporary amateur athlete is faced with another 
alternative that an increasing number of them choose - a collegiate 
playing career coupled with the opportunity to further one's education. 
Actually, a collegiate career has always been an available alter-
native (provided the athlete's academic standing was acceptable), but 
the option has never been as practical as it is at present. In recent 
years college baseball has emerged as a major sport on a few campuses 
around the country and many other schools are currently upgrading their 
baseball programs in order to compete. With this emergence has come 
many of the benefits that other major collegiate sport programs have 
offered to the amateur athlete, including: a full scholarship, an 
attractive schedule with a great deal of inter-regional traveling, the 
opportunity to continue to display one's talents in front of profes-
sional scouts, and, other general forms of preferential treatment 
afforded student-athletes. 
The professional clubs are not in total disharmony with those 
colleges and universities which provide quality baseball programs. 
College baseball acts as a national development program for the pro-
fessional game, one that the professionals do not financially maintain. 
So, in effect, the collegiate game has become an independent farm 
system for the professionals. The improvement of college baseball 
has also aided the professional scouting industry. A scout is able to 
watch a group of talented prospects perform during a college game 
whereas a normal high school visit is for the investigation of only 
one player. Professional scouts have the additional advantage of 
judging a college player's potential over a longer period of time. In 
the long run this should benefit the professional clubs by increasing 
their knowledge of the available amateur personnel. 
Administrators of professional clubs concur that the quality of 
college baseball has greatly improved. These experts agree that the 
contemporary top-ranked schools play at a competitive level comparable 
to some of the better Single A professional minor league teams and 
that other major schools are equivalent to the professional ro~kie 
league classification. 7 An example concerning the Atlanta Braves 
exhibits how one club has adjusted from the high school to collegiate 
player market over the past decade. It was estimated that early in 
the 1970 1 s 80 percent of the Braves' first-year players were signed 
directly out of high school. By 1979 this figure had reversed so that 
80 percent of Atlanta's signed prospects had experienced some type of 
collegiate competition. 8 
There are, however, conflicts between the collegiate and profes-
sional game. One problem is bonus money. Professional clubs have, in 
a sense, become a reliable scouting agency for the college baseball 
coaches. When a high school graduate is selected in the amateur free-
agent draft college coaches will promptly contact the youth to make 
counter-proposals to the drafting club's offer. Because a talented 
high schooler has a possible collegiate career as one of his options, 
he is able to bargain with the professional club with a great deal of 
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leverage. As a result the signing bonuses offered to athletes just out 
of high school are again on the rise. Another trend has been for 
collegiate players to sign with professional clubs following their 
junior year. This procedure tends to favor the player during negotia-
tions with the drafting club because the player has the option of 
playing a final year of college baseball if the bonus incentive is not 
satisfactory. This type of strategy can backfire, however, if the 
player's senior year achievements are not exceptional. He then has no 
choice but to sign with any interested club for considerably less money.9 
Another conflict between the collegians and professionals involves 
the question of what is best for the player. This is where Professional 
Baseball believes that it has an edge. While recognizing the fact that 
inter-collegiate baseball has improved in recent years, a consensus 
of professional officials contend that it is best for both the prospec-
tive player and the signing professional club to sign a player as soon 
as possible, despite the inherent problems of judging potential talent 
at such an early age. 10 The early signing procedure ensures that a 
player will benefit from better coaching and competitive opposition 
throughout these most important formative years. It also provides a 
successful player the opportunity for a longer professional career 
before he reaches the age when his value becomes limited. In addition, 
professional clubs can make counter-proposals of their own. They 
commonly attempt to persuade the very best young athletes to sign 
directly out of high school by providing the finances necessary to 
pursue a college education during the off-season. 
Baseball's Scouting Business 
He sits motionless in the hot sunshine, with a shape-
less canvas hat cocked over his eyes. At last, responding 
to something on the field not perceptible to the rest of 
us, he takes out a little notebook and writes a few words 
in it, and then replaces it in his windbreaker pocket. 
The players steal a glance at the lone stranger as they 
come in from the field at the end of a half inning; the 
managers pretend to ignore him. Nobody knows his name, 
but everybody recognizes him, for he is a figure of pro-
found, almost occult knowledge, with a great power over 
the future. He is a baseball scout.ll 
The business of finding and judging baseball's amateur talent is 
assigned to the baseball scout. A good baseball scout has a near-
perfect understanding of all phases of the game that enables him to 
be capable of accurately detennining a player's value and potential 
after only a few investigative occasions. And, although the shift to 
an amateur draft process has somewhat changed a scout's role, his 
wisdom directly influences the selection of baseball's future profes-
sional players. 
A widespread distribution of baseball scouts has evolved from a 
time when individual ball clubs realized a need for more talented 
players than their local areas could adequately supply. This need 
became particularly important once the major league clubs had begun 
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to control minor league rosters during the l920's and l930's. Hence, 
the clubs began employing a few men in various parts of the nation to 
search for talented prospects. The number of scouts grew over the 
years so that by the l960's a well established network of scouts combed 
the ballyards in every part of the country in search of the next Henry 
Aaron or Sandy Koufax. 
The fact that the procurement of youthful talent is of major 
importance is substantiated by the contemporary employment figures 
and the money allocated toward Baseball's scouting industry. Most 
major league clubs employ approximately 10 full-time scouts and at 
least that many part-time scouts. (The 1965, 1970, and 1975 editions 
of the Baseball Blue Book listed an average of over 500 employed 
scouts.) In addition, in 1974 Baseball's owners voted to establish 
a centralized scouting force. This body, the Major League Scouting 
Bureau, offers a free-lance scouting service, complete with computer-
ized scouting reports on the most talented amateur prospects. The 
amount of money that a major league club spends annually simply for 
scouting purposes is difficult to attain but a 1976 estimate of $7.5 
million for the combined 24 clubs seems conservative. 12 
Prior to 1965 and the amateur draft the scouts were not only in 
the midst of the bonus chaos but their existence helped to perpetuate 
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and increase the bonus payments. During the bonus-baby years a scout's 
job was twofold. He was to evaluate the talent and also persuade 
certain prospects to sign with his club. The persuasive portion of the 
job meant that the scout sometimes had the authority from his employer 
to negotiate with the amateur player. A scout was in a position to 
better an opposing scout's financial offer as well as getting to 
personally know the player with whom ITT: was dealing. The degree of 
personal contact became important when opposing scouts offered essen-
tially the same monetary inducements to a player. Then, the more person-
able scout gained the advantage and normally came away with his player. 
The draft makes personal contact and friendship between the scout 
and player less necessary. As a result, some clubs operate with fewer 
full-time scouts. Also, a contemporary prospect may notice a scout's 
watchful eyes as he performs as an amateur but when the contract 
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negotiating begins the drafting club sends its scouting director, 
general manager, or vice-president to do the bargaining. The scout's 
job has become half-obsolete as his only requirement is to send accurate 
amateur player reports to his club's front office. The club 1 s manage-
ment makes the final decisions of whom to select on drafting day. 13 
The establishment of the Major League Scouting Bureau has had its 
effects upon Baseball 1 s scouting industry as well. The MLSB's imperson-
al but comprehensive coverage of amateur baseball means that there is 
less of a need for part-time scouts. The Bureau's existence also has 
changed the roles of some of the club's employed scouts. A MLSB 
report is written anonymously so that clubs subscribing to the service 
find it necessary to send their own scouts to "cross-check" prospective 
players in person for assured thoroughness. Other clubs contend that 
the centralized scouting service is overpriced at $100,000 per year and 
an unnecessary, and sometimes inaccurate, luxury. About one-quarter of 
the clubs have stubbornly opposed the use of this service since it was 
established and continue to employ their entire independent scouting 
intelligentsia. 
The Atlanta Braves Example 
The scouting system of the Atlanta Braves provides an example of 
one major league club's scouting methods. Atlanta currently employs 
20 scouts, eight of whom are part-time. The Braves had reduced their 
number of scouts in the mid-1970's but are presently in the process of 
rebuilding their scouting staff in hopes that the added employment will 
rejuvenate their club's competitiveness. Like all clubs, the Braves 
have a reasonably accurate idea of where the most and best amateur 
baseball is played and they attempt to locate their scouts in these 
areas. There is also the tendency for a club to show a local bias to 
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its scouting arrangement. Table III displays the geographic arrangement 
of Atlanta's scouting staff. 
TABLE III 
LOCATION OF ATLANTA BRAVES 1 SCOUTS, 1980 
Number Number 
of of 
State Scouts State Scouts 
Alabama l Illinois l 
Arizona l Michigan l 
Arkansas l New York l 
California 4 North Carolina l 
Dominican Republic l Ohio l 
Florida l Tennessee 3 
Georgia 3 
Part-time scouts, commonly referred to as 11 bird-dogs 11 in much of 
the literature because of their knack of finding the obscure talented 
prospects, are employed primarily to keep watch over their local areas. 
Because part-time scouts are usually employed in other work they are 
not able to do near as much traveling as those employed full-time. 
Other part-timers tend to be elderly gentlemen who do their work simply 
because they love the game. Depending upon his historical accuracy of 
judging prospects, a part-timer may or may not have as much influence 
with the club 1 s management as full-time scouts. In the case of the 
Braves, their scouting director considers his part-time scouts to be 
equally as accurate and important as those employed on a full-time 
b . 14 as1s. 
A club 1 s spatial organization of scouts, like t~at of the Braves, 
suggests that an individual scout has a specific in-state or multi-
state territory to cover. It is obvious from the Atlanta example that 
certain areas of the country are less represented by their scouts. 
This does not imply, however, that amateurs performing in these unrep-
resented areas are conceded to other interested clubs. Scouts travel 
great distances, especially during the spring months, to watch quality 
amateur baseball wherever it might be played. For instance, many of 
Atlanta 1 s scouts annually converge on the southern diamonds in March 
when northern colleges make their trips to Florida and other parts of 
the South. And, in the winter months a few of the full-timers will 
visit the Caribbean to aid the one Atlanta scout permanently located 
there. Like all subscribing clubs, the Braves also acquire a great 
deal of information about the better domestic amateurs that their own 
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scouts do not see regularly from the Major League Scouting Bureau. The 
MLSB helps to broaden a subscribing club 1 s coverage area but, in many 
respects, its existence has made it increasingly necessary for these 
clubs 1 scouts to travel long distances. For example, Atlanta attempts 
to cross-check the MLSB 1 s most highly regarded prospects by three of 
its own scouts on separate investigations and most other amateurs 
that the Braves are particularly interested in are cross-checked twice. 15 
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CHAPTER IV 
METHODOLOGICAL TECHNIQUES OF THE ANALYSIS 
Compiling the Sample 
The raw data used in this investigation were compiled by the 
National Association of Professional Baseball Leagues of St. Petersburg, 
Florida. Their First Year Player Report, p~~ted 10 times per year for 
use within Organized Baseball 1 s industry, was the major data source. 
The data were provided to this researcher through the auspices of Cecil 
and Associates, a sports consultant agency in Atlanta, Georgia. Addi-
tional information came from the Official Baseball Register, published 
annually by The Sporting News of St. Louis, Missouri, and the Major 
League Year E_ Notebook, published annually by Baseball Blue Book, Inc. 
of St. Petersburg, Florida. 
A 100 percent sampling of those players who signed their initial 
professional baseball contracts during the years of 1965 through 1977 
is used for the analysis. This 13 year period was chosen primarily 
because those years of data were the ones made available to the 
researcher. Moreover, the sampling period is significant in that it 
surveys the initial years of the amateur free-agent draft as well as 
continuing through the time of Professional Baseball 1 s major league 
expansion in the late 1960 1 s and relative stability of the 1970 1 s. 
(The American League did add two clubs, Seattle and Toronto, in 1977, 
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consequently the figures of these two expansion clubs are minimal in 
this sample.) 
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The significant information involving every player in the sample 
includes data indicating: his home address when the initial profes-
sional contract was signed (presumably his amateur playing origin); the 
major league club with whom he signed, and; whether the player later 
advanced into the major leagues. Of lesser significance is the indica-
tion of whether the player signed his professional contract after being 
selected in the amateur free-agent draft, or rather as a free-agent. 
Displayed in Figure l is one page of raw data concerning the signings 
of 38 first-year players during 1968. Those players who were found to 
have later performed in the major leagues are encircled. 
A domestic player 1 s origin was coded for computational ease by 
state, county, and metropolitan area (when applicable). The metro-
politan area category employs the United States Census Bureau 1 s classi-
fication of Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSA). The SMSA 
includes the county in which a central city of 50,000 inhabitants 
(or 25,000 under certain circumstances) is located, and adjacent 
counties that are found to be metropolitan in character and economically 
and socially integrated with the county of the central city. In New 
England, the requirement with regard to a central city as a nucleus 
still holds, but the units comprising the area are cities and towns 
rather than counties. The census of 1970 listed 243 SMSAs. (A 
procedure indicating each domestic player 1 s three digit zip code area 
was also coded but is not used during the analysis.) 
Those foreign players included in the sample were grouped as to 
their nation and, in the case of Canadian players, by province. The 
FIRST YEAR PLAYrn REPORT NO. !:i, 1968 
FIRST YEAR PLAYER CONTRACTS OF MAJOR LEAGUE ORGANIZATIONS 
APPROVED LlY THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION IN PERIOD 
t.iA Y 22, 1968 to July 5, 1966 
*Indicates pl;iyrr wlected al .Frtc Agtnt Orait 
CLUB HOME CITY 
AMERICAN LEAGUE 
BALTl~IORE 
Aberdeen ••••••.• , •••• •:.11chael Hamm 
"George Manz 
. Bluefield ••••••••• , ••• •John llldnchard 
*Leonard Finch 
"Conrad I fcrrman~ 
c:x;,·J0~ 
*Lauy Jone& 
Ronald R. Pctnson 
Steve Robida 
*Lo11111e Teasley 
Miami •••••••••••.•• ~~.'.!::Wai§ 
Stockton •••••••..• ; ~ : Ralph J. Manfredi 
BOSTON 
Jamestown •••••••••••• *Allen Collins 
· ·~lichael Collins 
*Manuel Crespo 
Richard D. Darnell 
*Michael Harvison 
Richard G. Jacobs 
!\like D. Johnson 
*Frank Mannerino 
l\lichael l\lazerall 
*John S. Moss· 
*Thomas Skenderian 
*Curtis Suchan 
•Robert Truskowski 
*Roger D. Ward 
*Richard Wicks 
Pittsfield • • • • • • • • • • . . • Carl E. Boteie 
Waterloo ••••• , ••••••• *William E. llro1m 
•Ronald F;ills 
__ Hc_~l)'..C:: .. ~ 
~~flothq_C:::. 
*Michael R. !\cal 
•Roh~1t Ovemullcr 
Winston.Salem ••••••. Cf;;1;, D. Curt1Q 
Henry L. Gracia 
*Mich&el Whitron 
Rapid City, S.D. 
Baltimore, Md. 
Denver, Colo • 
Napa, Calif. 
Somrnlale, NJ. 
!\hdlothian, Ya. 
Kan;as CitY., Mo. 
Rochester, N.Y. 
Snyder, N.Y. 
Taylors, S. C. 
Tampa, Fla. 
Roseville, Cali!. 
Glendora, Calif. 
Riveroide, Calif. 
Brenham, Texas 
Miami, Fla. 
Columbus, Ohio 
Ft. Worth, Texas 
Woonsocket, R. I. 
Buena Park, Calif. 
Oak Lawn, Ill. 
Westbrook, ~laine 
Bimungham, Ala. 
Readv1lle, Mas5. 
Tampa, Fla. 
Wayne, ~!ich. 
Ft Lauderdale, Fla. 
Lake Charles, La. 
Pittsfield, ~lass. 
Fresno, Cali(. 
Santee, Calif. 
~!creed, Calif. 
Sim,boro, La. 
Red<l•"ii· C&lif. 
Felton, Pa. 
Smithtown, N.Y. 
Morgan Hill, Cali!. 
J acksonv1lle, Fla. 
Figure 1. An Example of the Raw First-
Yea r Pl ayer Data 
POSITION 
OF 
RHP 
c 
3B 
RHP 
RHP 
RHP 
3B 
LHP 
RHP 
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home cities of Latin American players were also recorded when that 
information was available. 
Having geographically categorized the players by origin and major 
league club involvement, the next step was to group and standardize 
this information. This was done through the use of computer programs 
written by Dr. Stephen W. Tweedie, Associate Professor of Geography 
of Oklahoma State University, Stillwater, Oklahoma. 
The Location Quotient 
In order to properly compare the relative baseball player produc-
ti on capacities of separate geographic areas it is necessary to compen-
sate for the variation in populations. In this research the baseball 
player production figures are standardized through the use of the 
location quotient. A location quotient index (L.Q.) indicates the 
degree to which a localized area 1 s involvement or production figures 
for some activity vary relative to some other more comprehensive norm, 
such as figures at a regional or national level concerning the same 
activity. For this research the standard or norm chosen for relative 
comparison sake is the number of first-year professional baseball 
players originating from the United States. All location quotient 
computation is based upon the 1970 aggregate population totals at the 
national, state, SMSA, or county levels. Hence, the location quotient 
indices of this research can be considered as simply per capita 
production indices. 
An area's location quotient index was computed by the use of the 
following formula: 
X./X 
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Q - 1 L. .- Y./Y 
1 
( 6. l ) 
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Where x. l is the number of ballplayers produced in area X, 
x is the total population of area X, 
Y. is the number of ballplayers produced in the United States, 
l 
and y is the total United States population. 
By using the national rate of production as the divisor the subsequent 
quotient can be compared to the national production norm, which is 
equal to 1.00. Any computed index found to be less than l.00 indicates 
an area's rate of production to be less than the national rate, 
whereas an index greater than 1.00 signifies that area's production to 
be greater than the national norm. 
Some caution should be taken when analyzing a location quotient 
index because of its two inherent weaknesses. Location quotient 
indices less than the norm are compressed between 0.0 and 1.00 while 
those indices greater than the norm may rise to any number above 1.00. 
The other weakness becomes evident when a comparison is being made which 
involves an area with a very small population base. In a sparsely 
populated area the production of only a few players can create an 
abnormally high index value, possibly overemphasizing that place's 
productive importance. This latter weakness is especially noteworthy 
during the county level examination. 
Three separate location quotients are computed during this 
research and are given the titles of: "total location quotient," 
"major location quotient," and "success location quotient. 11 The total 
location quotient is designed to give an indication of an area's total 
per capita rate of ballplayer production relative to the total national 
rate. The resultant total location quotient indices involve the use 
of every player in the sample. 
A national rate of 6.154 players per 100,000 persons signed their 
initial professional baseball contracts during the 13 sampled years, 
or approximately one player per 16,249. (This adjusts to an annual 
average of 4.734 players per one million or one player per 211,238.) 
The example below shows how the state of New York's total rate of 
production can be compared to the total national rate: 
Number of N.Y. First-Year Players 
1970 Population of N.Y. 
Number of U.S. First-Year Players 
1970 Population of U.S. 
4. n- 5 
762 
18,241,584 
12,544 
203,810,000 
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= 5 = .68 Total L.Q. 6~154- ( 6. 2) 
New York's total location quotient index of .68 means that its production 
rate was only slightly better than two-thirds that of the total national 
rate. An area that was found to have produced players at a greater than 
average rate is Puerto Rico which had an index of 1.90, or nearly twice 
the total production rate of this country. 
It is important to note the cases of Puerto Rico and other foreign 
producing areas. Non-domestic production and population figures are 
not included in the divisor of the location quotient computation. To 
include the total populations of every foreign area that sent forth a 
baseball player would create an underestimation of the relative rate 
of production. Because the United States produced nearly 90 percent of 
the total players in the sample only this country's rate of production 
is used as the comparative rate. 
This research also determines a producing area's rate of only its 
highest quality players. To do so the identical computation is per-
formed as in the total location quotient example, but during this 
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procedure only those 11 major players 11 are included. In this case a 
11 major player11 is one who had advanced to the major leagues and 
appeared in at least one game at that level of competition by October 
of 1978. This procedure's areal per capita index of production is 
entitled the 11 major location quotient. 11 The major l oca ti on quotient is 
based upon a national rate of 5.69 major league players per one million. 
A final statistic is computed for each producing area entitled 
the 11 success location quotient. 11 This statistic is produced by dividing 
an area 1 s major location quotient by its total location quotient. The 
success location quotient proves to be a revealing statistic as it 
provides a comparison between an area 1 s successful production index 
versus its total production index. A success location quotient index 
of greater than 1.00 suggests that more of an area's players had 
advanced into the major leagues than was expected relative to the 
national rate. Conversely, a success location quotient index of less 
than 1.00 indicates a poorer than expected rate of successful advance-
ment. 
Annual rates of production at the state level are also determined 
in an attempt to discover any ongoing production trends during the 13 
year sample. This is done by calculating annual total location quotient 
indices. The charting of these indices over the 13 year period provides 
an indication of an area's increasing, decreasing, random, or relatively 
stable production of first-year players. 
Illustrative Techniques 
The spatial variations of baseball player production capacities 
are depicted and analyzed through the use of a selection of maps, 
tables, and graphs. The various location quotient indices previously 
described are the vital statistics in the majority of these illustra-
tions and tables. 
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CHAPTER V 
AN ANALYSIS OF THE TOTAL SAMPLE 
OF FIRST-YEAR PLAYERS 
Introduction 
The game of baseball has been labeled 11 America 1s national past-
time11 since its early existence. Whether the game continues to be held 
in that esteem is not to be debated here, but another question does 
arise from the boastful statement that essentially is the crux of this 
thesis. Is baseball's presence equally important throughout the entire 
continent?. One of the best ways to measure a sport's geographic 
variation of importance is through the use of participatory data. If 
a sport is considered to be proportionately significant throughout an 
area, one might expect to find a spatially uniform pattern of indi-
viduals participating in the sport. The next three chapters geograph~ 
ically analyze various aspects of high quality baseball participation. 
The first of these three chapters examines a 13 year sample of amateur 
baseball players who became professionals. The athletes of this 
sample are heretofore entitled Professional Baseball 1s 11 first-year 
playes. 11 
13,985 individuals became ftrst-year professional baseball players 
during the years 1965 through 1977. 12,544 of these players, or nearly 
90 percent, were residents from the United States. A foreign contingent of 
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l,441 players was comprised primarily of Canadian and Latin American 
athletes. The American players were categorized by their state, county, 
and, when applicable, metropolitan origin. The foreign players were 
analyzed only by their national origin. (Throughout this analysis a 
foreign nation 1 s production will be compared with that of the state 
level domestic production.) 
Analysis at the State Level 
A ranking of 10 producing states on the basis of total output 
exhibits California 1 s predominance (Table IV). That state produced-
nearly 22 percent of the sample 1 s total number of players, practically 
as many as the next five ranked areas combined. The strong ranking of 
the Dominican Republic in this list gives some indication of baseball 1 s 
importance in Latin America and, had the list been lengthened to include 
the eleventh ranked area, Puerto Rico 1 s inclusion would have further 
substantiated this fact. (For the complete production figures of 
every state and foreign producer see Appendix A.) 
The ranking of states by virtue of their total production figures 
is of some interest, but that type of procedure does not provide the 
means for a relative or per capita production comparison. Because 
there is an inherent correlation between the total number of baseball 
players produced and an area 1 s population figures, those areas having 
the larger populations naturally send forth more players than the 
lesser populated areas. Thus, it is necessary to employ a comparative 
statistic that takes into account an area 1 s population base. The 
statistic in this case is the location quotient. Throughout the 
remainder of this research the location quotient can be regarded as a 
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simple per capita measurement. Because this chapter examines the total 
sample of first-year players the corresponding statistic is entitled the 
"total location quotient" or 11 total L.Q. 11 (The procedure used to 
derive the location quotient is detailed in Chapter IV.) 
TABLE IV 
LEADING STATES PRODUCING PROFESSIONAL BASEBALL'S 
FIRST-YEAR PLAYERS, 1965-1977 
Percent 
Number of 
of Total 
Rank State Pl ayers (13985) 
l. California 3066 21. 9 
2. New York 762 5.5 
3. Florida 678 4.8 
4. Pennsylvania 597 4.3 
5. Dominican Republic 548 3.9 
6. Texas 545 3.9 
7. Illinois 542 3.9 
8. Ohio 501 3.6 
9. New Jersey 438 3. l 
10. Michigan 422 3.0 
Top l O Total 8099 57.9% 
All Others 5886 42. l 
Total 13985 100% 
A general pattern of baseball player per capita productivity is 
provided by a choropleth map of the total location quotient indices at 
the state level (Figure 2). This type of mapping helps to compare 
quantitatively an area's productivity relative to other areas and 
to the national production norm. Also, certain broad regionalizations 
can be made with the use of this mapping technique. (Figure 2 and 
the subsequent state figures involving data at this level of aggrega-
tion are based upon 60 areal units. Each of these 60 areas produced a 
minimum total of 13 first-year professional players, an average of 
at least one per year.) 
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California is the only domestic area which furnished players at a 
rate of more than twice the national norm. Four Latin American areas 
also are in this category. The next highest class of productivity 
includes Florida, Nevada, Arizona, and Puerto Rico. Thus, only nine 
areas from a total of 60 produced ballplayers well above the national 
average. A majority fall within the next two categories of production, 
that of surrounding the national norm or being one class below normal. 
Eight areas are included in the lowest producing category. These state 
figures provide some superficial evidence that the production of pro-
fessional baseball players is, at least partially, ubiquitous in nature. 
That is, although there may be a spatially variable production pattern 
the game seems to have some significance throughout the continent. 
Based on a regional examination additional comments can be made 
concerning the mapped data: The extreme southwestern United States is 
an area of great baseball involvement as is much of Latin America; but 
for Oklahoma and Missouri's near normal production, the vast midsection 
of the country does not approach the national productivity rate, and; 
PER CAPITA PRODUCTION OF PROFESSIONAL BASEBALL'S 
FIRST-YEAR PLAYERS 
Alt.SKA ~ HAWAII 
BAHAMAS .. NICARAGUA 
CANADA ~ PANAMA 
CANAL ZONE II! PUERTO RICO 
DOM. REPUBLIC 'i-il VENEZUELA 
VIRGIN ISLANDS 1111 
BASED ON TOTAL LOCATION QUOTIENT 
0 100 200 300 
MILES 
D <0.40 
D o.40-0.84 
k:::::::::I o.as-1.19 
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Ill 0!:2.00 
Figure 2. Per Capita Production of Professional Baseball's First-Year Players 
the coastal states, both east and west, show similar characteristics. 
This last point is deserving of further comment. Disregarding the 
California and Florida anomalies and a low yield from northermost 
New England, the coastal production is uniquely uniform. Oregon and 
Washington are near equal in production and many of the Atlantic 
coastal states are comparable as well. The indices of the Carolinas, 
Virginia, and Maryland vary by only .02, indicating an especially 
strong regional uniformity in that portion of the Southeast. 
Analysis at the County Level 
The state total location quotient indices present a general 
picture of baseball player production but analysis at the state lvel 
of aggregation leaves much to be desired. A look at the within-
state variability of production is required if a more localized 
examination is to be conducted. This within-state detail is provided 
when the data are examined at the county level. (In most cases no 
comparable political divisions were available for the foreign areas 
so only the United States is included in this procedure.) 
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A more intricate illustration is produced when the total location 
quotient is mapped by county (Figure 3). The more localized pattern 
points out that a considerable number of counties did not produce a 
single player during the sampling period. Many of these non-producing 
counties are located in the lesser-populated Great Plains and Rocky 
Mountain regions. Also, a substantial portion of western Appalachia 
(West Virginia, Kentucky, and Tennessee) was not at all productive. 
States in the Northeast tended to have a higher percentage of producing 
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Figure 3. Per Capita Production of Professional Baseball's First-Year Players by County 
counties and a somewhat more uniform pattern because of their smaller 
size and larger populations. 
The county based map indicates that California 1 s most productive 
areas are located in the southern half of the state. Nearly every 
county from San Francisco southward to the Mexican border produced at 
a rate of at least twice the national norm. Northern California shows 
no similar uniformity. In fact, some of these counties sent forth 
players at less than the national rate or produced none at all. The 
other westernmost continental states show a wide range of randomly 
scattered production rates within each state. In the South much of 
coastal Florida is producing well above the national average but most 
of the Deep South has a scattered production pattern. A majority of 
Deep South counties produced below the national rate or were non-
producers. 
Those producing counties found in the lowest category of produc-
tion are significant in that they most accurately show where there is 
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a relatively high population base and a low production rate. Although 
this type of county is scattered throughout the country, the majority 
are located in the northeastern quadrant, the greatest concentration 
being in those states near the Great Lakes. The Great Lakes region also 
has a considerable number of moderately l-0w producing counties. Hence, 
this region a~pears to be the poorest overall producer of those areas 
having a substantial population base. 
A brief summary of the leading per capita producing counties 
further pinpoints those individual places that have trained some of 
today 1 s professional ballplayers. A ranking of the top 25 counties 
based upon their per capita rates of production indicates that a vast 
majority of the best producing areas are located in the southern half 
of the United States (Table V). California has the most counties in 
this table 1 s rankings (5), no other state can claim more than two. 
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The California counties were also the highest total producers of those 
listed. The production figures of Orange, Sacramento, and Fresno 
counties are especially noteworthy. (In order for a county to be con-
sidered for ranking in Table V a minimum production requirement of four 
players was necessary. This criterion increased the probability that 
only those counties which had traditionally supported quality amateur 
baseball might be ranked.) 
While one might expect to find a producing county 1 s index to be 
similar to its respective state's index, that is not always the case. 
A few abnormally disparate county-state comparisons, especially examples 
involving Kentucky and Texas, are worthy of mention. Kentucky 1 s total 
location quotient of .52 strongly suggests that baseball is not a 
popular participatory sport within that state. The Texas index of .79 
tells much the same story to a lesser degree. However, each of these 
states can claim two of the counties listed in the top 25 producing 
counties. In fact, the two Texas counties are ranked in the top six. 
The fact is that a high degree of local participation and subsequent 
production is possible anywhere in the country. Whereas the large 
preponderance of Texas and Kentucky populations seemingly do not 
promote local amateur baseball, the communities in and around Caldwell, 
Brenham, Paintsville and Glasglow evidently have supported their 
amateur programs quite well. 
Rank 
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3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
l 0. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
19. 
20. 
21. 
22. 
23. 
24. 
25. 
been 
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TABLE V 
LEADING COUNTIES BASED ON PRODUCTION RATE 
OF FIRST-YEAR PLAYERS* 
Number 
Total of 
County , State L. Q. Pl ayers Leading City 
Burleson, Texas 8. 12 5 Caldwell 
King George, Va. 8.08 4 Dahlgren 
Lincoln, La. 5. 77 12 Ruston/Grambling 
Johnson, Ky. 5.56 6 Pai n ts vi 11 e 
Terrell, Ga~ 5.69 4 Dawson 
Washington, Texas 5.17 6 Brenham 
Asotin, Wash. 4. 71 4 Cl arks ton 
Southampton, Va. 4.37 5 Courtland 
Lamar, Miss. 4.27 4 Lumberton 
Franklin, Tenn. 4. 17 7 Winchester 
Carson City, Nev. 4. 16 4 Carson City 
Bamberg, S.C. 4.07 4 Bamberg/Denmark 
Merced, Calif. 4.04 26 Merced 
Clinton, I 11. 4.02 7 Carlyle 
Pickens, Ala. 4.00 5 Aliceville 
Newton, Mo. 3.95 8 Neosho 
Sacramento, Calif. 3.63 141 Sacramento 
Indian River, Fla. 3.61 8 Vero Beach 
Li n co 1 n, Mo . 3.60 4 Troy 
Fresno, Calif. 3.58 91 Fresno 
Pontotoc, Okla. 3.50 6 Ada 
Monroe, Ill. 3.45 4 Waterloo 
Barren, Ky. 3.40 6 Glasgow/Cave City 
Solano, Ca 1 if. 3.25 34 Fairfield 
Orange, Calif. 3.24 283 Anaheim 
*Counties needed to have produced four or more p 1 ayers to have 
considered. 
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Analysis of Metropolitan Areas 
Many of those counties ranked in Table V are comprised of small, 
rural populations so that, although these counties produced at incred-
ibly high rates, they actually did not send forth a large total number 
of players. Obviously, it was the large cities that provided most of 
the players for Organized Baseball's clubs (Table VI). The 25 largest 
total producing metropolitan areas (or SMSAs) can claim over 40 percent 
of the total domestic production. The largest single producer was Los 
Angeles which produced 1,152 players or over nine percent of the ~ 
country's total. No other SMSA came close to matching Los Angeles' 
total production. On a per capital basis the Los Angeles production 
rate is better than two and one-half times the national norm. The 
California SMSAs of Anaheim, Sacramento, and San Diego all produced at 
even greater rates, and seven of the leading nine per capital producing 
metropolitan areas are located in California. Of those urban areas 
that produced at a rate above the national norm only three - Cincinnati, 
Kansas City, and St. Louis - can be regarded as northern cities, and 
even these border on areas of southern culture. 
Some of the heavily populated urban areas of the Midwest nad 
Northeast were important total producers, yet their rates of production 
were generally found to be below the national norm. However, upon 
closer inspection it is apparent that many of these northern SMSAs are 
equaling or exceeding their respective home state's production index. 
Detroit far surpassed the Michigan per capita index and Boston, Chicago, 
and Pittsburgh produced better than did Massachusetts, Illinois, and 
Pennsylvania respectively. Also, the SMSA of New York was no burden 
on its state's total production index as their rates were identical. 
Rank 
(Based 
on Total 
L. Q.) 
l. 
2. 
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8. 
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TABLE VI 
PRIMARY FIRST-YEAR PLAYER PRODUCING 
METROPOLITAN AREAS* 
SMSA, State 
Anaheim, Calif. 
Sacramento, Calif. 
San Diego, Calif. 
Los Angeles, Calif. 
San Jose, Calif. 
Tampa-St. Pete., Fla. 
San Bernardino, Calif. 
Phoenix, Ariz. 
San Francisco, Calif. 
Miami, Fla. 
Cincinnati, Ohio 
Atlanta, Ga. 
Kansas City, Mo. 
St. Louis, Mo. 
Seattle, Wash. 
Detroit, Mich. 
Houston, Texas 
Newark, N.J. 
Boston, Mass. 
Baltimore, Md. 
Pittsburgh, Pa. 
Chicago, Ill. 
Philadelphia, Pa. 
New York, N. Y. 
Washington, D.C. 
Total 
L.Q. 
3.24 
3.23 
2.70 
2.66 
2.30 
2.26 
2.22 
2.02 
l. 84 
l.82 
l. 45 
l. 31 
l. 30 
l. 11 
1. 13 
.98 
.95 
.92 
. 90 
.85 
.84 
. 80 
.70 
.68 
.68 
Number 
of 
Pl ayers 
283 
159 
226 
1152 
151 
141 
156 
120 
352 
142 
124 
112 
l 00 
162 
100 
252 
116 
l 05 
153 
107 
126 
345 
207 
483 
120 
68 
Rank 
(Based on 
Number of 
Players) 
5 
10 
7 
l 
13 
15 
11 
18 
3 
14 
17 
21 
24 
9 
24 
6 
20 
23 
12 
22 
16 
4 
8 
2 
19 
*Includes all SMSAs producing a minimum of 100 first-year 
players during the study period. See Appendix B for full SMSA 
titles. 
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There are other large cities, a preponderance of them located in 
the Midwest and Northeast, that do not at all compare with those 
mentioned on the following page (Table VII). These 16 low-producing 
SMSAs each have populations in excess of one-half million and produced 
at rates well below their respective home state's index. Cincinnati's 
strong ranking among the highest producing cities is further impres-
sive when one realizes how weak its neighboring metropolises were in 
producing ballplayers. Columbus, Indianapolis, and Louisville all 
are approximately 100 miles from Cincinnati and none of them show any 
resemblance to the Queen City's ability to nurture first-year base-
ballers. This example further suggests the importance of local 
support, or its lack thereof, in determining a community's productive 
capability, and cautions one to be extremely careful when attempting 
to regionalize the country's baseball player production. 
Other relatively high producing metropolitan areas not previously 
mentioned must also be cited (Tabel VIII). While these urban areas 
have produced less than the largest suppliers on the basis of total 
output, each deserves recognition by virtue of its per capital rate 
of production. (But for Birmingham, every city in Table VIII had a 
1970 population of less than one-half million inhabitants.) 
An examination of the lesser producing but high ranking urban 
areas reveals once again that a preponderance of California cities 
dominate the list. Moreover, a western and southern bias is evident, 
as only three of the 24 cities - Trenton, Decatur, and Portland, 
Maine - have distinctive northern locations. Of these three anomalies, 
Portland's statistics are especially startling. Situated in a state 
which produced at less than three-quarters the national average, this 
. 
TABLE VII 
HEAVILY POPULATED, LOW FIRST-YEAR PLAYER 
PRODUCING METROPOLITAN AREAS* 
Number State's Total 
Total of Minus (-) 
L.Q. 
SMSA, State L.Q. Pl ayers SMSA's Total L.Q. 
Springfield, Mass. .76 25 .08 
Philadelphia, Pa. .70 207 . 12 
Ha rt ford, Conn. .68 28 .30 
Washington, D.C. . 68 120 .25 
Columbus, Ohio .64 36 . 12 
Cleveland, Ohio .60 76 . 16 
Syracuse, N.Y. . 59 23 .08 
Rochester, N. Y. . 59 32 .09 
Dallas, Texas . 58 56 . 21 
Grand Rapids, Mich. . 57 19 .20 
Providence, R. I. . 56 32 .06 
Honolulu, Hawaii .49 19 .06 
Louis vi 11 e, Ky. .45 23 .07 
Indianapolis, Ind. .44 30 . 1 0 
Milwaukee, Wis. . 37 32 . 2 2 
Akron, Ohio . 29 12 . 47 
*Includes all SMSAs with a population exceeding one-half 
million, a total L.Q. index of less than .80, and, an SMSA total 
L~Q. index of .05 less than respective home state's total L.Q. 
See Appendix B for full SMSA titles. 
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Rank 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
19. 
20. 
21. 
22. 
23. 
24. 
TABLE VIII 
LEADING LESS-POPULATED METROPOLITAN AREAS BASED 
ON PRODUCTION RATE OF FIRST-YEAR PLAYERS* 
SMSA, State 
Fresno, Calif. 
Bakersfield, Calif. 
Springfield, Mo. 
Vallejo, Calif. 
Portland, Maine 
Santa Barbara, Calif. 
Stockton, Calif. 
Mobile, Ala. 
Oxnard, Ca 1 if. 
Pensacola, Fla. 
West Palm Beach, Fla. 
Decatur, Ill. 
Waco, Texas 
Modes to, Ca 1 if. 
Wilmington, N.C. 
Birmingham, Ala. 
Eugene, Ore. 
Tucson, Ariz. 
Asheville, N.C. 
Tulsa, Okla. 
Orlando, Fla. 
Las Vegas, Nev. 
Trenton, N.J. 
Spokane, Wash. 
Total 
L.Q. 
3.58 
3. 11 
2.97 
2.87 
2.64 
2.52 
2.52 
2.46 
2.46 
2.27 
2.24 
2. 21 
2.09 
2.00 
1. 97 
l.85 
1. 83 
1. 80 
1. 79 
1. 70 
1. 67 
1. 66 
1. 66 
1. 53 
Total Players 
Produced 
91 
63 
28 
44 
23 
41 
45 
57 
57 
34 
48 
17 
19 
24 
13 
84 
24 
39 
16 
50 
50 
28 
31 
27 
*Includes all SMSAs producing less than 100 first-year 
players at a rate greater than 1.5 of national norm. See Appendix 
B for full SMSA titles. 
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city sent forth 23 professional players, a rate constituting more than 
two and one-half times the national norm. Again, evidence of a com-
munity's involvement overshadowing its surrounding regional tendency. 
Analysis of Foreign Producers 
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Canada and much of Latin America are two distinct foreign regions 
that supply a significant number of ballplayers to Organized Baseball's 
ranks. The Canadian supply is small relative to its population through-
out each of its provinces, whereas the Latin American region is com-
prised of nations producing players at widely varied rates. Extremely 
limited production also occurred in Japan, Australia, Taiwan, Holland, 
and South Africa. The combined total foreign production of first-year 
players equaled 1,441 players, 10.3 percent of the entire sample's 
total. 
Canada produced 212 players during the sampling period, a total 
nearly comparable with the state of Maryland. Based on per capita 
production its extremely low index of .16 was identical to Alaska's 
production rate. Canada's largest total producing province was Ontario 
(99 players); its highest per capita producer was British Columbia 
(.34). Despite these relatively low production figures, Canada's 
current involvement within Baseball's realm is notable. It was the 
third largest foreign producer and presently houses two major league 
and five minor league franchises. 
Since the 1940's when the Washington Senators signed a few light-
skinned Latins to fill their war-depleted roster, Latin America's 
importance to Organized Baseball has grown dramatically. This loosely 
defined Spanish-speaking region centered around the Caribbean Sea 
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exported 1,212 players during the sampling period, 84 percent of the 
entire foreign total. This significant supply of players has encour-
aged some scouts to regularly visit the region, or, in a few cases, to 
base themselves there in order to find the best prospects. And, 
because foreign players are not subject to the amateur-free-agent 
draft, a scout working outside of the United States can again experience 
the freedom and individuality that made his job so exciting during the 
bonus-baby years. The following excerpt describes the phenomenon of 
reborn scouting practices quite well. 
The Caribbean is the last place for scouts and their teams 
to find unknowns, to put their ken and pride on the line 
in a free-bid market, to scuffle and con, even deceive one 
another. It is a glorious anachronism and a last hurrah 
for the baseball regulars who were brought up in that 
wheeler-dealer world. 1 
The Dominican Republic, Puerto Rico, and Venezuela are the primary 
suppliers located in this region producing nearly 90 percent of the 
Latin American total. Both the Dominican Republic and Puerto Rico 
produced players at approximately twice the United States• per capita 
rate while the more heavily populated nation of Venezuela had a total 
production index of only one-third our national norm. The Dominican 
Republic is the single-most dominant foreign producer. Its cities of 
San Pedro de Macoris and Santo Domingo were found to be the most common 
Dominican player origins. Puerto Rican players came from a wide 
variety of places, Carolina and Ponce being the most prevalent. A 
majority of the Venezuelans included no precise local origin data, 
consequently no specifics regarding common Venezuelan player origins is 
possible. The Bahamas, Nicaragua, Panama, the Canal Zone, and the 
Virgin Islands act as secondary Latin suppliers. Each of these areas 
exported an average of one or more players per year. A few players 
also originated from Colombia, Aruba, Costa Rica, Cuba, Guatemala, 
and Mexico. 
Two of these Latin American countries which greatly support base-
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ball but currently export practically none of their players to Organized 
Baseball's system are Cuba and Mexico. These two nations provide 
examples of politics and nationalism interfering with the movement of 
talented athletes to a higher level of competition. 
Cuba was most responsible for supplying the Spanish-speaking major 
leaguers during the l950's and early l960's as nearly 100 native Cubans 
reached the major leagues. During much of this time Havana was affil-
iated with American's Triple A International League, a circumstance 
which naturally promoted the movement of baseball players from Cuba to 
the United States. Cuba's baseball enthusiasm has continued to the 
present but, since the revolution two decades ago led by Fidel Castro's 
communist regime, its involvement with Organized Baseball has totally 
ceased. 2 (One player was assigned a Cuban origin during the study 
period due to the lack of additional information. The player gave 
Guantanamo Bay, an American owned armed forces base on the island of 
Cuba, as his address.) 
Despite Mexico's 1970 population of over 49 million inhabitants, 
few of its native youth truly excel in the sport. Mexico's production 
of ballplayers remains unimpeded politically but other factors enter 
into the reason for so few Mexican's playing professional baseball in 
the United States. Reasons advanced by baffled scouts include poor 
diet, interest in other sports, and a general lack of societal support 
for professional sports. 3 Also, Mexico does have a professional 
baseball system of its own and nearly every Mexican youth who is 
talented enough chooses to play ball in his native country, at least 
during his earliest professional years. Thus, only one Mexican player 
was included in the sample's list of first-year professional players. 
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A different sampling of all those players on a major league club roster 
prior to the 1978 season showed that out of a total of 1,108 ball-
players, 12 had matriculated from the professional Mexican leagues. 4 
Toward an Explanation of the Total 
First-Year Player Production 
An analysis of the origins for all of the sampled players strongly 
suggests that there are two variables which help to promote the pro-
duction of baseball players. These variables are climate and community. 
And, whereas the climate variable would seem to be somewhat dependent 
upon successfully interacting with the community in order to create an 
area of high production capacity, the community variable appears able 
to act independently toward producing a great many ballplayers. 
The climate variable is quite apparent. A vast majority of the 
best producing areas are located where there is a significant amount of 
warm weather. California's dominance during the sample period most 
obviously points out the importance of a temperate climate, but there 
are other examples that also indicate the connection between climate 
and the production of talented baseball players. A few Latin American 
nations and a large number of domestic southern cities and counties 
were found to be excellent total and per capita producers of first-year 
players, further signaling the relationship. And, approaching the 
climate variable from a negative standpoint, the greatest concentration 
of low producing areas was found clustered in the Midwest, Northeast, 
and throughout Canada. 
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The fact is that the most reliable way to become a well trained 
athlete of any sport is to continually practice the necessary funda-
mentals. This simply cannot be done in areas of the country that 
annually receive snow and freezing temperatures. Thus, the comparative 
advantage shifts to those willing athletes in the seasonally warmer 
climates, where the honing of skills is more easily achieved on a year-
round basis. 
This is not to say that athletes from Michigan, Wisconsin, 
Minnesota, and other northern states cannot become talented enough to 
interest the professional baseball scouts, because they have and 
continue to. But these young men need an advantage too, and most of 
them probably realize it through plenty of hard work with the encour-
aging support of their communtties, the second, and probably most 
important, variable. 
There are many ingredients involved within the idea of a commun-
ity1 s assistance in the production of baseballers. Community support 
is a general term which can include the local society 1s attitudes 
toward baseball and the willingness of its businesses and individuals 
to financially sponsor amateur baseball. The quality of a community 1s 
playing facilities subtly reveals the degree of local societal interest 
and the amount of attention paid toward the amateur teams in the 
vicinity by the local media can be used as a measure of community 
involvement. 
It is probably safe to say that nearly every American town pro-
vides some form of Little League Baseball for its local youngsters. 
This makes the presence of Little League Baseball a virtually meaning-
less measure of local baseball involvement. The hinging factor of the 
community variable becomes the amount and quality of the programs that 
are made available to the more physically mature adolescent. Rooney 
has stated that the amount of high school sponsored baseball is a 
relatively insignificant indicator of the origins of quality baseball 
talent. Rather, it is the other forms of competitive involvement such 
as Babe Ruth and Connie Mack Leagues and American Legion sponsorship 
that help to determine an area's propensity for producing talented 
amateur ballplayers. 5 
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Another ingredient that should not be overlooked is a community's 
quality of coaching. Although professional scouts may regard acer-
tain amateur's weaknesses as repairable through stiff major league 
training, thereby signing the player as a potentially high risk 
candidate, a talented, fundamentally sound amateur athlete will attract 
more scouts and a bigger signing bonus. 6 
There is a reason to believe that the presence of other intensively 
popular local sports negatively influences a community's baseball 
player production. Rooney has determined 1~here quality high school 
football and basketball reign supreme within the country. 7 Using 
Rooney's distinctive sport regions as examples it appears that most 
of these areas are comparatively poor producers of baseball players. 
Given the relatively warm climate of football-crazed Texas, one would 
expect to find reasonably high baseball production throughout the 
state. Texas did have a few excellent producing counties but its 
overall baseball production was disappointing. To the north, much of 
Pennsylvania, West Virginia, and Ohio also have been consistently 
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strong in high school football. This same area is an ordinary to 
mediocre supplier of baseball talent. The neighboring metropolitan 
areas of Akron and Canton, Ohio are especially good examples of places 
that so highly emphasize football that their quality baseball partici-
pation consequently suffers. The same can be said of areas in 
Illinois, Indiana, and Kentucky with regard to their overemphasis of 
basketball. One region that has been shown to support both high school 
football and basketball quite well does not conform to this idea of 
under emphasizing baseball. This area is southern California, the 
greatest producer of quality amateur baseballers. So, as has been the 
case throughout this analysis, this section of the country continues to 
break a 11 the rules. 
Many of the community involvement measures previously mentioned 
are probably at least partially dependent upon the community's past 
history of baseball sponsorship. A town or city that sponsored a 
successful professional or semi-professional team during the first 
half of this century (when baseball was practically the only profession-
al sport played) is no doubt more likely to support amateur baseball at 
the present than one having little or no past baseball tradition. 
Accordingly, a community rich with baseball tradition at any level of 
competition will place a far higher value upon continuing to maintain 
baseball's existence than those towns that have never formed a friend-
ship with the sport. 
It is not totally clear whether the present existence of a pro-
fessional baseball team is a significant determinant of an area's 
producing capacity. On the surface it would appear that the presence 
of a major league franchise has some positive effect. Most of the 20 
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major league cities in this country had total location quotient indices 
that were either greater than the national norm or of their respective 
home state. (The major exceptions to this are Cleveland, Milwaukee, 
and Philadelphia.) But, it. is necessary to be cautious when analyzing 
the individual production performances of many major league cities. 
Some major league organizations have an affinity for signing a great 
number of home-town boys. A club might choose to sign many local 
players because it is an inexpensive scouting method but more likely 
the practice is performed as a public relations gesture. The home club 
is a vital cog in the community and having a few home-grown players 
within its organization only helps to promote local interest. Plus, 
if one of the local boys should happen to successfully advance to the 
major league club, the club has assured itself of increased home city 
support. 
There is less of a relationship between a professional baseball 
city at the minor league level and its local production performance. 
At the Triple A minor league level, 10 of the 26 cities provided first-
year players at comparatively mediocre rates. The 10 low producing 
minor league cities were: Albuquerque, Columbus, Des Moines, 
Indianapolis, Providence, Rochester, Syracuse, Tacoma, Toledo, and 
Springfield, Illinois. There are nearly 100 more cities that house 
lower level minor league ball clubs. This large number makes it diffi-
cult to generalize their effect upon the production of talented 
amateur players but in some cases the presence of one of these clubs 
might be a primary factor in encouraging a maintenance of quality 
amateur programs. A few selected examples of very good production in 
lower level minor league cities include: Eugene, Tulsa, Asheville, 
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Chattanooga, and Paintsville, Kentucky. 
It is also impossible to objectively determine the influence that 
Organized Baseball might have upon those training camp communities that 
act as a home for more than a month each spring to the 26 major league 
clubs. A relatively high proportion of baseball players originate 
from these cities of Florida and from Phoenix and Tucson in Arizona. 
Yet, the inherent good climate of these places has to be considered as 
a major determining factor. Also, caution is necessary when examining 
the first-year player production rates of those lesser populated 
counties and cities that house major colleges and universities. These 
figures may be inflated, not showing the community's actual emphasis of 
amateur baseball. Because there is an increasing percentage of players 
being signed off of college campuses each year, a college town's 
production may be overestimated. In most cases those players that 
were signed out of college indicated their home origin as being their 
parent 1 s home. However, there are probably instances when the player 
breaks off his ties to that prior community, subsequently claiming his 
college address as home. 
An Analysis of Production Trends 
The total first-year player sample was also examined on an annual 
basis in order to determine any ongoing geographic production tendencies. 
Each state and principal producing foreign country was classified 
into one of four possible groups depending upon its production trend 
during the 13 year sampling period. The four groups were entitled: 
ihcreasing, decreasing, stable, and random. To be categorized as 
"increasing" it was necessary for an area to show a relatively steady 
gain in its total location quotient index from the early to latter 
stages of the sample. Conversely, 11 decreasing 11 areas revealed 
noticeable declines in their total indices and 11 stable 11 areas were 
ones which basically provided a constant supply of players. Finally, 
those states classified as 11 random 11 had a deviation of more than 1.0 
between their minimum and maximum total location quotient indices 
while indicating no steady increase or decrease in production during 
the period. When each state had been classified into one of these 
four groups it was possible to examine for geographic implications and 
patterns of the spatial distribution (Figure 4). 
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The mapping of these four various trends indicates that a major 
portion of the United States experienced no substantial change in its 
production throughout the period. The dispersed distribution of stable 
producers has its heaviest concentration in many of the more densely 
populated states of the Midwest and Northeast. Illinois is an example 
of a constant primary producer (Figure 5)~ Canada was another rela-
tively stable producer (Figure 6). The Canadian graph is especially 
intriguing considering the fact that Montreal's major league franchise 
which began in 1969 seems to have stimulated no additional production 
from the country. 
Those areas that expanded their production are found in warm 
weather locations. This suggests that the aforementioned climate 
variable is becoming an increasingly important factor related to the 
production of ballplayers. Florida's annual production graph is a 
prime example of increased productivity (Figure 7). Despite its 
amenable climate, much of Latin America more than likely increased its 
production simply because Baseball's management began to recognize the 
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Figure 8. The Increasing Production Trend of Latin America 
84 
potential of Latin players and accepted more Latins into its system 
during this period (Figure 8). The leveling off of Latin American 
production in the last few years of the sample was quite likely due 
to a newly imposed federal regulation directed principally toward 
Professional Baseball 1 s clubs. The regulation was in response to the 
increasing number of foreign athletes who chose not to return to their 
home countries when their playing seasons were completed in the 
United States. In essence, the rule restricts each major league 
club from increasing its signing involvement in the Caribbean by 
assigning an immigration quota to each club, based upon that club 1 s 
previous degree of employment of foreign athletes. 8 
There were 13 states that showed signs of decreasing production. 
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Their locations are varied with the South and North near equally 
represented. Growing community disinterest in baseball is one possible 
reason for the decreasing productivity but there are no doubt other 
factors also influencing this decline. In the next chapter the degree 
of an area 1 s success in advancing its players into the major leagues 
is analyzed. Interestingly, some of the states showing a sharp decline 
in production were also poor providers of major league talent. It is 
possible that the scouting industry recognized this trend and has 
subsequently begun to sign fewer players from these states. Iowa 
presents an excellent example of a state experiencing a steady produc-
tion decrease (Figure 9). This state produced more players in the 
first two years of the sample than during the last six years combined. 
The seven areas categorized as random producers could generally 
be described as lesser-populated, lower total producing states. It 
was not possible to classify any of these states in the other three 
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Figure 10. The Random Production Trend of Arkansas 
categories because of their widely varying rates of production during 
the sample. An extreme example would be Delaware 1 s. It sent forth 
nine of its 37 first-year players in one year (1977) while failing to 
produce a single player during four years. Arkansas provides a more 
reasonable representation of a varied production pattern (Figure 10). 
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CHAPTER VI 
THE PRODUCTION OF MAJOR LEAGUERS 
Introduction 
An athlete who signs a contract with Organized Baseball in hopes 
of becoming a major leaguer faces tremendously discouraging odds. A 
vast majority of the players will never participate in even one major 
league game. Rather, they will spend their brief baseball playing 
careers in the lower paying, less glamorous minor leagues. There are 
no specific minor league time limits that a player must adhere to 
before either reaching the majors or retiring from Baseball's ranks, 
but there is some indication that a player who has not risen to a 
major league roster after a five or six year stint in the minors might 
be wise to consider another profession. And, because a contemporary 
major league club normally controls only four or five minor league 
team rosters, a player must show steady improvement during his first 
few minor league seasons or the club will unconditionally release him 
from Baseball in order to make room for a younger, more potentially 
talented player. 
Of the 13,985 first-year professionals included in this study 
only 1,257 (approximately nine percent) were found to have played in 
a major league game by October of 1978. The percentage of major 
leaguers will rise slightly when the players signed during the sample's 
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final years are given the full opportunity to advance through the minor 
league system. In the first 10 years of the study an average of 10.23 
percent of the first-year players later performed in the majors. 
Included in the major league total are some players who played sparingly 
in the majors and were soon returned to the minors, before being 
released. Consequently, if one wished to consider only those players 
who played steadily at the major league level, an estimate of seven 
percent (1 of every 14 professionals) might more accurately predict 
the chances of a player remaining in the majors for an extended period. 
Contrary to the comprehensive analysis given to the entire first-
year player sample, the sample of only those players reaching the major 
leagues is reviewed in less detail. Because the major league sample is 
considerably smaller, over 50 percent of the states and foreign 
producing nations produced less than one major league player per year. 
As a result of sample size it is more difficult to accurately examine 
the lesser populated and poorer producing areas. Therefore, a county 
level examination is not included in this chapter's analysis. 
The analysis of the major league sample is based upon the "major 
location quotient" or "major L.Q." - a per capita statistic computed 
similarly to the total location quotient. Only those first-year 
players who reached the major league level by October, 1978, are 
involved in the major location quotient, whereas every sampled first-
year player was included for the total location quotient's computation. 
The major location quotient is based upon a United States production of 
1,162 athletes who advanced into the major leagues. This computes to 
a national production rate of 5.69 major league players per one million 
people. 
Analysis at the State Level 
1 A list of the top 10 states ranked by virtue of their major loca-
tion quotient indices provides additional proof regarding the role of 
a warm climate in the production of quality ballplayers (Table IX). 
Rank 
l. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
TABLE IX 
LEADING STATES BASED ON PRODUCTION RATE 
OF MAJOR LEAGUE PLAYERS, 
1965-1978* 
Number 
Major of 
State L.Q. Pl ayers 
California 3.33 379 
Puerto Rico 2.28 36 
Arizona 2. 18 22 
Florida l. 55 60 
Oklahoma l. 51 22 
Dominican Republic l.32 32 
Washington l. 24 24 
Alabama l.07 21 
Michigan .99 50 
Texas . 97 62 
*States needed to have produced an average 
of one major league player per year to be 
considered. 
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Of these 10, only Michigan normally experiences severely frigid winters. 
The total number of Californians in the major leagues is phenomenal 
as over 30 percent of all the major league pl~yers originated from that 
state. Oklahoma's highly ranked position is noteworthy considering 
the fact that its total per capita production index of first-year 
players was just slightly above the national norm. The rapid decline 
of the major location quotient indices to less than 1.00 is also 
significant. California's exceptionally dominant production has forced 
the production figures of most other states to become comparatively 
small. 
A choropleth map based on the major location quotient indices at 
the state level displays the continental pattern of major league 
player production (Figure 11). This map further indicates that a 
majority of the states are poor producers of major league talent. 
Three states - Alaska, Vermont, and Wyoming - produced no major league 
players duirng the sampled years. The wide deviation in the range of 
foreign nation indices is created somewhat by the sample's size and the 
inherent population differences between the various foreign countries. 
Analysis of Metropolitan Areas 
An analysis of the metropolitan areas that produced the most major 
leaguers further supports the positive relationship between a continual 
warm climate and the high production of ballplayers (Table X). All of 
the SMSAs which produced at the rate of at least twice the national 
norm are located in areas far removed from cold winter weather. 
California's dominance in productivity is well substantiated by the 
fact that it can claim seven of the top nine ranked metropolitan areas. 
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Rank 
(Based 
on Tota 1 
L. Q.) 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
19. 
20. 
21. 
22. 
TABLE X 
PRIMARY MAJOR LEAGUE PLAYER PRODUCING 
METROPOLITAN AREAS* 
SMSA, State 
Sacramento, Calif~ 
Los Angeles, Calif. 
Anaheim, Calif. 
San Diego, Calif. 
Birmingham, Ala. 
Phoenix, Ariz. 
San Jose, Calif. 
San Francisco, Calif. 
San Bernardino, Calif. 
Miami, Fla. 
Tampa, Fla. 
Seattle, Wash. 
Cincinnati, Ohio 
Atlanta, Ga. 
Detroit, Mi ch. 
Houston, Texas 
Pittsburgh, Pa. 
Newark, N.J. 
St. Louis, Mo. 
Chicago, Ill. 
Philadelphia, Pa. 
New York, N.Y. 
Major 
Location 
Quotient 
5.48 
4.04 
3.36 
3.36 
2.85 
2. 72 
2.64 
2.53 
2.30 
2.22 
2.07 
1.60 
1. 39 
1.39 
1.34 
1. 14 
.95 
.93 
.88 
.70 
. 51 
.49 
Number 
of 
Pl ayers 
25 
162 
26 
26 
12 
15 
16 
45 
15 
16 
12 
13 
11 
11 
32 
13 
13 
10 
12 
28 
14 
33 
94 
Rank 
(Based on 
Number of 
Pl ayers) 
8 
l 
5 
7 
7 
11 
9 
2 
12 
10 
18 
14 
20 
21 
4 
15 
16 
22 
19 
6 
l3 
3 
*Includes all SMSAs producing a minimum of 10 major league 
players during the study period. See Appendix B for full SMSA titles. 
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Also, Los Angeles far surpassed any other SMSA in the number of players 
produced. 
A list of lesser-populated but significant metropolitan producers 
of major league talent includes a few northern SMSAs (Table XI). 
Rank 
l. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
TABLE XI 
LEADING LESS-POPULATED METROPOLITAN AREAS 
BASED ON PRODUCTION RATE OF 
MAJOR LEAGUE PLAYERS* 
Major 
Location 
SMSA, State Quotient 
Pensacola, Fla. 5.04 
Decatur, Ill. 4.21 
Billings, Mont. 4.02 
Fresno, Calif. 3.82 
Tyler, Texas 3.62 
Va 11 ej o, Cal if. 3.52 
Springfield, Mo. 3.44 
Santa Rosa, Calif. 3.43 
Santa Barbara, Calif. 3.32 
Springfield, I 11. 3.26 
Racine, Wis. 3.08 
Abilene, Texas 3.08 
Lima, Ohio 3.06 
Tucson, Ariz. 3.00 
Number 
of 
Players 
7 
3 
2 
9 
2 
5 
3 
4 
5 
3 
3 
3 
2 
6 
*Includes all SMSAs of less than one-half million population 
producing major league players at a rate three times greater than the 
national norm. See Appendix B for full SMSA titles. 
Despite a greater number of southern SMSAs ranked in Table XI, the 
production performances of Decatur, Billings, Racine, Lima, and 
Springfield, Illinois should encourage aspiring northern amateur ball-
players. The small sample size makes it difficult to estimate the 
degree to which the previously described community variable has stimu-
lated quality production from these areas but it is reasonable to 
assume that its effect has been significant. 
The final table concerning the metropolitan production of major 
leaguers strongly supports the negative effects of the climate var-
iable (Table XII). This list of the heavily populated, very poor 
producers of quality talent is made up entirely of SMSAs located in 
the United States 1 northeastern quadrant. Evidently these 11 urban 
areas are not only hindered by cold winter weather but by poorly 
supportive baseball communities as well. 
Areal Success Analysis 
The remaining portions of this chapter are devoted to analyzing 
the relative successful productivity of areas. The spatial variations 
in the production of first-year players (Chapter V) and of the subse-
quent major league players have been determined (preceding portions of 
Chapter VI). It is now appropriate to compare the results from these 
two previous analyses in order to ascertain the actual efficiency or 
"success" of an area's production. In this case ''success" relates to 
an area's ability to advance its first-year players into the major 
leagues. 
A third location quotient - "the success location quotient 11 or 
11 success L.Q. 11 - is used throughout the remainder of this chapter. 
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TABLE XII 
HEAVILY POPULATED, LOW MAJOR LEAGUE PLAYER 
PRODUCING METROPOLITAN AREAS* 
Major Number 
Location of 
SMSA, State Quotient Players 
Washington, D.C. . 35 6 
Bos ton, Mass. .32 5 
Indianapolis, Ind. .32 2 
Youngstown, Ohio .32 2 
Hartford, Conn. .32 1 
Milwaukee, Wis. .25 2 
Paterson, N.J. .25 2 
A 1 bany, N. Y. .23 1 
Springfield, Mass. 0 
Louisville, Ky. 0 
Rochester, N.Y. 0 
*Includes all SMSAs with a population 
exceeding one-half million and producing 
at a rate of less than .4 of the national 
norm. See Appendix B for full SMSA titles. 
The success location quotient index is computed by dividing an area's 
major location quotient index by its total location quotient index. 
As in the cases of the two previous location quotient computations, 
an area's success index is based upon a national norm index of 1.00. 
The example below computing Oklahoma's success index illustrates the 
simplicity of this measurement. 
Oklahoma's Major L.Q. Index: l.51 
Oklahoma's Total L.Q. Index: 1.06 
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= 1.42 Success L.Q. Index ( 6. 1) 
The relatively high success index of 1.42 means that, from a near 
normal production of first-year players, Oklahoma sent forth its 
players into major league competition at a much greater rate than might 
have been expected. This suggests that Oklahoma's amateur player pool 
is far more talented than the first-year player sample reflects. 
Conversely, Connecticut's total L.Q. of .98 extremely overestimates 
its ability to produce the highest quality ballplayers as this New 
England state's success L.Q. was a mediocre .53. 
Success Analysis at the State Level 
Unlike the previous maps depicting the data at the state level, 
broad regional tendencies involving the success index are not as 
apparent (Figure 12). The most successful states are. represented by 
a southwestern contingent of Utah, Oklahoma, Arizona, and California. 
Michigan and Hawaii are the only other states th~t fall into the highest 
success category. The northeastern states appear to be the least 
successful. Delaware, Maryland, and West Virginia form a contiguous 
group of the very poorest domestic success states and New Jersey, New 
York, Connecticut, and Massachusetts all produced at rates well below 
the national norm. Generally speaking, the remaining state success 
indices are distributed in a spatially random pattern that reveals no 
manifest north-south dichtomy. Except for Puerto Rico's moderately 
high success index, the foreign countries form a bloc of moderately 
low to poor advancers of talent. (Because of the smaller range of 
success location quotient indices and more concentration about the 
norm inherent with this index's computation, the index categories of 
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Figure 12 have been altered from the previous choropleth maps in order 
to better fit the data's frequency.) 
Another way to illustrate an area's relative rate of production 
success is via the use of a diagram which graphically portrays the 
indices of total first-year player production, major league player 
production, and subsequent success indices (Figure 13). The graph's 
x-axis represents the total location quotient and the y-axis measures 
the major location quotient. A state is positioned on the graph at 
the point where its two indices meet when they are drawn perpendicular 
to their respective axes. The state's success location quotient index 
is then determined by this point's relative distance from the nearest 
dashed, diagonal line radiating from the graph's bottom left corner. 
Those states plotted above the principal diagonal (heaviest dashed 
line intersecting the x and y intersection) have success indices 
greater than the national norm and those below, less than the national 
norm. The advantage that this figure has over a map based solely upon 
the success location quotient is that all three of an area's location 
quotient indices are readily available for comparison with any other 
area's respective indices. 
Of the 60 states and foreign nations plotted in Figure 13, o~ly 
one - Utah - is found in Quadrant I. Utah produced first-year players 
below the national rate while reversing that trend to produce a higher 
than average rate of major leaguers. In fact, Utah was the most 
successful of all areas in advancing its first-year players into the 
major leagues. Quadrant II, the graph's section signifying both better 
than average first-year and major league player production, contains 11 
areas. Each of these 11 experience relatively warm weather throughout 
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the year. Five of these 11 have success indices above l.Q. And, of 
those six in Quadrant II having success indices less than the norm, 
the four least successful areas are Latin American. The most crowded 
section of the graph is Quadrant III, where 43 areas are plotted. The 
areas located in Quadrant III had poorer than average production rates 
of both first-year and major league players. Thirty-two of these 43 
areas have success indices less than the national norm. Quadrant IV 
is comprised of five geographically dissimilar states which produced 
first-year players at rates greater than the national rate but major 
leaguers at rates below the norm. As a result the states plotted in 
Quadrant IV have relatively low success rates. 
A general summarization of Figure 13 is that of those states and 
foreign areas which produced first-year players at rates above the 
norm (16 of 60), only a select few (5) were able to advance their 
players into the major leagues at greater than average rates. It is 
hypothesized that the inhabitants of these five areas - Oklahoma, 
California, Arizona, Puerto Rico, and Washington - widely support the 
existence of a great many excellent amateur baseball programs. The 
same can be said for Utah, in accordance with its distinctive success 
index. On the other hand, just as these six appear to be the choicest 
providers for Baseball 1 s system, there are a great many other states 
and involved foreign nations that display qualities of inferior pro-
duction. The graph shows that a large majority of areas (44 of 60 
produced first-year players at rates below the national norm and that 
nearly three-quarters of these (32 of 44) subsequently advanced less 
than an average share of players into the majors. 
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Success Analysis of Metropolitan Areas 
A survey of metropolitan areas based upon their respective success 
indices provides for a more localized examination. A list of the 
most successful producing SMSAs is comprised of 20 spatially dispersed 
urban areas (Table XIII). Five of these are Californian and eight more 
are located in the southern one-half of the country, a fact which 
implies an association with the climate variable. The climatic 
conditions do not totally dictate an area 1 s success performance how-
ever, as evidenced by a group of four highly successful SMSAs located 
near the Great Lakes (Columbus, Gary, Detroit, and Cleveland) and 
another in Nebraska (Omaha). 
A list of the most inferior producing SMSAs shows that 16 of the 
18 least successful urban areas are located east of the Mississippi 
River (Table XIV). Eleven of these are concentrated in the Northeast. 
The remaining seven are southern SMSAs with three of these located in 
Florida. But for the presence of Ft. Worth and Las Vegas in Table 
XIV, the western two-thirds of the United States is void of relatively 
unsuccessful metropolitan areas. 
Toward an Explanation of Areal Success 
The various state and metropolitan area success rates cannot be 
explained as simply as the total first-year player rates of production 
were accounted for in Chapter V. The climate and community support 
variables succinctly provided the necessary answers concerning the 
analysis of the first-year player origins. A close examination of the 
success indices suggests however, that a third variable was, in some 
instances, associated with an area's degree of success. This third 
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TABLE XIII 
MOST 11 SUCCESSFUL" SMSAs* 
Major League 
Success Pl ayers/ Fi rs t-
Rank SMSA, State L. Q. Year Players 
l. Pensacola, Fla. 2.22 7/34 
2. Columbus, Ohio 2.09 7/36 
3. San Antonio, Texas l. 75 7/43 
4. Sacramento, Calif. l. 70 25/159 
5. Tucson, Ariz. l.67 6/39 
6. Omaha, Neb. l. 59 5/34 
7. San Francisco-Oakland, Calif. l.56 45/352 
8. Birmingham, Ala. l. 54 12/84 
9. Gary, Ind. l.54 4/28 
10. Los Angeles, Calif. l. 52 162/1152 
11. Oklahoma City, Okla. l. 50 6/43 
12. Salt Lake City, Utah l. 47 4/29 
13. Nashville, Tenn. l. 47 4/29 
14. Seattle, Wash. l. 42 13/100 
15. Detroit, Mich. l. 37 32/252 
16. Phoenix, Ariz. l. 35 15/120 
17. Santa Barbara, Calif. l.32 5/41 
18. Tulsa, Okla. l. 29 6/50 
19. Cleveland, Ohio l. 27 9/76 
20. San Diego, Calif. l.25 26/226 
*The term "successful 11 refers to an area 1 s ability to advance its 
first-year players into the major leagues. This list includes all 
SMSAs with a success location quotient index greater than 1.24. See 
Appendix B for full SMSA titles. 
SMSA, State 
Jacksonville, Fla. 
Baltimore, Md. 
Ft. Worth, Texas 
Ft. Lauderdale, Fla. 
Youngstown, Ohio 
Hartford, Conn. 
Las Vegas, Nev. 
Boston, Mass. 
Trenton, N.J. 
Harrisburg, Pa. 
Bridgeport, Conn. 
Greensboro, N.C. 
A 1 bany, N. Y. 
Paterson, N.J. 
West Palm Beach, Fla. 
Springfield, Mass. 
Chattanooga, Tenn. 
Rochester, N.Y. 
TABLE XIV 
LEAST 11 SUCCESSFUL 11 SMSAs* 
Success 
Location 
Quotient 
.50 
.49 
.48 
.46 
.42 
.38 
.38 
.36 
.35 
. 32 
.32 
. 30 
. 29 
.27 
.22 
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. Major League 
Pl ayers/ Fi rs t-
Yea r Pl ayers 
2/42 
5/107 
2/45 
2/47 
1/25 
1/28 
1/28 
5/153 
1 /31 
1/33 
1/33 
1/34 
1/36 
2/77 
1/48 
0/25 
0/28 
0/32 
*The term 11 successful 11 refers to an area 1 s ability to advance its 
first-year players into the major leagues. This list includes all 
SMSAs with a success location quotient index less than .51. See 
Appendix B for full SMSA titles. 
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variable, involving the complex nature of Professional Baseball's 
scouting industry, is appropriately entitled the 11 scouting variable. 11 
The recognition of a third explanatory variable does not down play the 
role of the climate and community variables. On the contrary, the 
type of climate and the degree of community involvement remain 
critical in the production of quality baseballers. However, in the 
end it is the scouting industry that decides, either rightly or wrongly, 
who and how many players are selected from an area each year. Thus, 
the inclusion of the scouting variable becomes absolutely necessary in 
explaining an area's degree of productive success. 
The scouting variable has two interrelated characteristics that 
appear to be factors which affect an area's index of success. First, 
the somewhat fixed spatial distribution of the scouts inherently 
influences the first-year player signing results, consequently affecting 
an area's subsequent degree of success. Secondly, a more intangible 
aspect of the variable relates to the scouting industry's local and/or 
regional (in)accuracy in selecting the finest available amateur players. 
In essence, the scouting variable questions whether the scouting industry 
works as efficiently and signs its players in the most discriminating 
manner as possible. 
It has been assumed throughout this research that the major league 
clubs have a reasonably good idea, based upon historical experience, 
where the most and best amateur players are being produced. Accordingly, 
it is assumed that Baseball's scouts have been positioned in an effi-
cient manner conforming to the distribution of amateur players. An 
overall assessment would conlcude that these assumptions are valid. 
It appears however, in a scattering of locales, that the baseball 
establishment has not positioned its scouts nor judged the amateur 
talent as efficiently as possible. 
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Missouri and Arkansas provide excellent examples where the scouting 
industry seemingly overestimated a state's amateur talent base. 
Missouri has traditionally supplied a great share of baseball players 
into the professional ranks, a legacy no doubt sparked and sustained 
by Professional Baseball's historical presence in St. Louis. Arkansas 
has produced fewer players but it too has gained recognition for its 
supply of 11 country 11 ballplayers. Nevertheless, this research indicates 
that the contemporary ballplayers of Missouri and Arkansas are neither 
as plentiful nor as talented as Baseball's scouts perceive them to be. 
The scouting industry's perception problem in Missouri and 
Arkansas may stem from the fact that both states are over-populated 
with scouts, creating a situation where the states may have become 
11 over-scouted. 11 ·· A simple way to judge the relative degree of investi-
gative scouting that a state experiences is from the ratio of a state's 
total number of signed first-year players per number of resident 
scouts. Through the use of a directory of employed major league 
scouts for the years of 1965, 1970, and 1975, it was found that a 
national average of 22.2 first-year players were signed per scout 
during the 13 sampled years. This means that a state having a ratio 
considerably less than the 22.2 player/scout norm was too heavily 
saturated with scouts relative to its amateur talent base. In the case 
of Missouri a misapportionment of scouts is obvious. It's player/ 
scout ratio was 11.2, indicating that it housed twice as many scouts 
as the national norm deems necessary. Only one other state that 
produced over 50 first-year players during the sample, neighboring 
Arkansas, had a lower proportion of signed players to resident scouts 
(10.4). (This areal player/scout ratio is not a totally accurate 
comparative measure. The general population distribution of an area 
affects the efficiency of a scout and scouts commonly travel out of 
their resident states in search of prospective players. However, 
the fact remains that most scouts work out of their home residences 
and are normally confined to certain limited scouting regions, giving 
some credence to the measurement.) 
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It is believed that the poor success indices of Missouri and 
Arkansas are not a matter of coincidence. Rather, it is hypothesized 
that both states, because of their relatively high number of scouts, 
are receiving too much undeserved attention from the scouting industry. 
Consequently, this leads to a far greater number of Missouri and 
Arkansas players being signed to professional contracts than actually 
. deserve the honor. This reasoning is supported by their state success 
indices. Missouri's total L.Q. index of 1.01 indicates that its 
involvement with amateur baseball is comparable with the nation as a 
whole. Yet, its players have had such poor success in reaching the 
major leagues that the quality of Missouri's amateur programs and the 
judgement of the Missouri-based scouts must now be severely questioned. 
The same can be said for Arkansas. This state's total L.Q. index was 
less respectable than Missouri's and its success performance was even 
poorer. 
Similarly, the phenomenon of "under-scouting" aids in explaining 
the high success rates of a few states. Of the six states with the 
highest success indices only Oklahoma (interestingly adjacent to the 
over-scouted region of Missouri and Arkansas) had more scouts than its 
109 
talent base warranted. Utah, the most successful state, averaged only 
one resident scout for a player/scout ratio of 53.0. It is possible 
that with so few scouts only Utah's best amateur players were given 
much notice by the scouting industry. It stands to reason that if 
Utah's marginal prospects were never given the full opportunity to 
regularly perform before a scout's watchful eyes that very few of 
them would have been drafted. 
The northeastern United States' regional success performance was 
basically mediocre. Not surprisingly, the area also was over-
represented with scouts, but not as disproportionately as either 
Missouri or Arkansas. With a great number of scouts residing in the 
Northeast and five major league clubs located between Boston and 
Baltimore there is a natural tendency to overestimate the talent from 
this area. This is borne out more locally by the low success indices 
of many northeastern SMSAs. 
The poor success of three SMSAs in Florida was not anticipated. 
It might be explained by the cities' immediate access to Professional 
Baseball's present-day training grounds. While Florida had a near 
normal. player/scout ratio (21.2), it must be remembered that a majority 
of the professional clubs base their annual spring conditioning camps, 
winter instructional sessions, and season-long rookie leagues in this 
state. With so much attention paid to the state by Professional Base-
ball, its clubs could be inclined to sign marginal Florida prospects 
simply because of geographic convenience. An equally marginal amateur 
prospect who played baseball in an area not frequented as often by 
scouts would more likely go unnoticed. 
The high success rates of Columbus, Gary, Detroit, and Cleveland 
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are puzzling. The respective home states in question have near normal 
player/scout ratios and five major league franchises (counting the two 
in Chicago) to ensure local scouting coverage. Nevertheless, the 
scouts conspicuously underestimated the talent being produced in these 
four midwestern SMSAs. The demographics of the four urban areas suggest 
that there may be a racial explanation. It is known that there is a 
declining number of black baseball players entering Professional 
Baseball. 1 However, the black athlete 1 s growing supremacy in other 
American sports might also exist in Baseball, perhaps in a more subtle 
manner. Rather than dominating the rosters as black athletes do in so 
many domestic team sports, blacks may display their baseball playing 
superiority by advancing into the major leagues at a greater rate than 
whites. This is pure speculation and, because of the absence of racial 
information in this study 1 s data, no racially related explanation is 
currently verifiable, but it is a theory deserving of further research. 
The Lack of Foreign Success 
Of the sample 1 s 1 ,441 first-year foreign players, 94 gained major 
league status for a successful percentage of 6.52. (Nine were Canadian 
ballplayers and the remaining 3'5 were Latin American.) This foreign 
success percentage is significantly lower than the domestic success 
ratio of 9.26. The disparity of these figures suggests that it is not 
appropriate to compare the general advancement success of foreign 
players with that of domestic players. Consider the production figures 
of Latin America. This area produced a significant amount of first-year 
players but a comparatively small proportion of major leaguers. The 
area 1 s relatively low success indices could be hastily regarded as a 
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warning to the major league clubs not to spend their time or money on 
Latin prospects. A closer inspection and a better understanding of the 
details involved with foreign professional signings show that such a 
warning is, in some respects, misleading. In fact, despite the 
foreigner's higher than average risk of failure, there are some clubs 
which evidently believe that the scouting and signing of Latins is a 
highly profitable investment. (See Individual Club Strategies -
Chapter VI I.) 
There are many factors which cause the overall Latin success 
performances to be less impressive than most domestic areas. One 
reason for the low foreign indices, and truthfully for their present 
underestimation, is caused by an inherent characteristic of the sampled 
data. The signing of Latin players, especially those from the major 
Latin producer - the Dominican Republic - became increasingly more 
common during the latter stages of the sampling period. Hence, the 
foreign success indices should improve slightly when all of these more 
recently signed athletes are given the full opportunity to progress 
through the minor league system. Disregarding this methodological 
bias, a Latin prospect truly faces a more formidable task of proving 
himself worthy of major league roster status than do domestic players. 
Not only must the Latin player convince American management that he is 
as good or better than his American counterpart, but the Latin player 
must attempt to do so while adjusting to a culture much different from 
his own. Homesickness is a problem that many young Caribbean prospects 
never overcome and, there is also the problem of a different language. 
In this context the general rule of thumb is that those Latin ball-
players who fail to learn English will fall short of reaching the major 
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leagues. 2 Defined in baseball terminology this means that a Latin's 
ability to speak and. understand the English language may be as important 
as his being able to hit the hard-breaking slider or to throw a curve 
consistently for strikes. 
The American stereotype of the Latin ballplayer's personality has 
also inhibited his widespread acceptance and success within Organized 
Baseball. Latins have gained a reputation among Baseball's management 
of being generally moody, explosive, and uncoachable. While this 
temperament might accurately describe some Latins it probably can be 
applied to an equal proportion of American ballplayers as well. Still, 
this oversimplified caricature of the Latin ballplayer is of no benefit 
to any individual Latino during his quest for recognition by the sign-
ing scouts and his later advancement through the minor league system. 
The management of clubs that have signed a significant number of 
Latins confess that they do so with the expectation of very few ever 
reaching the majors. Yet, despite this anticipated failure, clubs justi-
fy their concentrated foreign scouting involvement in simple economics. 
Rather than offering bonuses of upwards to $100,000 for highly sought 
after American drafted players, the free market of the Caribbean pro-
vides a wealthy supply of prospects willing to sign free-agent con-
tracts for bonuses as small as $1,000 and, in no case has a Latin 
player received more than $20,000 as a signing bonus. Thus, monetary 
constraints might compel many clubs to sign a high proportion of Latin 
athletes. While financial and ethnic discrimination is obvious, 
Baseball's management candidly defends its practices on the basis that 
the Latin player is acknowledged to be a far riskier investment than 
a domestic product. 3 
FOOTNOTES 
1c. C. Johnson Spink, 11 Black Supply Turns From Torrent to Trickle, 11 
The Sporting News (February 19, 1977), p. 39. 
2Frank Deford, 11 Liege Lord of Latin Hopes,i1 Sports Illustrated 
(December 24, 1973), p. 65. 
3Ibid. 
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CHAPTER VII 
A BASEBALL FAN'S IMPRESSIONS OF THE DATA 
Introduction 
The two preceding chapters have examined the subject of quality 
baseball participation from a traditional economic-geographic viewpoint. 
The attempt to answer the questions of where, why, and to what degree 
quality baseball participation exists has been of the utmost importance, 
but those answers alone do not reveal how Professional Baseball's in-
dividual clubs have reacted to the spatial participatory pattern. It is 
also necessary to examine the data in a manner more harmonious with the 
average baseball fan's point of view. This final analysis chapter is 
included in anticipation of the question: "How _does my favorite major 
league team fit into this scheme? 11 
An Overview of the Signing Statistics 
There was a noticeable decline in the number of players that 
entered Baseball's ranks during the sampling period (Table XV). This is 
particularly borne out by the table's annual figures listed beneath the 
heading "first-year players signed per club. 11 This statistic became 
necessary for proper comparison because six expansion franchises were 
added to the major leagues between 1965 and 1977. The most first-year 
players per club were signed in 1967 (59.2 players per club) and the 
least in 1975 (35.8 players per club). 
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TABLE XV 
ANNUAL FIRST-YEAR PLAYER SIGNING STATISTICS 
Number of First-Year Players Signed Number of 11 Successes 11 
First-Year 
Number Percent of Players Percent 
of Drafted Free- Total Drafted Signed Drafted Free-Agent Total Total 
Year Clubs Signees Agents Signed Signees Per Club Successes Successes Successes Successes 
1965 20 * * 1102 * 55. l * * 124 11. 25 
1966 20 503 628 1131 44.5 56.6 77 33 110 9.73 
1967 20 674 509 1183 57.0 59.2 96 20 116 9. 81 
1968 22** 642 455 1097 58.5 49.9 l 01 14 115 l 0. 48 
1969 24 728 600 1328 54.8 55.3 95 33 128 9.64 
1970 24 694 557 1251 55.5 52. l 102 32 134 l 0. 71 
1971 24 595 471 1066 55.8 44.4 91 24 115 lo. 79 
1972 24 586 484 l 070 54.8 44.6 79 27 l 06 9. 91 
1973 24 542 395 937 57.8 39.0 76 19 95 l 0. 14 
1974 24 521 434 955 54.6 39.8 75 20 95 9.95 
1975 24 501 357 858 58.4 35.8 59 10 69 8.04 
1976 24 587 375 962 61.0 40. l 34 5 39 4.05 
1977 26 631 414 1045 60.4 40.2 10 l 11 l. 05 
Total 300 7204 5679 13985 55.9 46.6 895 238 1257 8.99 
*Data not given. 
**Four expansion clubs began signing first-year players during the middle of the 1968 signing period. 
Their totals were estimated to constitute two club 1 s signings. 
__, 
__, 
(J1 
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The table differentiates between those players who turned profes~ 
sional after being chosen in the amateur free-agent draft or signed as 
free-agents. Despite a general decline in the annual number of drafted 
players, a relatively constant proportion of first-year players con-
tinued to be selected by way of the draft process throughout the period. 
The remainder of those athletes ~1ho became first-year players did so by 
signing as amateur free-agents after they had been overlooked by or, in 
the case of foreign players, exempt from the amateur free-agent draft 
process. As there was an increase in the number of Latin American 
players during the study period, the signing of American free-agents be-
came a less customary occurrence in the 1970's. 
The decreasing number of "successes" (those advancing into the 
majar leagues by October of 1978) in the final years was caused by the 
lack of time given those more recently signed players to move into the 
major leagues. Overall, the percentage of successes from each individ-
ual signing year was relatively stable. The year 1965 appears to have 
been the best signing period when 11.25 percent of that year's crop 
later competed in the major leagues. The group of players signed in 
1969 may have been the least proficient as only 9.64 percent of those 
players had gained a successful status ten years later. 
Annual Observations 
In addition to the sample's first year being the single-most suc-
cessful signing year, 1965 was also the initial year for Baseball's 
amateur free-agent draft. The first player chosen by way of the draft 
process was Rick ~onday who was signed by the Kansas City Jl.thletics. 
The A's also acquired Rollie Fingers, Sal Banda, and Gene Tenace from 
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the amateur ranks that year and were soon on their way to becoming the 
American League's dominant team by the early 1970 1 s. Other particularly 
illustrious professional careers were initiated in 1965 by Ken Holtzman 
{Cubs, later dealt to the Athletics in a trade for Monday in 1971), 
Nolan Ryan and Amos Otis (Mets), John Bench (Reds), Larry Bawa (Phil-
lies), and Graig Nettles (Twins). 
The 1966 class of first-year players was one of the poorest yield-
ing ones. One hundred ten players reached the major leagues from this 
year's class with an extraordinarily high proportion of the successes 
being former free-agents (30.0 percent). Although very few of the 1966 
selections later gained 11 .l\ll-Star 11 status, three of this year's athletes 
were to become major contributors to Baseball 1 s livelihood in the coming 
years. Andy Messersmith signed with California in 1966 and, while his 
pitching accomplishments during the next decade were significant, base-
ball historians will forever remember Messersmith as the player who suc-
cessfully defied Baseball 1 s reserve system. Messersmith 1 s challenge of 
the reserve clause in 1975 helped to change a player-club contractual 
system that had been in effect within Organized Baseball since the late 
1800 1 s. The after'effects of Messersmith 1 s defiance were increased con-
tractual freedom for Baseball's veteran players and significantly higher 
player salaries. One athlete who took full advantage of these increased 
player benefits was Reggie Jackson, another prospect who turned profes-
sional in 1966. Jackson's turbulent career with Oakland, Baltimore, and 
the New York Yankees would become legendary due to his exploits both on 
and off of the playing diamond. And, Baseball gained a future Hall of 
Fame candidate in 1966 when the New York Mets were able to sign Tom 
Seaver to a professional contract only after an unusual turn of events. 
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Rather than sign with the Dodgers who had drafted him in 1965, Seaver 
chose to finish his college career at the University of Southern Cali-
fornia before turning professional. Then in 1966, after Atlanta was 
found to have violated the rules by signing him before his collegiate 
season had officially ended, Seaver finally became a Met. Seaver soon 
developed into one of Baseball 1s premier pitchers and was the vital cog 
in the Mets' drive to the world championship in 1969. 
The year 1967 saw the most first-year players selected per club. 
The year had its share of talented athletes, many of whom would be 
traded by their original signing club before their achievements would 
become nationally known. Four of this year's players, after being 
traded, were instrumental in leading their teams to the American Lea-
gue's Championship Series of 1979. Ken Singleton (Mets) and Rick 
Dempsey (Twins) found their way to Baltimore by the late 1970 1s while 
Don Baylor and Bobby Grich, who had both initially dgned with the 
Orioles, became California Angel products in 1977. Also in 1967 Carlton 
Fisk signed with Boston, Ted Simmons with St. Louis, Jon Matlack with 
the Mets, Dave Concepcion with Cincinnati, Cesar Cedeno with Houston, 
and Vida Blue with the Athletics. Cleveland may have found the 11 sle-
eper11 of this year's prospects when they signed Jim Kern as a free-
agent after he had been ignored by the drafting process. 
Four new major league clubs - Montreal, San Diego, Seattle (later 
Milwaukee), and the Kansas City Royals - began selecting players in the 
summer of 1968 and would begin to compete on the field in 1969. Tne 
1968 signing year might best be entitled 11 The Dodger's Year. 11 Dave 
Lopes, Steve Garvey, Ron Cey, Bill Buckner, Joe Ferguson, Bobby Valen-
tine, and Doyle Alexander all signed into the Los Angeles system during 
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1968. In all, the Dodgers had 12 future successes come from its class 
of 55 first-year players. It was one of the most efficient single year 
yields by an individual club and was probably the most talented group of 
amateur athletes joining a ballclub 1 s organization during one signing 
year of the sample. Talent was not totally confined to the Dodger camp 
however, as Gary Matthews and George Foster signed with San Francisco, 
Cecil Cooper and Bill Lee with Boston and Greg Luzinski with Philadel-
phia. The year 1968 was also the year \I/hen the late Thurman Munson 
turned professional with the New York Yankees. 
With the four new expansion franchises signing a great many ath-
letes throughout 1969 in order to build reputable minor league systems, 
this year saw the most first-year players (l,328) entering into Base-
ball 1 s ranks. In general the National League clubs seemed to have had 
more success from this year 1 s selections with the signing performances 
of Cincinnati and Pittsburgh especially noteworthy. The Reds signed 
Rawley Eastwick, Ken Griffey, Ross Grimsley, and Don Gullett in June of 
1969 and added Joaquin Andujar from the Dominican Republic and Dan 
Driessen to their farm system later in the year. Pittsburgh countered 
by signing t\-10 Latin players, Rennie Stennett from the Canal Zone and 
Omar Moreno from Panama, and the Pirates also acquired Kent Tekulve as a 
free-agent after he was passed over by the draft. Mickey Rivers signed 
his first professional contract with Atlanta in 1969 but was quickly 
dealt to California later that same year. Other first-year players from 
this year who later became prominent major leaguers included James Rodney 
Richard (Astros), Bob Boone (Phillies), Ken Reitz and Al Hrabosky (Cardi-
nals, Buddy Bell (Indians), Al Cowens (Royals), Bert Blyleven (Twins), 
and Jeff Burroughs (Senators). 
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The 1970 signing period has advanced the most players into the 
major leagues (134) and it marked the last year when athletes were signed 
into Baseball's ranks at an average rate of over 50 players per club. 
Two clubs in particular, Pittsburgh and Kansas City, helped to maintain 
this average as they signed 106 and 102 first-year players into their 
respective systems. These were the two largest annual signing classes 
for an individual club in any year of the sample. Both clubs found one 
outstanding player in their wholesale signing campaigns as the Pirates 
signed Dave Parker, and the Royals, Frank White. It could be argued 
that the White Sox found more talent from a much smaller pool of pros-
pects. The Chicago club had an especially efficient year as eight of 
its 33 first-year prospects late-advanced into major league competition. 
Terry Forster, Rick Gossage and Bucky Dent became the most successful 
from this White Sox contingent. Other 1970 first-year players who later 
became significant major league performers were Bill Campbell, signed as 
a free-agent by Minnesota, Bill ~·1adlock and Rick Haits (Senators), Doug 
DeCinces (Orioles), Rick Burleson (Red Sox), Chris Chambliss (Indians), 
Sixta Lezcano and Darrell Porter (Brewers), and Dave Kingman and Chris 
Spier (Giants). The year 1970 was also the year when Houston signed 
Clatk Gillies, a prospect from Moose Jaw, Saskatchewan. Gillies soon 
gave up on his baseball career and instead became a starting member of 
the National Hockey League's New York Islanders. 
The 1971 signing year was a relatively good one. The second high-
est proportion of major league players advanced from this year's pool of 
first-year prospects (10.79 percent) with a few of the successes develop-
ing into Baseball's best performers later in the decade. The clubs had 
now begun to sign fewer first-year players than ever before and most 
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clubs would continue to sign still fewer athletes throughout the re-
mainder of the study period. The especially talented group of athletes 
who began their professional careers in 1971 included Jim Rice (Red Sox), 
Frank Tanana (Angels), George Brett (Royals), Ron Guidry (Yankees), Burt 
Hooton (Cubs), Steve Rogers (Expos), Mike Schmidt (Phillies), and Keith 
Hernandez (Cardinals). Probably the most unexpected success of 1971 was 
captured by the Chicago Cubs when they signed Bruce Sutter as a free-
agent. 
The group of first-year players signed in 1972 can only be classi-
fied as average. From this signing year forward to the 1977 class it 
becomes increasingly more difficult to judge the significance of the 
signing periods and an individual ballplayer's talent. As the saying 
goes, 11 only time will tell. 11 A talented youth movement was ensured 
within the Montreal system when the Expos signed Gary Carter, Larry 
Parrish, and Ellis Valentine in 1972. The San Francisco pitching corps 
was greatly aided by the signing of John Montefusco, Bob Knepper, and 
Ed Halicki this same year. Willie Randolph and John Candelaria, both 
of Brooklyn, became members of Pittsburgh's organization while Rick 
Manning and Dennis Eckersley both signed with Cleveland. Scott McGregor 
and Tippy Martinez signed with the Yankees in 1972 but both pitchers be-
came better known after they were dealt to Baltimore in 1976. Other 
significant players signed in 1972 included Claudell Washington and Chet 
Lemon (A's), Dennis Leonard (Royals), Randy Jones (Padres), and the late 
Lyman Bostock (Twins). 
This sample's most immediate and celebrated ascent from amateur 
status to major league competition occurred in 1973 when the Texas 
Rangers signed 18 year old David Clyde to a professional contract and 
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immediately thrust him into major league competition as a starting 
pitcher. Clyde became an immediate gate attraction and money-maker for 
the destitute Ranger organization as curious spectators were drawn to 
see the youth pitch. Clyde, however, gained little from his exploi-
tation but for the notoriety, a sore arm, and a losing pitcher's repu-
tation. After spending a year and a half as a Ranger, Clyde wa·s sent to 
the minors in 1975 and subsequently traded to Cleveland. He has since 
seen only limited action as a major leaguer. Other more impressive pro-
fessional careers began in 1973 which were handled in a more orthodox 
fasion. National League fans were to later enjoy the talents of Warren 
Cromartie (Expos), Lee Mazzilli (Mets), Dave Winfield (Padres), and Jack 
Clark (Giants) while Mike Flanagan and Eddie Murray (Orioles), Fred Lynn 
and Butch Hobson (Red Sox), Robin Yount (Brewers), and Ron LeFlore 
(Tigers) became some of the more talented American League players. 
LeFlore's career is particularly unique as he was si~ned as a free-agent 
after a Tiger scout spotted him playing baseball in a Michigan prison 
reformatory. 
The 1974 signing year included a player signed by California who's 
career might best be described as "v1hat might have been . • . 11 t1i ke 
Miley, a shortstop and quarterback for Louisiana State University's base-
ball and football squads, was a top draft choice of the Angels in 1974. 
The Angels, in need of a steady performing shortstop, considered ~iley 
to be an outstanding 11 can 1 t miss" prospect but a 1977 auto accident 
abruptly ended Miley's life just as he appeared to be on the verge of 
becoming their regular shortstop. Miley's tragic death helped to create 
a situation where the Angels' management would spend the remainder of 
the decade futiley searching for a suitable replacement. Other clubs 
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were more fortunate with their 1974 first-year signings. Dennis Marti-
nez and Rich Dauer (Orioles), Willie Wilson (Royals), Roy Smalley 
(Rangers), Bob Stanley (Red Sox), Butch 1-Jynegar (Twins), and Mark 
Fidrych (Tigers) would later excel in the American League and Garry 
Templeton (Cardinals), Mike Lacoss (Reds), and Rick Sutcliffe (Dodgers) 
would gain fame as National League performes. The single-most effi-
cient signing year for one club also occurred in 1974 when Milwaukee 
sent eight of its 22 first-year players into the major leagues. None of 
the eight players, advancing from one of thesmallest first-year signing 
classes of any individual club, have yet to become well-publicized stars 
but the occasion is significant for its marks the infancy of a successful 
rebuilding campaign within the Brewer organization. 
The year 1975 was an all-time low for first-year players (858). 
This was also the year when there began a noticeable decline in the num-
ber of subsequent successes. The decline is directly attributable to 
the lack of time given these more recently signed players to advance en-
tirely through the minor league system. Those 1975 first-year players 
who did advance rapidly through the minors and have shown signs of star-
dom at the major league level include Carney Lansford and Willie Mays 
Aikens (Angels), Lou Whitaker, Jason Thompson, and Dave Rozema (Tigers), 
Bump Wills (Rangers), Rich Gale (Royals), Andre Dawson (Expos), Gene 
Richards (Padres) and Don Robinson (Pirates). 
The first-year player signings of 1976 already have yielded a few 
proven major league performers. Detroit continued its prosperous youth 
movement by signing Steve Kemp, Alan Trammel, and Jack ~1orris and 
rapidly entered them into major league competition while Lary Sorensen 
became one of the better pitchers in the American League in less than 
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three years of professional experience with Milwaukee. And, Kenny Land-
reaux, signed by California in 1976 and later dealt to Minnesota has 
also showed signs of brilliance during his brief major league career. 
Two new American League franchises, Toronto and Seattle, began 
selecting first-year players as well as competing on the field in 1977. 
The existence of these expansion teams helped to raise the number of 
first-year players to its highest total since 1972. Two of this year's 
players rapidly advanced into the major leagues and each played a signi-
ficant role in improving his club's competitiveness. Paul ~olitor be-
came ~ilwaukee's regular second baseman in 1978 and quickly achieved a 
reputation as being one of the best major league rookies of that year 
despite having less than one year of previous professional experience. 
Bob Welch of Los Angeles was another celebrated rookie from the 1977 
signing class. Welch gained a great deal of notoriety when his 1978 
pitching achievements helped the Dodgers capture the National League 
pennant. 
Two Intriguing Conclusions 
There seem to be two inconspicuous trends hidden within the annual 
first-year player data that are deserving of further mention. Although 
it is much too soon to be entirely certain, it appears as if the Ameri-
can League has narrowed the competitive gap and, in fact, may be in the 
process of overtaking the National League in both the quality and quan-
tity of successful first-year player signings. For most of the past 
two decades a strong case could have been made supporting the National 
League's overall superiority. In general, the National League was more 
receptive to signing black and Latin ballplayers and its rosters were 
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commonly more youthfully oriented than those in the American League. 
Now, in 1980, the pendulum is swinging back in the junior circuit's favor. 
Less apparent racial differences currently exist between the two leagues 
(however, National League clubs continue to sign more Latins) and the 
recent successful advancement of young talent by American League clubs, 
especially by Baltimore, Detroit, Minnesota, and Milwaukee, has injected 
a youthful enthusiasm into American League competition. 
This is not meant to infer that the National League rosters are 
void of young talent. On the contrary, the National League has a reason-
able amount of youthful prospects and two of its clubs, ~ontreal and 
Houston, have recently become pennant contenders primarily through the 
use of young ballplayers, but the overall dominance of the National Lea-
gue seems to have been eroded. With many of the younger premier players 
currently performing in the American League (i.e., George Brett, Fred 
Lynn, Jim Rice, and Ron Guidry), superiority by the junior circuit may 
be on the horizon. 
The second hidden trend involves those domestic players who entered 
Professional Baseball from the status of amateur free-agents. These 
players were free to negotiate with any interested club after all of the 
organizations, on advice from the scouting establishment, chose not to 
select them during the drafting process. All of the clubs do sign some 
free-agents each year, simply to fill their minor league systems. The 
intriguing fact is that this sample's tiny minority of successful former 
amateur free-agents i;1cludes sane of Baseba 11 's most outstanding contem-
porary relief pitchers. The talents of Jim Kern, Kent Tekulve, Bill 
Campbell, and Bruce Sutter were totally ignored during the draft but 
these four men subsequently developed into tremendously skillful 
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relievers. The careers of these four men suggest that amateur pitchers 
best equipped to become relievers in the professional gaMe May possess 
qualities that are not easily detected by the scouting industry. More-
over, some of the best relievers often become effective only after they 
have developed their necessarily unique skills during a lengthy stint in 
the minor leagues and/or perfected a consistent "trick pitch." These 
four relievers are evidence of this. Kern and Tekulve each spent more 
than six years in the minors before becoming permanent major league 
bullpen fixtures while Campbell and Sutter advanced more quikcly with 
the aid of especially effective sinker ball pitches. One should not as-
sume, however, that relief pitchers are the only individuals underesti-
mated by the scouting establishments. Non-pitchers such as Toby Harrah 
and Andre Thornton (1967, Phillies), Enos Cabell (1968, Orioles), Dan 
Driessen (1969, Reds), Frank White (1970, Royals), Jerry Royster (1970, 
Dodgers), Larry Parrish (1972, Expos), and Claudell \.Jashington (1972, 
A's) all became regular performers in the major leagues after being 
ignored during the draft but none of these men have as yet reached the 
accomplished heights of Kern, Tekulve, Campbell or Sutter. Generally 
speaking though, the scouts do a commendable job of judging potential 
talent. Only 148 of the sample's 4,316 domestic free-agents (3.43 per-
cent) have advanced into the major leagues, far below the success rate 
of drafted players (l,019 successes from 7,207 drafted players, or 
12.42 percent). 
Individual Club Strategies 
Each major league franchise operated a little differently when it 
came to signing first-year players into their respective systems. There 
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was a significant difference in the total number of prospects invested 
in by individual clubs as well as there being a contrast in the geogra-
phic make-up of club rosters. There were clubs that signed a great many 
home state or regionally proximate prospects while other organizations 
showed little deference toward acquiring players in a comprehensible 
geographic pattern. (See Figure 14.) And, in the end, organizations 
administered their signed prospects differently according to their sys-
tems's needs and quantity and quality of talent. \!leaker clubs had a 
tendency to advance a greater proportion of their players into the major 
leagues in an "on the job training 11 approach, \vhereas the more compet-
itive teams could often afford the luxury of sending only their finest 
young players into major league competition (Figure 1-0). Table XVI and 
Appendix C provide data that compare the various club strategies. A 
brief synopsis of each club's behavior follows. 
The American League 
The Baltimore Orioles organization followed a strategy common to 
many clubs by signing a large share of local players and also concen-
trating heavily in the abundant California market. Over one-fourth of 
Baltimore's first-year players were from California and half of these 
resided in Los Angeles County. Their local signing market included 
Maryland, Virginia, Pennsylvania, \·Jest Virginia, and North Carolina. 
The Orioles signed the third largest contingent of first-year players 
within the American League and they had the higest winning percentage 
of any club during the study. With an ample supply of prospects and a 
very successful major league club this organization \'1as not forced to 
rush unproven youngsters into major league competition. 
LEADING MAJOR LEAGUE CLUB SIGNING INVOLVEMENT BY STATE* 
Ml LES 
Cards 23.1 
Royals 15. 4 
0200 "" 
*includes all clubs signing a minimum of 8.33% 
of an area's total first-year players. 1965-1977. 
* 
* 
Reds 15.4 
Twins 11.6 
Dodgers 11.9 
Royals 11.0 
Mets 10.1 
Yankees 10 1 
Twins 
Dodgers 9.0 
Reds 9.5 
Astros 9. 2 
[Michigan) Tigers 31.8= Detroit Tigers 
signed 31.8'1o of Michigan's first-year 
players, 1965-1977. 
*=States producing less lhan 25 
first-year players were not considered. 
NONE= No club signed over 8.33 % of 
area total. 
Figure 14. Leading Major League Club Signing Involvement by State 
CANADA 
Tigers 15.6 
Expos 15.1 
Pirates 14.6 
Cards 9.1 
LATIN AMERICA 
Pirates 14.0 
WEST VIRGINIA 
Pirates 16. 2 
Orioles 13.2 
Cubs 11.8 
MAINE 
A. Sox 15.6 
Yankees 15.6 
NEW HAMPSHIRE 
R. Sox 18.8 
MASSAC HU SETS 
R. Sox 19.1 
Cards 11. 2 
Pirates 10.9 
RHODE ISLAND 
R Sox 36.1 
CONNECTICUT 
A.Sox 12.0 
NEW JERSEY 
Tigers 11.0 
DELAWARE 
Phillies 18.9 
Aslros 16.2 
MARYLAND 
Orioles 21.3 
Rangers 13.1 
Pirates 11.8 
TABLE XVI 
SIGNING AND SUCCESS STATISTICS FOR MAJOR LEAGUE CLUBS 
Average 
First- Annual 
Won-Loss Year Number of Number Percent 
Rate Players First-Year of Total 
American League Clubs 1965-1979 Signed Pl ayers Successes Successes 
Baltimore Orioles .5807 660 50.8 49 7.42 
Boston· Red Sox .5325 624 40.0 55 8.81 
California Angels .4765 542 41. 7 56 . l 0. 33 
Chicago White Sox .4749 451 34.7 57 12.64 
Cleveland Indians .4642 547 42.l 44 8.04 
Detroit Tigers .5144 718 55.2 63 8.77 
Kansas City Royals . 5163 608 60.8 41 6.73 
Milwaukee Brewers . 4501 322 32.2 38 11.80 
Minnesota Twins .5226 730 56.2 54 7.40 
New York Yankees .5243 589 45.3 52 8.83 
Oakland A's .4951 476 36.6 43 9.03 
Seattle Mariners * 47 47. 0 Texas Rangers .4588 437 33.6 61 13.96 
Toronto Blue Jays * 27 27.0 
American League Total .5000 6778 44.5 6-3 9.04 
TABLE XVI (Continued) 
Average 
Fi rs t- Annual 
Won-Loss Year Number of 
Rate Pl ayers First-Year 
National League Clubs 1965- 1979 Signed Pl ayers 
Atlanta Braves . 4720 552 42.5 
Chicago Cubs .4852 514 39.5 
Cincinnati Reds .5667 622 47.9 
Houston Astros .4741 509 39.2 
Los Angeles Dodgers .5498 565 43.5 
Montreal Expos .4489 426 42.6 
New York Mets .4580 694 53. 4 
Philadelphia Phillies .4955 640 49.2 
Pittsburgh Pirates .5543 887 68.2 
St. Louis Cardinals . 5136 785 60.4 
San Diego Padres .4035 286 28.6 
San Francisco Giants .5148 727 55.9 
National League Total .5000 7207 48. 1 
Major League Total .5000 13985 46.3 
*Clubs only began play in 1977 and were not considered in this 
Number 
of 
Successes 
55 
58 
46 
46 
62 
38 
66 
53 
60 
61 
40 
59 
644 
1257 
category. 
Percent 
Total 
Successes 
9.96 
11. 24 
7.40 
9.04 
10. 97 
8.92 
9. 51 
8.23 
6. 76 
7.78 
13.98 
8. 12 
8.94 
8.99 
__, 
w 
0 
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It is not surprising that the Boston Red Sox were the most influ-
ential signing club in New England. This portion of the country is re-
nowned for its support of the Red Sox, and the club reciprocated by being 
the top signing club in Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island, New 
Hampshire, and Maine. The Red Sox also were the top signing club in 
Alabama and Mississippi and the second-most active signer in Louisiana, 
thus displaying a regional trend that is most difficult to comprehend. 
Boston signed the most Latin players of any American League Club (60) 
and they also signed Win Remmerswaal from Holland in 1975 who performed 
briefly for the Red Sox during the 1979 season. 
The California Angels are in a position where they obviously be-
lieve it is best to stay at home. Three hundred and eleven first-year 
players, nearly 60 percent of the club 1 s total, were signed from within 
California and over one-half of these home state prospects were from 
Los Angeles or Orange County. This marked the most players signed by a 
club from any state. The Angels indicated only token interest elsev,rhere. 
Although they signed very few players from Latin America (23), four of 
their Latin Prospects were from Colombia, a country which produced only 
seven prospects during the entire 13 year period. The Angels owned one 
of the poorer winning percentages during the sample and they sent the 
American League's fourth highest propoetion of first-year players into 
the major leagues. 
The Chicago White Sox signing and administrative strategies are 
good evidence that the club has not been one of Baseball's more finan-
cially stable organizations of late. The White Sox signed the third 
fewest first-year players per year in the American League and they ad-
vanced the league 1 s second highest proportion of prospects into major 
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league action, Theywere the top signing club in Indiana, the second 
leading signer in Wisconsin, and the third highest signing club in 
Illinois. The White Sox showed relatively little interest in Latin 
America as they relied most heavily upon the California supply for their 
outside source of talent, 
The Cleveland Indians were one of Baseball's more inept ball clubs 
during the study period. The Indians exhibited significantly more 
patience in advancing their prospects than many of the other poorly com-
petitive clubs but this patience might have been necessitated by the 
fact that their prospects were simply not as talented as other clubs. 
The Tribe was the leading signer of Ohio prospects with over one-third 
of these from the Cleveland SMSA. They were also the second most in-
volved club in Florida, a surprising fact considering that their spring 
training site has traditionally been in Arizona and that they currently 
have no rookie team in Florida. 
Detroit's signing strategy was one of the more intriguing. Not 
only did Detroit show a tremendously heavy involvement within its home 
state but the Tigers also displayed an unmatched affinity for signing a 
great many prospects from the Northeast in general. The Tigers were the 
top signing club in New Jersey, New York, and Canada (with most of the 
Canadian players residing in Ontario) and the second leading signer of 
Ohio and Pennsylvania talent. Nearly 60 percent of Detroit's first-year 
players were from those six areas. The Tigers were one of the very few 
clubs to sign more Anandians than Latins. They signed one player from 
the Dominican Republic and a meager 13 Latins in all. 
Despite being a late entry into the picture as a 1969 expansion 
club, the Kansas City Royals organization made a dramatic impact, The 
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Royals took the position that the most efficient way for them to become 
competitive was to sign as many first-year players as possible during 
their early existence. This method evidently was a sound one. By sign-
ing more first-year players per year than any American League club (60.8) 
Kansas City quickly became the most competitive of the four 1969 expan ... 
sion clubs, due in large part to the success of these former first-year 
players. However, after signing as many as 102 players in 1970, the 
Royals drastically reduced their first-year signings to include only 90 
prospects during the last three combined years of the sample. Thus, it 
will be interesting to see if this reduction has any effect upon Kansas 
City's future performance. From a geographic standpoint over 30 percent 
of their signings included California prospects and they were the lead-· 
ing signer of Virginia talent. 
The Milwaukee Brewers also began as an expansion club in 1969 as 
the Seattle Pilots. The Brewer management did not follow the example of 
Kansas City's wholesale signing campaign. Instead, the Brewers signed 
the fewest first-year players per year as any American League club 
(32.2), approximately one-half as many prospects as Kansas City. From 
this small group of prospects the Brewers have advanced 38 successes. 
This smaller pool of minor league players makes for a less competitive 
system and one might argue that Milwaukee paid the price for having re-
latively few players within its system during their early existence. 
The Brewers were one of Baseball's least competitive teams before they 
invested heavily in a few veteran players who were available in the re-
entry draft. These high-priced veterans, coupled with some very tal-
ented youngsters, made the BrevJers a serious pennant contender late in 
the 1970's. Despite their tendency to sign few amateur prospects, 
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Milwaukee signed the most Puerto Rican prospects of any club during the 
study period. 
The Minnesota Twins present a regional signing strategy that domi-
nates the signing of athletes from the upper Midwest. The Twins were 
the top signing club in Nebraska and Iowa, and they signed nearly 50 per-
cent of Minnesota's amateur prospects. They are also heavily dependent 
upon the California supply as one-third of their prospects are from that 
state. Despite signing the most American League prospects (730) the 
Twins were one of the three clubs to sign only three players from Latin 
America. This extremely low Latin involvement is an especially signifi-
cant departure from the club's past signing history. Before moving to 
Minnesota in 1961, this franchise has been based in Washington, D.C. and 
at that time the club was considered to be one of Baseball 1s leading 
Latin signers. More recently the Twins lost most of their best players 
through the re-entry draft but the club has shown a remarkable resi1i-
ancy to remain competitive with the aid of younger talent advancing 
from within their well-stocked farm system. 
The New York Yankees showed a noticeable amount of interest in pro-
spects from the Northwest. The Yankees were the top signing club in 
Washington and Idaho and the second most involved club in Oregon. The 
Yanks also signed more Iowa prospects than any other club, The club was 
fairly involved with local prospects as they signed the second most 
players from New Jersey and the third most from the state of New York. 
The Yankees were especially successful in the Dominican Republic as five 
of their 26 Dominican prospects became successes. New York's farm sys-
tem has not been considered to be one of Baseball's best but the club 
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fielded one of the American League's better teams built primarily from 
effective trades and professional free-agent acquisitions. 
The Oakland A's are an example of an organization that deteriorated 
to near extinction during the sample. The A's signed some exceptionally 
talented prospects during the 1960's and they reaped the benefits by be-
coming the American League's dominant club in the first half of the 
1970's. During five of the last eight signing years however, Oakland 
reduced its first-year signings to less than 30 per year. Consequently, 
when Oakland began losing its regulars to the re-entry draft and through 
trades later in the. decade there was not a sufficient talent base within 
its system to absorb the losses. As a result the A's immediately became 
one of Baseball's major embarrassments. This rapid image decline com-
bined with the club's financial oroblems further affected Oakland's abil· 
I 
ity to sign much needed amateur talent. Rather than signing with the 
A's many amateur draftees chose to wait six months in hopes of being 
selected by another club in the next draft's secondary phase. Oakland 
is the only club in recent history to operate without an in-house scout-
ing system as they depend entirely upon the Major League Scouting Bureau 
for prospect information. The A's signed over one-third of their pro-
spects from California, during the study period. 
The Texas Rangers began as an expansion club in 1961 when they were 
inserted into the Washington, D.C. market that had been vacated as a re-
sult of Washington's previous club moving to Minnesota. This second 
Washington franchise also departed the nation's capital at the close of 
the 1971 season and resettled in the Dallas-Ft. Worth area, The 
Senators-Rangers signed the second fewest first-year players per year as 
any American League club while advancing the league's second highest 
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total number of prospects into major league competition. This club has 
had financial difficulties throughout its existence and its strategy of 
signing very few prospects and then advancing a large share of them into 
the major leagues is an indication of these fiscal pressures. (This be-
havior is quite comparable to Milwaukee 1 s administrative handling of 
their prospects.) The Senators-Rangers showed their disdain for the 
non-domestic supply of prospects by signing only three foreign players. 
Because the Seattle Mariners and the Toronto Blue Jays only began 
signing first-year players in 1977 very little can be said concerning 
their strategies. Seattle signed a great deal more players than 
Toronto {Seattle - 47; Toronto - 27). The Mariners acquired most of 
their prospects from California, Florida, and ~Jashington. The Blue Jays 
were the only club to sign a majority of non-United States players when 
they signed seven Canadians and seven Dominicans, 
The National League 
One of the clubs heavily involved with signing southern prospects 
is Atlanta. The Braves signed the most first-year players from Georgia 
and Louisiana and they were one of the top three signing clubs in 
Alabama, Tennessee, and Texas. They also displayed a concentrated 
effort in Latin America. The organization showed no carryover effect 
from being located in Milwaukee prior to 1966 as the Braves signed only 
two Wisconsin prospects and their involvement in the upper Midwest in 
general was minimal. Atlanta 1 s annual signing figures indicate that the 
club is attempting to upgrade its farm system. They averaged less than 
35 first-year player signings per year from 1968 through 1975 but during 
the last two years of the sample the Braves signed 47 and 46 prospects. 
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In contrast to Chicago's American League club, the Chicago Cubs 
displayed less of a regional interest in midwestern prospects. The Cubs 
were the second leading signer of Illinois prospects but otherwise their 
involvement was scattered. They did not sign a single player from the 
Dominican Republic and overall their number of signed Latin prospects 
was well below average. The Cubs signed the league's third fewest pros-
pects per year and advanced the second highest proportion of successes. 
The Cubs, like Atlanta, significantly increased their number of signed 
prospects during the sample's final two years. 
The Cincinnati. Reds were the winningest National League team during 
the study period. The Cincinnati organization signed a higher than 
average number of prospects and, due to their highly successful major 
league club, they were not forced to advance unproven players into major 
league competition. The Reds exhibited an interest in local amateur 
players by being one of the top signing clubs in Ohio, Kentucky, and 
Indiana and they signed the most prospects from Florida, Texas, the 
Dakotas, Nebraska, Utah, and New Mexico. The Reds also displayed a tend-
ency to be one of the most progressive clubs in unestablished foreign 
markets by signing three players each from Taiwan and Australia. 
A club which improved its winning percentage during the study was 
Houston. The Astros signed the third largest contingent of Latin 
players by being heavily involved with Dominican and Venezuelan pros~ 
pects. Like nearly every club, the Astros found a large share of their 
domestic talent in California. They were also the second leading signer 
of Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona talent. Houston significantly de-
creased its average number of first-year players during the final seven 
years of the sample and yet the club increased its competitiveness. 
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Much of the club's recent improvement is attributable to a bolstered 
pitching staff. It remains to be seen whether the Astros can develop 
enough talented everyday players from within their farm system to remain 
a consistent pennant contender. 
The Los Angeles Dodgers were the top signing club in both Kansas 
and Oklahoma. The club signed most of its players from California and 
it had a greater than average success rate in Latin America. It was 
mentioned earlier in this chapter that the Dodgers may have had the most 
impressive single signing year of any club when, in 1968, they signed 
Bill Buckner, Ron Cey, Dave Lopes, and Steve Garvey among 12 future suc-
cesses. The year of 1968 was just one of many good years for the 
Dodgers in the late 1960's when a large proportion of their prospects 
became successful major leaguers. The Dodgers followed a trend of many 
clubs by decreasing their first-year signings during the 1970's. Be-
cause of the veteran ballclub's contemporary competitiveness at the 
major league level their farm system decrease had no noticeable effect 
upon the club's success, until 1979. This past season the Dodgers suf-
fered many injuries and the club quickly fell from contention when they 
had few talented replacements within their deflated system. Whether the 
Dodgers are able to remain competitive in the near future when many of 
their veterans will be facing retirement will greatly depend upon the 
success of their farm system. 
The Montreal Expos entered into major league competition in 1969 as 
an expansion club. While their competitiveness has been limited during 
the study, with the aid of a recent organizational youth movement, the 
Expos have emerged as one of the National League's most talented young 
teams. Montreal signed the second most Canadian players (32) and they 
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exhibited the most widespread involvement within Canada by signing 
players from seven different provinces. Because the Canadian supply 
showed no increase during the period it appears as if Montreal is obtain-
ing many of those Canadian ballplayers who would have signed with an 
American franchise prior to the Expos' existence. 
The New York Mets' fortunes are told quite well by their annual 
success figures. Thirty-two of the Mets' 66 successes were advanced 
from the club's 1965-1967 signing years. This was the period when the 
"Amazing Mets" were being developed within their farm system. This team 
won a world championship in 1969 but has since fallen back to a level of 
consistent mediocrity. One of their main problems has been an ineffec-
tive minor league system. The Mets did not greatly decrease their first-
year signings as so many clubs have, but the quality of their system 
must be severely questioned when it can provide only 34 major league 
players in 10 years for a team so desperately in need of talent. The 
Mets acquired approximately one-fifth of their prospects from California 
and they signed the second most first-year players of any club from New 
York, Georgia, and Puerto Rico. 
The Philadelphia Phillies were one of the very few organizations to 
maintain a relatively constant number of first-year players entering 
into their system throughout the entire 13 year period, This constant 
stock of prospects provided the Phillies with a steady supply of young 
successes who helped to improve the club's ranking from one of a peren-
nial loser to a pennant contender. The Phillies were the top signing 
club of Delaware and South Carolina prospects although they acquired 
the largest share of their players from California. The Phillies also 
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were involved in much of Latin America but as yet they have benefitted 
little from their Latin signings, 
Pittsburgh was the most prolific signer of first-year players, In 
contrast to other clubs, the signing figures of this organization are 
extraordinary. The Pirates signed 887 players to first year contracts 
or an average of over 68 prospects per year during the study period, 
During the same period the Chicago White Sox and Texas Rangers each 
entered approximately one-half as many prospects into their Pespective 
systems. Pittsburgh has not significantly decreased this signing behav-
ior in recent years. as they have maintained a hefty average of over 62 
new players per year since 1970. Because of the extreme total number of 
players signed by the Pirates, the club is a significant signing force 
anywhere baseball is played, They were the top signing club in 
Pennsylvania and West Virginia as well as signing a great share of the 
players in the Rocky Mountains and from the Northwest. However, the 
Pirates most concentrated effort was centered in the Caribbean. They 
signed 100 prospects from the Dominican Republic and a total of 170 
Latins in all. No other club approached these figures. Obviously 
Pittsburgh has operated under the premise of 11 the more, the better. 11 
While this type of massive signing ~ampaign may not be as initially 
selective as some, competition within a farm system is enhanced when a 
great many players are vying for a few positions, It could be argued 
that Pittsburgh's very competitive nature during this period was a pro-
duct of this wholesale signing strategy. 
Were it not for Pittsburgh's colossal signing figures the St, 
Louis Cardinals would have been the club to have signed the most first-
year players. They signed approximately 100 less players than did 
141 
Pittsburgh, and, like the Pirates, the Cardinals were a significant 
signing force in the Caribbean. Besides adding a large share of 
California prospects into its system, St. Louis found a great many pros-
pects within its own region. The Cards were the top signing club in 
Missouri, Illinois, Arkansas, and Tennessee and one of the most in-
volved clubs in Oklahoma, Iowa, and Alabama. Probably much of this 
regional loyality is a product of St. Louis' long history of being Base-
ball's westernmost and southernmost ~ajar league city. The Cardinals 
may have been compelled to preserve their healthy minor league system in 
deference to Branch Rickey's beliefs. As general manager of the 
Cardinals the late Mr. Rickey reconstructed the club into a pennant 
contender during the 1920's with Baseball's initial employment of a 
minor league farm system. Ironically, Mr. Rickey was also a member of 
Pittsburgh's front office durfng the 1950 1 s. His long term influence 
on these two clubs may be more significant than baseball fans realize. 
An excellent club to contrast with both Pittsburgh and St. Louis is 
San Diego. The Padres are the National League's answer to the American 
League's Milwaukee Brewers. The Padres were a 1969 expansion club who 
appear to have since invested as little money and talent into their 
minor league system as any ballclub. What large sums of money this club 
has spent has gone for veteran ballplayers acquired through the re-entry 
draft. This is an expensive strategy that sometimes helps a club save 
face at the major league level for a brief spell, but without a sub-
stantial foundation of young players in its system, clubs like the 
Padras find that a consistent pennant contender is seldom build via the 
re-entry draft. One-third of those first-year players that San Diego 
did sign resided in California. The Padres signed only three players 
from Latin America. 
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The San Francisco Giants signed the fourth most first-year players 
of any club. The Giants were the second leading signer of California 
prospects and in general they showed a greater than average western 
involvement. They were one of the leading signers in Arizona, Utah, 
Nevada, Oregon, Washington, Idaho, and Montana. The Giants also put 
forth a significant signing effort in Latin America. The Giants also 
invested in the seldom tapped amateur Oriental market by signing six 
players from Japan and one from Taiwan. San Francisco decreased their 
number of first-year signings in the latter stages of the sample but 
they maintained an average of 40 new prospects per year from 1973 
through 1977. 
A Summary of the Strategies 
A comparison between the American and National Leagues indicates 
that the National League clubs signed over 400 more total prospects. 
They did this primarily by signing a great many more amateur free-
agents than the American League. Most of these free-agents were foreign 
players, specifically Latin American players, an area where many 
National League clubs were particularly involved. In fact, the 
National League signed 70 percent of the Latin supply with seven of its 
clubs (Pittsburgh, St. Louis, Houston, San Francisco, Philadelphia. 
New York, and Atlanta) signing more Latins than Boston, the leading 
American League club in the Caribbean. 
Two general relationships were intimated during the individual 
club synopses that deserve additional review. The first one involves 
the association between a club's signing strategy and its playing 
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performance. It was found that a club 1 s degree of competitiveness 
(measured by its win-loss percentage, 1965-1979) is, in part, dependent 
upon the number of prospects the club has within its organization 
(measured by the annual average number of first-year players signed 
from 1965 through 1977). 
A scatter diagram of the relation illustrates the position of 
each club (Figure 15). Most of the clubs either fall within quadrant 
II or III. A club located in quadrant III signed a less than average 
number of first-year players and won less than 50 percent of its games. 
The San Diego Padres illustrate this behavior at its most extreme. A 
club located in quadrant II signed a greater than average share of 
prospects and won more than 50 percent of its game. The Pittsburgh 
Pirates present an example of this behavior. The New York Mets club 
was this relationship 1 s most obvious anomaly. Despite signing more 
than its share of prospects the Mets owned one of the lower won-loss 
percentages of the period. 
The second relationship concerns the proportion of players that 
an organization chooses to advance into the major leagues. It was 
found that a club which advanced a greater than average proportion of 
its former first-year players into the major leagues generally had a 
poorer competitive team at the major league level and, conversely, a 
club which advanced a small share of its prospects into the major 
leagues was normally successful as a major league competitor. 
The relation's scatter diagram again reveals the San Diego Padres 
organization to be a prime example of how not to administer a ballclub 
(Figure 16). Joining the Padres in quadrant IV are other clubs who, 
in essence, were forced out of necessity to send a greater share of 
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prospects into major league competition before these players had been 
properly trained at the minor league level. These clubs suffered 
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the consequences of losing more than half of their games. Baltimore, 
Cincinnati, and Pittsburgh are examples of more fortunate ballclubs. 
They were able to remain quite competitive throughout the period while 
advancing only their very best athletes into major league competition. 
Two clubs who were furtherest from following this trend were Cleveland 
and Los Angeles. The Indians sent a relatively small amount of their 
prospects into the majors despite having consistently mediocre seasons. 
On the other hand, the Dodgers were able to remain a contending club 
in spite of having only an average supply of prospects and sending a 
greater than normal share of them into the big leagues. 
CHAPTER VIII 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Analysis Summary 
This research has focused on a fe1~ very significant geographical 
aspects of Professional Baseball. The amateur playing origins of 
13,985 of the game's contemporary players have been analyzed in order to 
determine the total and per capita ballplayer production capacities 
of various areas. After the initial player analysis a group of 1,257 
players were separated from the total sample by virtue of their subse-
quent advancement into the major leagues - the highest competitive level 
in Professional Baseball. This smaller group of successful prospects 
was used as an indicator of an area's ability to produce the highest 
quality prospects. A comparison between the total and major league 
player samples determined the actual productive success of an area. In 
addition, the major league clubs were examined to characterize each club 
by its signing habits and the subsequent management of its signed 
prospects. 
A few general summarizing comments concerning my most significant 
findings are appropriate. Southern California was found to be the 
dominant player supply area for the professional clubs. This was the 
only extensive region in the United States that uniformly produced 
players at a rate well above the national norm. An investigation of 
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counties and metropolitan areas revealed that player production took 
place throughout the country. Outside of California high production 
appeared to be a localized phenomenon, not based on any strict regional-
ism. It was hypothesized that the degree of community support, financial 
and otherwise, was probably most responsible for an area 1 s productivity. 
Climate also appeared to be an obvious factor. Generally the northern 
·states were poorer producers than southern states. However, the climate 
variable was considered to be secondary to the community support vari-
able in terms of influencing an area's productivity. Some communities 
in the North produced well above the national norm while numerous 
southern communities were mediocre producers. The mixture of strong 
societal support with a favorable climate made Latin America an impor-
tant player producing area. The Dominican Republic and Puerto Rico were 
especially significant foreign suppliers. Latin players generally 
advanced into the major leagues at a rate below that of domestic play-
ers but this did not deter some clubs from depending relatively heavily 
upon the Latin player market. 
The spatial distribution of baseball scouts was also believed to 
have had some effect upon an area 1 s successful productivity. In areas 
where a relatively high proportion of scouts resided there was often 
an overestimation of that region's player talent. This was especially 
true in Missouri, a state that produced first-year players equal to the 
national rate but advanced a comparatively small proportion of its 
prospects into the major leagues. Also, much of the Northeast, another 
heavily scouted area, tended to be a poor advancer of major league 
performers. 
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There was a wide variety of major league club signing strategies 
but t\>/O tactics were commonly employed. Most clubs used California as 
their principal supply area and many also acquired a large proportion of 
local players. This was personified best by the Minnesota Twins. They 
signed nearly one-half of the prospects from Minnesota and surrounding 
states and a higher than average proportion of California-bred players. 
The Detroit Tigers displayed a considerable involvement with the 
Michigan amateur player market and in the Northeast in general. The 
Pittsburgh Pirates far surpassed other clubs by their dependency upon 
Latin prospects. On the whole the National League was more heavily 
involved in the Caribbean player market than were American League clubs. 
The reasons for a major league club 1 s competitive success, or lack 
thereof, were more clearly understood when it was revealed that the 
number of signed prospects was directly related to a club's competitive-
ness. Clubs that annually signed a great many prospects were those who 
remained competitive throughout the study period. Conversely, those 
clubs which continually signed a less than average number of prospects 
rarely found themselves in pennant contention. Along this line it was 
also shown that the perennially weaker clubs were more likely to advance 
a greater proportion of their prospects into the major leagues than 
those clubs regularly vying for first place. 
Future Research Considerations 
Numerous questions are often created that go unanswered or that 
are only answered superficially in pioneering research. This unprece-
dented investigation of Professional Baseball is no exceptiono Some of 
the more perplexing uncertainties produced during this study involve 
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the explanatory variables (community, climate, and scouting) proposed as 
influencing player production. In essence, these specific factors 
should only be considered as hypotheses at this juncture. While it 
seems reasonable to assume that their influence is substantial, the 
degree to which these variables affect production is not at all clear. 
An attempt should be made to control forandquantify these and other 
possible explanatory variables to scientifically determine their actual 
influence and how they might spatially vary. This could be done 
through a series of in-depth community case studies. I would especially 
like to see an intensive investigation of the status of amateur base-
ball in southern California and a comparison of these findings with 
those from a similar investigating procedure of an extremely low player 
producing area. 
A great deal more is to be learned about Baseball's scouting 
industry. This research has barely scratched the surface of this 
geographically dynamic system~ How the present spatial distribution 
of scouts has evolved and how the individual club and Major League 
Scouting Bureau staffs might be rearranged in order to become more 
efficient are tasks that the sports geographer should pursue in the 
future. Related to this approach would be a more thorough investigation 
of each club's scouting and administrative behavior. With tighter finan-
cial constraints being forced upon Professional Baseball's management 
caused by inflation and skyrocketing player salaries, clubs may wish to 
re-evaluate their strategies. If a comprehensive study of Baseball and 
its externalities is initiated in the future it would be most beneficial 
to review the subject from a geographic perspective. 
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Further research of Professional Baseball might include a survey 
of its increasing dependency upon the college player market. There are 
those who believe that college baseball will totally replace the lower 
classified minor league system during the remainder of this century. 
Any increased interaction between baseball's professionals and 
collegians might prove to be especially suitable for those interested in 
investigating the changing processes of the game's spatial organization. 
An aspect previously mentioned in this thesis as needing more study 
concerns the black baseball player. Determining the successful advance-
ment rate of black players, whether blacks currently face participatory 
discrimination at any competitive level, professional or amateur, and 
how discrimination might spatially exist could prove to be rewarding 
research. A general comparison of inter-city baseball participation 
versus suburban and/or rural involvement could be incorporated with the 
black player investigation. 
This author is not so naive to think that the 13 year sample of 
first-year players examined in this research completely discloses the 
entire story of quality baseball participation. Continued monitoring 
of first-year player signings would reveal on-going production and 
club signing trends, add to an already significant amount of informa-
tion, and create a more definitive picture regarding the success of the 
more recently sampled athletes. In conjunction with a continuation of 
sampled first-year professionals, more consideration should be given to 
the evaluation of collegiate rosters, especially now that college 
baseball's importance is on the upswing. 
A final future research proposal involves combining the player 
origin data of this research with that previously produced from similar 
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examinations of quality high school football and basketball participa-
tion. Because these three sports are generally considered to be the 
most popular national team sports it might prove fruitful to spatially 
examine the aggregation of this participato~ data. A diversification 
index similar to those used by economic geographers in their evaluation 
of employment structures of cities and states could be employed to 
determine how these three sports interact in various areas of the 
country. 
The long list of necessary future research further substantiates 
the extensiveness and importance of the sub-discipline of sports 
geography. There remains so much to be done and, at present, so few 
to do the work. It is my hope that this research might prove to be the 
spawning grounds for a great deal more geographically-related interest 
and research of baseball and other sports. 
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APPENDIX A 
PLAYER PRODUCTION FIGURES BY STATE AND 
FOREIGN COUNTRY 
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Number of 
Number of Major 
State or First-Year Total League Major Success 
Foreign Country Players L. Q. Players L.Q. L. Q. 
Alabama 241 l. 14 21 l.07 .94 
Alaska 3 . 16 
Arizona 179 l. 64 22 2. 18 l. 33 
Arkansas 73 .62 4 .37 . 60 
California 3,066 2.50 379 3.33 l. 33 
Colorado 92 .68 6 .48 . 71 
Connecticut 183 .98 9 .52 . 53 
Delaware 37 l. l 0 l .32 . 29 
D.C. 14 .30 l .23 . 77 
Florida 678 l. 62 60 l. 55 .96 
Georgia 285 l. 01 19 .73 . 72 
Hawaii 26 .55 3 .69 l. 25 
Idaho 36 .82 2 .49 .60 
Illinois 542 . 79 . 49 . 77 .97 
Indiana 173 .54 13 .44 .81 
Iowa 109 .63 9 . 56 . 89 
Kansas 109 .79 9 .70 .89 
Kentucky 104 . 52 11 . 60 l. 15 
Louisiana 183 .82 18 . 87 l. 06 
Maine 45 .74 4 . 71 .96 
Maryl and 221 .92 9 .40 . 44 
Massachusetts 304 . 87 19 .59 .68 
Michigan 422 . 77 50 .99 l. 29 
Minnesota 166 . 71 15 . 66 . 93 
Mississippi 99 .73 9 . 71 . 97 
Missouri 290 l. 01 18 .68 . 67 
Montana 30 .70 3 .76 l. 09 
Nebraska 52 . 57 6 • 71 l. 24 Nevada 49 l. 63 2 .72 .44 New Hampshire 32 .70 3 . 71 l. 01 New Jersey 438 .99 27 .66 . 67 New Mexico 39 .62 2 .35 .56 New York 762 .68 47 .45 .66 North Carolina 285 .91 20 .69 .. 76 North Dakota 14 .37 l .28 .76 Ohio 501 .76 47 . 77 l. 01 Oklahoma 167 l.06 22 l.51 l.42 Oregon 149 l.16 11 .92 .79 Pennsylvania 597 .82 44 .65 .79 Rhode Island 36 .62 3 .56 .90 South Carolina 146 . 92 14 .95 l. 03 South Dakota 16 .39 l .26 .67 
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Number of 
Number of Major 
State or Fi rs t-Year Total League Major Success 
Foreign Country Players L. Q. Pl ayers L. Q. L.Q. 
Tennesse 183 .76 12 .54 . 71 
Texas · 545 .79 62 . 97 l. 23 
Utah 53 . 81 7 l.16 l. 43 
Vermont 11 .40 
Virginia 266 . 93 22 .83 .89 
Washington 235 1. 12 24 l. 24 l. 11 
West Virginia 68 .63 3 .30 . 48 
Wisconsin 160 . 59 18 • 72 1. 22 
Wyoming 9 .44 
( U . S . To ta l s ) 12, 544 1. 00 l '162 l. 00 l. 00 
Alberta 7 .07 l . 11 1. 57 
British Columbia 44 .34 l . 07 . 21 
Manitoba 9 . 15 
Maritime Prov. 10 .08 
Ontario 99 . 21 6 . 12 . 57 Quebec 35 .09 
Saskatchewan 8 . 13 l . 18 1. 38 
(Canada Totals) 212 . 16 9 .07 .44 
Aruba 3 .83 
Australia 5 . 01 
Bahamas 30 3. 17 l l. 12 .35 
Canal Zone 17 4.93 l 3. 13 .64 
Colombia 7 * l * l. 75 Cos ta Rica l . 01 
Cuba l * Dominican Republic 548 2. 10 32 l. 32 .63 
Guatemala l * Holland l * Japan 6 * Mexico l * Nicaragua 30 .25 2 . 18 . 72 
Panama 32 .36 3 .35 . 97 
Puerto Rico 323 l. 90 36 2.28 l. 20 South Africa l * Taiwan 4 * 
State or 
Foreign Country 
Venezuela 
Virgin Islands 
(Foreign Totals) 
Total 
Number of 
First-Year 
Players 
204 
14 
l '441 
13,985 
*Less than .01. 
Total 
L. Q. 
. 32 
3.45 
* 
* 
Number of 
Major 
League 
Players 
9 
l 
95 
1,257 
Major 
L.Q. 
. 14 
2.65 
* 
* 
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Success 
L. Q. 
.44 
• 77 
. 67 
.95 
APPENDIX B 
PLAYER PRODUCTION FIGURES BY 
INDIVIDUAL SMSA 
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SMSA, State 
Abilene, Tex. 
Akron, Ohio 
Albany, Ga. 
Albany-Schenectady-Troy, 
N.Y. 
Albuquerque, N.M. 
Allentown-Bethlehem-Easton, 
Pa.-N.J. 
Altoona, Pa. 
Amari 11 o, Tex. 
Anaheim-Santa Ana-Garden 
Grove, Calif. 
Anderson, Ind. 
Ann Arbor, Mich. 
Appleton-Oshkosh, Wis. 
Asheville, N.C. 
Atlanta, Ga. 
Atlantic City, N.J. 
Augusta, Ga.-S.C. 
Austin, Tex. 
Bakersfield, Calif. 
Baltimore, Md. 
Baton Rouge, La. 
Bay Ci ty, Mi ch . 
Beaumont-Port Arthur-
Orange, Tex. 
Bi 11 i ngs, Mont. 
Biloxi-Gulfport, Miss. 
Binghampton, N.Y.-Pa. 
Birmingham, Ala. 
Bloomington-Normal, Ill. 
Boise City, Idaho 
Boston, Mass. 
Bridgeport, Conn. 
Bristol, Conn. 
Brockton, Mass. 
Brownsville-Harlingen-
San Benito, Tex. 
Bryan-College Station, Tex. 
Buffalo, N.Y. 
Canton, Ohio 
Cedar Rapids, Iowa 
Champaign-Urbana, Ill. 
Charleston, s .C. 
Charleston, W. Va. 
Number of 
First-Year Total 
Pl ayers L. Q. 
7 
12 
13 
36 
14 
31 
7 
9 
283 
1 
10 
12 
16 
112 
12 
6 
21 
63 
107 
23 
3 
13 
12 
7 
9 
84 
5 
6 
153 
33 
3 
10 
3 
1 
76 
10 
4 
1 
14 
13 
1. 00 
.29 
2.36 
. 80 
. 72 
.93 
. 84 
l. 01 
3.24 
. 12 
. 69 
.70 
1. 79 
1. 31 
·l. 11 
.38 
1. 15 
3. 11 
.85 
l. 31 
.42 
.67 
2.23 
.85 
• 48 
l.85 
.78 
. 87 
.90 
1. 37 
.74 
.85 
.35 
.28 
. 91 
. 44 
.40 
. 10 
.75 
.92 
Number of 
Major 
League 
Pl ayers 
2 
2 
1 
2 
29 
1 
2 
2 
11 
l 
4 
5 
5 
2 
1 
2 
l 
12 
1 
5 
l 
4 
1 
Major 
L. Q. 
3.08 
. 51 
l. 76 
.23 
.63 
3.59 
. 74 
l. 27 
2. 41 
1. 39 
1. 00 
2.38 
2.67 
.42 
l. 23 
.54 
4.02 
l. 30 
2.85 
1. 68 
.32 
. 43 
l. 25 
. 51 
. 47 
.56 
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Success 
L. Q. 
3.08 
l. 76 
.75 
.29 
.68 
1.11 
1. 07 
1.81 
1. 35 
l. 06 
.90 
2.07 
.86 
.49 
.94 
. 81 
1. 80 
l. 53 
1. 54 
2. 15 
.36 
. 32 
3. 57 
. 56 
1. 07 
.75 
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Number of 
Number of Major 
Fi rs t-Year Total League Major Success 
SMSA, State Players L. Q. Pl ayers L. Q. L. Q. 
Charlotte, N.C. 33 1. 31 3 1. 28 .98 
Chattanooga, Tenn.-Ga. 28 1. 49 
Chicago, I 11. 345 . 80 28 .70 .88 
Cincinnati, Ohio-Ky.-Ind. 124 1. 45 11 1. 39 .96 
Cleveland, Ohio 76 .60 9 .76 1. 27 
Colorado Springs, Colo. 10 . 69 2 1. 48 2. 14 
Columbia, Mo. 3 .60 
Columbus, Ga.-Ala. 20 1. 36 
Columbus, Ohio 36 .64 7 1. 34 2.09 
Corpus Christi, Tex. 16 . 91 
Dallas, Tex. 56 . 58 6 . 67 1. 16 
Danbury, Conn. 2 . 41 
Davenport-Rock Island-
Moline, Iowa- I 11. 13 . 58 
Dayton, Ohio 45 .86 3 .62 .72 
Decatur, I 11. 17 2. 21 3 4. 21 1. 90 
Denver, Colo. 61 . 81 3 . 42 .52 
Des Moines, Iowa 10 . 57 
Detroit, Mich. 252 .98 32 l. 34 1. 37 
Dubuque, Iowa 5 .90 
Duluth-Superior, Minn.-
Wis. 11 . 67 
Durham, N.C. 5 . 43 
El Paso, Tex. 14 . 63 2 . 97 1. 54 
Erie, Pa. 16 .99 
Eugene, Oreg. 24 1. 83 
Evansville, Ind .-Ky. 19 l. 33 
Fall River, Mass.-R.I. 13 1. 41 2 2.34 1. 66 
Fargo-Moorhead, N. Oak.-
Minn. 3 . 40 
Fayetteville, N.C. 7 .54 
Fitchburg-Leominister, Mass. 1 . 17 
Flint, Mich. 19 .·. 62 
Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood, 
3 1. 05 1. 69 
Fla. 47 1. 23 2 . 57 : .46 Fort Smith, Ark.-Okla. 4 .40 1 1. 09 2.73 Fort Wayne, Ind. 9 .52 1 . 62 1. 19 Fort Worth, Tex. 45 .96 2 .46 .48 Fresno, Calif. 91 3.58 9 3.82 1. 07 Gadsden, Ala. 9 1. 54 
Gainesville, Fla. 4 .62 
Galveston-Texas City, Tex. 9 . 86 2 2.06 2.40 
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Number of 
Number of Major 
First-Year Total League Major Success 
SMSA, State Pl ayers L.Q. Pl ayers L. Q. L.Q. 
Gary-Hammond-East Chicago, 
Ind. 28 . 72 4 l. 11 l. 54 
Grand Rapids, Mich. 19 . 57 4 l. 30 2.28 
Great Falls, Mont. 6 l. 19 
Green Bay, Wis. l . 10 
Greensboro-Winston-Salem-
High Point, N.C. 34 . 92 l .28 .30 Greenville, S.C. 16 . 87 
Hamilton-Middletown, Ohio 18 l. 29 2 l. 55 l. 20 
Harrisburg, Pa. 33 l. 30 l .42 .32 Hartford, Conn. 28 . 68 l .26 .38 
Honolulu, Hawaii 19 .49 3 .84 l. 71 Houston, Tex. ll6 .95 13 l. 14 l. 20 Huntington-Ashland, w .. va.-
Ky. -Ohio 8 . 51 . 69 l. 35 Huntsville, Ala. 9 .64 
Indianapolis, Ind. 30 . 40 2 .32 .73 Jackson, Mich. 6 .. 68 
Jacksonville, Fla. 42 l. 29 2 .65 .50 Jersey City, N.J. 35 .93 3 . 86 . 92· Johns town, Pa. 18 l. 11 2 l. 34 l. 21 Kalamazoo, Mich. 8 .64 .2 l. 74 2. 72 Kansas City, Mo. -Kans. 100 l. 30 5 .69 .53 Kenosha, Wis. 7 . 96 l l. 49 l. 55 Knoxvi 11 e, Tenn. 22 .89 l .42 . 47 Lacrosse, Wis. 7. l. 41 l 2. 18 l. 55 Lafayette, La. 3 .44 l l. 60 3.64 Lafayette-West Lafayett, Ind. 6 .89 
Lake Charles, La. 9 l. 01 
Lancaster, Pa. 15 .76 3 l. 65 2. 17 Lansing, Mich. 13 .56 
Laredo, Tex. 
Las Vegas, Nev. 28 l. 66 . 63 .38 Lawrence-Haverhill, Mass.-
N.H. 6 .42 
Lawton, Okla. 6 .90 l l. 62 1. 80. Lewis ton-Auburn, Maine 7 l. 25 l 2. 41 l. 93 Lexington, Ky. 11 l. 03 2 2.01 l. 95 Lima, Ohio 10 . 95 3 3.06 3.22 Lincoln, Neb. 5 .48 
Little Rock-North Little 
Rock, Ark. 24 l. 21 4 2. 16 l. 79 Lorain-Elyria, Ohio 9 . 57 
Los Angeles-Long Beach, 
Cal if. l '152 2.66 l. 62 4.04 l. 52 
SMSA, State 
Louisville, Ky.-Ind. 
Lowell, Mass. 
Lubbock, Tex. 
Lynchburg, Va. 
Macon, Ga. 
Madison, Wis. 
Manchester, N.H. 
Mansfield, Ohio 
McAllen-Pharr-Edinburg, 
Tex. 
Memphis, Tenn.-Ark. 
Meriden, Conn. 
Miami, Fla. 
Midland, Tex 
Milwaukee, Wis. 
Minneapolis-St. Paul, Minn. 
Mobile, Ala. 
Modes to, Ca 1 if. 
Monroe, La. 
Montgomery, Ala. 
Muncie; Ind. 
Muskegon-Muskegon Heights, 
Mich. 
Nashua, N.H. 
Nashville-Davidson, Tenn. 
New Bedford,- Mass. 
New Britain, Conn. 
New Haven, Conn. 
New London-Groton-Norwich, 
Conn. 
New Orleans, La. 
New York, N.Y. 
Newark, N.J. 
Newport News-Hampton, Va. 
Norfolk-Portsmouth, Va. 
Norwalk, Conn 
Odessa, Tex. 
Ogden, Utah 
Oklahoma City, Okla. 
Omaha, Nebr.-Iowa 
Orlando, Fla. 
Owensboro, Ky. 
Oxnard-Ventura, Calif. 
Number of 
First-Year Total 
Players L.Q. 
23 
15 
10 
10 
18 
6 
5 
4 
4 
42 
3 
142 
2 
32 
93 
57 
24 
7 
8 
3 
5 
29 
4 
7 
22 
16 
64 
483 
105 
21 
33 
9 
9 
8 
43 
34 
44 
5 
57 
.45 
l . 14 
. 91 
1. 31 
1. 42 
.34 
.75 
.50 
.36 
.89 
. 87 
l. 82 
. 50 
• 37 
.83 
2.46 
2.00 
.99 
.65 
.38 
.52 
.87 
. 43 
.78 
1.00 
1. 25 
.99 
.68 
• 92 
1. 17 
.80 
l. 22 
l. 59 
1. 03 
l. 09 
l. 02 
1. 67 
l. 02 
2.46 
Number of 
Major 
League 
Players 
1 
1 
2 
1 
1 
3 
16 
2 
9 
5 
2 
l 
4 
5 
33 
10 
2 
2 
1 
2 
6 
5 
3 
6 
Major 
L.Q. 
. 81 
. 98 
2.83 
.84 
.60 
.67 
2.22 
.25 
. 86 
2.32 
1.81 
.86 
l. 28 
. 83 
.49 
. 93 
l. 20 
. 51 
l. 89 
2.78 
1. 64 
l. 62 
1. 23 
2.80· 
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Success 
L. Q. 
. 71 
l. 08 
2. 16 
.59 
l. 76 
.75 
l. 22 
.68 
l.04 
.94 
. 91 
1. 32 
l. 47 
• 84 
• 73 
1. 01 
l. 03 
. 65 
l. 19 
2.70 
1. 50 
l. 59 
.74 
1. 14 
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Number of 
Number of Major 
First-Year Total League Major Success 
SMSA, State Players L.Q. Pl ayers L.Q. L. Q. 
Paterson-Clifton-Passaic, 
N.J. 77 . 92 2 .25 . 27 
Pensacola, Fla. 34 2.27 7 5.04 2.22 
Peoria, I 11. 12 . 57 l . 51 . 90 
Petersburg-Colonial Heights, 
Va. 8 1. 01 1 l. 35 1. 34 
Philadelphia, Pa.-N.J. 207 .70 14 . 51 .73 
Phoenix, Ariz. 120 2.02 15 2. 72 l. 35 
Pine Bluff, Ark. 4 .76 
Pittsburgh, Pa. 126 .85 13 . 95 l. 12 
Pittsfield, Mass. 11 2.24 1 2. 19 . 98 
Portland, Maine 23 2.64 2 2.47 . 94 
Portland, Oreg. 84 l. 35 7 1. 21 . 90 
Providence-Pawtucket-
Warwick, R.I.-Mass. 32 . 57 3 .56 . 98 
Provo-Orem, Utah 12 1. 42 1 l. 27 .89 
Pueblo, Colo. 5 . 69 
Racine, Wis. 14 l. 33 3 3.08 2.32 
Ra 1 i e gh, N. C. 7 . 50 
Reading, Pa. 9 . 49 
Reno, Nev. 11 1. 48 
Richmond, Va. 38 1. 19 4 1. 35 1. 13 
Roanoke, Va. 4 .36 l . 97 2.69 
Rochester, Minn. 3 . 58 
Rochester, N.Y. 32 . 59 
Rockford, Ill. 5 . 33 
Sacramento, Calif. 159 3.23 25 5.48 1. 70 
Saginaw, Mich. 8 .59 1 . 80 1. 36 
St. Joseph, Mo. 7 1. 31 
St. Louis, Mo.-Ill. 162 1. 11 12 .88 .79 
·Salem, Oreg. 8 .70 1 . 93 1. 33 
Salinas-Monterey, Calif. 20 1. 30 1 .70 . 54 
Salt Lake City, Utah 29 .84 4 1. 25 1.49 San Angelo, Tex. 5 1. 14 
San Antonio, Tex. 43 . 81 7 l. 42 ·. 1. 75 
San Bernardino-Riverside-
Ontario, Calif. 156 2.22 15 2.30 1. 04 San Diego, Calif. 226 2.70 26 3.36 1. 25 San Francisco-Oakland, 
Calif. 352 1. 84 45 2.53 1. 56 San Jose, Calif. 151 2.30 16 2.64 1. 15 Santa Barbara, Calif. 41 2.52 5 3.32 l. 32 Santa Rosa, Calif. 14 1. 11 4 3.43 3.09 
167 
Number of 
Number of Major 
First-Year Total League Major Success 
SMSA, State Players L. Q. Pl ayers L. Q. L. Q. 
Savannah, Ga. 13 1. 12 
Scranton, Pa. 1 7 l. 18 
Seattle-Everett, Wash. 100 1. 13 13 1. 60 1.42 
Sherman-Denison, Tex. 2 .39 
Shreveport, La. 21 1. 16 1 .60 . 52 
Sioux City, Iowa-Nebr. 4 .56 
-
Sioux Falls, S. Oak. 4 .68 
South Bend, Ind. 15 .87 
Spokane, Wash. 27 1. 53 2 1. 21 .79 
Springfield, Ill. 7 .70 3 3.26 4.66 
Springfield, Mo. 28 2.97 3 3.44 1. 16 
Springfield, Ohio 9 . 93 1 1. 12 1. 20 
Springfield-Chicopee-
Holyoke, Mass.-Conn .. 25 .76 
Stamford, Conn. 12 .94 1 .84 .89 
Steubenville-Weirton, Ohio-
W. Va. 11 1.08 
Stockton, Calif. 45 2.52 3 1. 81 . 72 
Syracuse, N.Y. 23 .59 3 .83 1. 41 
Tacoma, Wash. 21 .83 2 .85 1. 02 
Tallahassee, Fla. 8 1. 26 l 1. 70 1. 35 
Tampa-St. Petersburg, 
Fla. 141 2.26 12 2.07 .92 
Terre Haute, Ind. 7 .65 
Texarkana, Tex.-Ark. 5 .80 
Toledo, Ohio-Mich. 31. .73 2 .49 .67 
Topeka, Kans. 12 1. 26 2 2.26 1. 79 
Trenton, N.J. 31 1. 66 l .58 .35 
Tucson, Ariz. 39 1.80 6 3.00 1. 67 
Tulsa, Okla. 50 1. 70 6 2.20 1. 29 
Tuscaloosa, Ala. 8 1. 12 l 1. 51 1.35 
Tyler, Tex. 3 .50 2 3.62 7.24 
Utica-Rome, N.Y. 15 . 71 l . 51 • 72 
Vallejo-Napa, Calif. 44 2.87 5 3.52 1. 23 
Vineland-Millville-
Bridgeton, N.J. 3 .40 l 1. 45 3.63 Waco, Tex. 19 2.09 l l. 19 .57 
Washington, D.C.-Md.-Va. 120 .68 6 .35 . 51 Waterbury, Conn. 15 1. 17 2 1. 67 l.43 
Waterloo, Iowa 8 .98 l 1. 32 l. 35 
West Palm Beach, Fla. 48 2.24 l .50 .22 Wheeling, W. Va. 11 .98 
Wichita, Kans. 21 .88 l .44 .50 Wichita Falls, Tex. 4 . 51 
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Number of 
Number of Major 
Fi rs t-Year Total League Major Success 
SMSA, State Pl ayers L. Q. Pl ayers L. Q. L. Q. 
Wilkes-Barre-Hazleton, 
Pa. 19 .90 
Wilmington, Del.-N.J.-
Md. 36 l. 17 2 .70 .60 
Wilmington, N.C. 13 l. 97 l l. 63 .83 
Worcester, Mass. 19 .89 2 l. 02 l. 15 
York, Pa. 17 . 84 3 l. 60 l. 90 
Youngstown-Warren, Ohio 25 .76 l .32 .42 
243 SMSAs Total 9,517 l. 11 913 l. 15 l. 04 
APPENDIX C 
AGGREGATE CLUB SIGNINGS 
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170 
Baltimore Orioles 
Percent Percent 
Number· of of Club's of Area's !~umber of 
State or First-Year F·i rs t-Year First-Year Major League 
Foreign Country Pl ayers Players Pl ayers Pl ayers 
Alabama 3 .45 l. 24 
Alaska 
Arizona 6 . 91 3.35 l 
Arkansas 
California 168 25.45 5.48 19 
Colorado 7 l.06 
Connecticut 12 l.82 7. 61 
Delaware 3 . 45 8. 11 
Dist. of Columbia 2 .30 14. 29 
Florida 27 4.09 3 .. 98 l 
Georgia 7 l. 06 2.46 
Hawaii 3 .45. l. 15 
Idaho 2 . 30 5.56 
Illinois 22 3.33 4.06 
Indiana 6 . 91 3.47 
Iowa 3 .45 2.75 
Kansas 3 . 45 2.75 
Kentucky 4 . 61 3.85 
Louisiana 3 .45 l. 64 
Maine 3 .45 6.67 
Maryl and 47 7. 12 21. 27 l 
Massachusetts 13 l. 97 4.28 l 
Michigan 18 2.73 4.27 l 
Minnesota 5 .76 3.01' 
Mississippi l . 15 l. 01 
Missouri 10 l. 52 3.45 
Montana 3 .45 10.00 
Nebraska 
Nevada 
New Hampshire 4 . 61 l. 25 l 
New Jersey 16 2.42 3.65 l 
New Mexico l . 15 2.56 l 
New York 36 5.45 4. 72 2 
North Carolina 24 3.64 8.42 l 
North Dakota 1 . 15 7. 14 
Ohio 13 l. 97 2.59 
Oklahoma 6 . 91 3.59 
Oregon 7 l. 06 4.70 
Pennsylvania 38 5.76 6.37 3 
Rhode Island 
South Carolina 9 l. 36 6. 16 
South Dakota 1 . 15 6.25 
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Baltimore Orioles (Continued) 
Percent Percent 
Number of of Club's of Area's Number of 
State or Fi rs t-Year First-Year First-Year Major League 
Foreign Country Players Players Players Pl ayers 
Tennessee 4 . 61 2. 19 2 
Texas 16 2.42 2.94 2 
Utah 2 .30 3.78 
Vermont l . 15 9.09 
Vi rgi ni a 29 4.39 10.90 5 
Washington 9 1. 36 3.83 
West Virginia 9 1. 36 13. 24 
Wisconsin 5 .76 3. 13 
Wyoming 1 . 15 ll. ll 
(U.S. Total) 614 93.03 4.-89 45 
Aruba 
Aus tra 1 i a 
Bahamas 2 .30 6.67 
Canada 1 . 15 .47 
Canal Zone 
Columbia 
Cos ta Rica 
Cuba 
Dominican Rep. 14 2. 12 2.55 
Guatemala 
Holland 
Japan 
Mexico 
Nicaragua 8 1. 21 26.67 2 
Panama 1 . 15 3. 13 
Puerto Rico 16 2.42 4.95 2 
South Africa 
Taiwan 
Venezuela 4 . 61 1.96 
Virgin Islands 
(Foreign Total) 46 6.97 3.19 4 
Total 660 100.0 4. 72 49 
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Bos ton Red Sox 
Percent Percent 
Number of of Club's of Area's !~umber of 
State or First-Year Fi rs t-Year First-Year Major League 
Foreign Country Pl ayers Players Pl ayers Pl ayers 
Alabama 29 4.65 12. 03 4 
Alaska l . 16 33.33 
Arizona l . 16 .56 
Arkansas 1 . 16 1. 37 
California 98 15. 71 3.20 12 
Colorado 4 .64 4.34 1 
Connecticut 22 3.53 12.02 1 
Delaware 
Dist. of Columbia 
Florida 36 5. 77 5.31 4 
Georgia 10 l. 60 3. ·51 1 
Hawaii 
Idaho 2 .32 5.56 1 
111 i noi s 10 1. 60 1.85 
Indiana 5 .80 2.89 
Iowa 2 .32 1.83 
Kansas 2 .32 1.83 
Kentucky 2 .32 l. 92 
Louisiana 14 2.24 7.65 1 
Maine 7 1. 12 15. 56 
Maryl and 5 .80 2.26 
Massachusetts 58 9.29 19.08 3 
Michigan 36 5. 77 8.53 6 
Minnesota 4 .64 2.41 
Mississippi 11 1. 76 11. 11 
Missouri 6 .96 2.07 
Montana 1 . 16 3.33 
Nebraska 5 .80 9.62 1 
Nevada 2 . 32 4.08 
New Hampshire 6 .96 18.75 1 
New Jersey 17 2. 72 3.88 1 
New Mexico 
New York 33 5.29 4.33 4 
North Carolina 5 .80 l. 75 
North Dakota 
Ohio 6 . 96 2.00 
Oklahoma 9 5.39 5.39 1 
Oregon 4 .64 2.68 
Pennsylvania 26 4.17 4.36 1 
Rhode Island 13 2.08 36. 11 2 
South Carolina 6 .96 4.11 1 
South Dakota 
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Boston Red Sox (Continued) 
Percent Percent 
Number of of Club's of Area's Number of 
State or First-Year First-Year Fi rs t-Year Maj or League 
Foreign Country P 1 ayers Pl ayers Pl ayers Pl ayers 
Tennessee 9 1. 44 4.92 1 
Texas 23 3.69 4.22 1 
Utah 4 .64 7.55 
Vermont 
Virginia 10 1. 60 3.76 
Washington 4 .64 1. 70 
West Virginia 
Wisconsin . 16 .63 
Wyoming . 16 11. 11 
( U. S. To ta 1 ) 552 88.46 4.40 49 
Aruba 
Aus tra 1 i a 
Bahamas 3 . 48 10.00 
Canada 11 1. 76 5. 19 
Canal Zone 
Columbia 
Costa Rica 
Cuba 
Dominican Rep. 11 1. 76 2.01 
Guatemala 
Holland . 16 100. 00 
Japan 
Mexico 
Nicaragua 
Panama l . 16 3. 13 
Puerto Rico 23 3.69 7. 12 5 
Sou th Africa 
Taiwan 
Venezuela 18 2.88 8.82 
Virgin Islands 4 .64 28.57 
(Foreign Total) 72 11. 54 5.00 6 
Total 624 100.00 4.46 55 
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California Angels 
Percent Percent 
Number· of of Club's of Area's !~umber of 
State or First-Year Fi rs t-Year First-Year Major League 
Foreign Country Pl ayers Players Players Pl ayers 
Alabama 5 .92 2.07 2 
Alaska 
Arizona 7 l. 29 3. 91 
Arkansas 
Ca 1 i forni a 311 57.38 10. 14 24 
Colorado 1 . 18 1. 09 
Connecticut 3 .55 1. 64 
Delaware 
Dist. of Columbia 
Florida 7 1. 29 1.03 2 
Georgia 3 . 55 1. 05 
Hawaii 
Idaho 2 . 37 5.56 
Illinois 22 4.06 4.06 4 
Indiana 3 .55 1. 73 
lm'la 2 .37 1.83 
Kansas 3 .55 2.75 
Kentucky 
Louisiana 10 1.85 5.46 1 
Maine 
Maryland 7 1. 29 3. 17 1 
Massach us et ts 7 l. 29 2.30 2 
Michigan 16 2.95 3. 79 4 
Minnesota 4 .74 2.41 
Mississippi 2 .37 2.02 
Missouri 4 .74 1. 38 
Montana 1 . 18 3.33 
Nebraska l . 18 1. 92 
Nevada 5 .92 10.20 
New Hampshire 
New Jersey 3 . 55 .68 
New Mexico 3 . 55 7.70 1 
New York 7 1. 29 . 92 
North Carolina 5 .92 1. 75 
North Dakota 1 . 18 7. 14 
Ohio 13 2.40 2.59 
Oklahoma 1 . 18 .60 
Oregon 4 .74 2.68 
Pennsylvania 4 .74 .67 
Rhode Island 1 . 18 2.78 
South Carolina 3 .55 2.05 1 
South Dakota 2 .37 12. 50 1 
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California Angels (Continued) 
Percent Percent 
Number of of Club 1 s of Area 1 s Number of 
State or First-Year First-Year First-Year Major League 
Foreign Country Players Pl ayers Pl ayers Pl ayers 
Tennessee 4 .74 2. 19 l 
Texas 16 2.95 2. 94 2 
Utah 5 . 92 9.43 1 
Vermont 
Virginia 7 1. 29 2.63 1 
Washington 6 1.11 2.55 l 
West Virginia 
Wisconsin 6 1.11 3.75 2 
Wyoming 
(U.S. Total) 517 95.39 4. 12 55 
Aruba 
Austra 1 i a 
Bahamas 
Canada 2 . 37 .94 
Canal Zone 
Columbia 4 .74 57. 14 1 
Costa Rica 
Cuba 
Dominican Rep. 10 1.85 1.82 
Guatemala 
Holland 
Japan 
Mexico 
Nicaragua 
Panama 1 . 18 3.13 
Puerto Rico 8 1.48 2.48 
South Africa 
Taiwan 
Venezuela 
Virgin Islands 
(Foreign Total) 25 4.61 1. 73 1 
Total 542 100.00 3.88 56 
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Chicago White Sox 
Percent Percent 
Number of of Club 1 s of Area's !~umber of 
State or First-Year First-Year First-Year Major League 
Foreign Country Pl ayers Players Players Pl ayers 
Alabama 16 3.55 6.64 3 
Al as ka 
Arizona 4 .89 2.23 l 
Arkansas 2 . 44 2.79 l 
California 94 20.84 3.07 16 
Colorado 7 l. 55 7. 61 l 
Connecticut 2 . 44 l.09 
Del a\'/are 
Dist. of Columbia 
Florida 26 5.76 3 .. 83 3 
Georgia 5 'l. 11 l. 75 
Hawaii 
Idaho 
Illinois 43 9.53 7.93 3 
Indiana 19 4. 21 10.98 3 
Iowa 9 2.00 8.26 2 
Kansas 2 . 44 l.83 
Kentucky l .22 . 96 l 
Louisiana 5 l. 11 2.73 
Maine 1 .22 2.22 
Maryl and 3 . 67 l. 36 
Massachusetts 3 . 67 .99 l 
Michigan 12 2.66 2.84 2 
Minnesota l .22 .60 
Mississippi 6 l. 33 6.06 
Missouri 9 2.00 3. 10 
Montana 2 . 44 6.67 l 
Nebraska l . 22 l. 92 
Nevada l .22 2.04 
New Hampshire 
Nevi Jersey 9 2.00 2.05 
New Mexico 
Ne11 York 14 3. 10 1.84 
North Carolina 25 5.54 8. 77 
North Dakota l . 22 7. 14 
Ohio 20 4.43 3.99 8 
Oklahoma 3 .67 l.80 
Oregon l . 22 .67 l 
Pennsylvania 25 5.54 4. 19 l 
Rhode Island l .22 2.78 
South Carolina 7 l. 55 4.79 
South Dakota l .22 6.25 
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Chicago White Sox (Continued) 
Percent Percent 
Number of of Club's of Area's Number of 
State or First-Year Fi rs t-Year First-Year Major League 
Foreign Country Players Pl ayers Players Players 
Tennessee 10 2.22 5.46 l 
Texas 4 .88 .73 2 
Utah 2 .44 3. 77 
Vermont 
Virginia 10 2.22 3.76 
Washington 2 .44 .85 
West Virginia l .22 1.47 1 
Wisconsin 22 4.88 13.75 4 
Wyoming 
(U.S. Total) 432 95.79 3.·44 56 
Aruba 
Australia 
Bahamas 1 .22 3.33 
Canada 
Canal Zone 
Columbia 
Cos ta Rica 
Cuba 
Dominican Rep. 3 . 67 .55 
Guatemala 
Ho 11 and 
Japan 
Mexico 
Nicaragua 
Panama 
Puerto Rico 6 1. 33 1.86 1 
South Africa 
Ta i\'Jan 
Venezuela 9 2.00 4.41 
Virgin Islands 
(Foreign Total) 19 4.21 1. 32 l 
Total 451 100.00 3.22 57 
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Cleveland Indians 
Percent Percent 
Number of of Club 1 s of Area 1 s lfomber of 
State or First-Year Fi. rs t- Year First-Year Major League 
Foreign Country Pl ayers Players Players Pl ayers 
Alabama 11 2.01 4.56 
Alaska 
Arizona 11 2. 01 6. 15 
Arkansas 
California 74 13. 53 2.41 11 
Colorado l . 18 l.09 
Connecticut 8 l.46 4.37 
Delaware l . 18 2.70 
Dist. of Columbia l . 18 7. 14 l 
Florida 49 8.96 7 .. 23 3 
Georgia 19 3.47 6.67 2 
Hawaii 2 . 37. 7.69 l 
Idaho l . 18 2.78 
Illinois 18 3.29 3.32 
Indiana 12 2. 19 6.94 
Iowa 3 .55 2. 75 
Kansas 3 . 55 2.75 
Kentucky 3 .55 2.88 
Louisiana 9 l. 65 4.92 l 
Maine 
Maryland 8 l. 46 3.62 
Massachusetts 15 2.74 4.93 
Michigan 18 3.29 4.27 2 
Minnesota l . 18 .60 
Mississippi 6 l. l 0 6.06 
Missouri 10 l. 80 3.45 
Montana 
Nebraska 
Nevada 2 . 37 4.08 
New Hampshire l . 18 3. 13 
New Jersey 8 1. 46 1. 83 2 
New Mexico 3 .55 7.69 
New York 27 4.94 3.54 2 
North Carolina 14 2.56 4. 91 2 
North Dakota 
Ohio 70 12.80 13. 97 3 
Oklahoma 9 l. 65 5.39 
Oregon 3 .55 2.01 
Pennsylvania 14 2.56 2.35 
Rhode Island 
South Carolina 8 l. 46 5.48 l 
South Dakota 
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Cleveland Indians (Continued) 
Percent Percent 
Number of of Club's of Area's Number of 
State or First-Year First-Year First-Year Major League 
Foreign Country Players Pl ayers Players p·1 ayers 
Tennessee 6 l. l 0 3.28 
Texas 28 5. 12 5. 14 5 
Utah 4 .73 7.55 1 
Vermont 
Virginia 12 2. 19 4. 51 
Washington 12 2. 19 5. 11 3 
West Virginia 4 .73 5.88 
Wisconsin 5 . 91 3. 13 1 
Wyoming 
(U.S. Total) 515 9.4. 15 4. 11 43 
Aruba 
Australia 
Bahamas 2 .36 6.67 
Canada 
Canal Zone 
Columbia 
Cos ta Rica 
Cuba 
Dominican Rep. 19 3.47 3.47 2 
Guatemala 
Holl and 
Japan 
Mexico 
Ni ca ra gua 
Panama 1 . 18 3. 13 
Puerto Rico 3 . 55 . 93 
South Africa 
Ta i\'1an 
Venezuela 7 1. 28 3.43 
Virgin Islands 
(Foreign Total) 32 5.85 2.22 2 
Total 547 100.00 3. 91 45 
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Detroit Tigers 
Percent Percent 
Number· of of Club's of Area's !~umber of 
State or First-Year Fi rs t-Year First-Year Major League 
Foreign Country Pl ayers Players Players Pl ayers 
Alabama 4 .56 1. 66 
Alaska 
Arizona 3 .42 1. 68 l 
Arkansas 4 . 56 5.48 
California 99 13. 79 3.23 17 
Colorado l . 14 1. 09 
Connecticut 4 .56 2. 19 
Delaware l . 14 2.70 
Dist. of Columbia 
Florida 20 2.79 2.95 
Georgia 11 1.53 3.86 l 
Hawaii 
Idaho 
Illinois 8 1.11 1.48 l 
Indiana 11 1. 53 6.36 
Iowa l .28 .92 
Kansas 7 .97 6.42 
Kentucky 3 .42 2.88 
Louisiana l . 14 .55 
Maine 
Maryl and 5 .70 2.26 l 
Massachusetts 10 1. 39 3.29 l 
Michigan 134 18. 66 31.75 11 
Minnesota 3 .42 1. 81 l 
Mississippi 
Missouri 19 2.65 6.55 l 
Montana l . 14 3.33 
Nebraska 2 . 28 3.85 
Nevada 
New Hampshire 4 .56 12. 50 
New Jersey 48 6.69 10. 96 6 
New Mexico 
New York 96 13. 37 12.60 5 
North Carolina 8 l.11 2.81 
North Dakota 
Ohio 60 8.36 11.98 8 
Oklahoma 3 .42 1. 80 
Oregon 
Pennsylvania 55 7.66 9. 21 l 
Rhode Island 3 .42 8.33 
South Carolina 4 .56 2.74 
South Dakota 
l 81 
Detroit Tigers (Continued 
Percent Percent 
Number of of Club 1 s of Area 1 s Number of 
State or First-Year First-Year Fi rs t- Year Maj or' League 
Foreign Country Pl ayers Pl ayers Pl ayers Pl ayers 
Tennessee 6 .84 3.28 
Texas 11 1. 53 2.02 l 
Utah 2 .28 3. 77 
Vermont 
Virginia 11 1. 53 4. 14 2 
Washington l . 14 .43 l 
West Virginia l . 14 1. 47 
Wisconsin 4 .56 2.50 l 
Wyoming 
(U.S. Total) 672 93.59 5.36 61 
Aruba 
Australia 
Bahamas 
Canada 33 4.60 15.57 2 
Canal Zone 
Columbia 
Cos ta Rica 
Cuba 
Dominican Rep. 1 . 14 . 18 
Guatemala 
Holland 
Japan 
Mexico 
Nicaragua 
Panama 
Puerto Rico 11 1. 53 3.41 
South Africa 
Taiwan 
Venezuela l . 14 .49 
Virgin Islands 
(Foreign Total) 46 6. 41 3. 19 2 
Total 718 100.00 5. 13 63 
182 
Kansas City Royals 
Percent Percent 
Ntimberof of Club's of Area's Mumber of 
State or First-Year Fi rs t- Year First-Year Major League 
Foreign Country Pl ayers Players Players Pl ayers 
Alabama 4 .66 1. 66 1 
Alaska 
Arizona 6 . 99 3.35 
Arkansas 4 .66 5.48 
Ca 1 i forni a 183 30.05 5.97 16 
Colorado 6 .99 6.52 l 
Connecticut 1 . 16 .55 
Delaware l . 16 2.70 
Dist. of Columbia 
Florida 27 4.43 3.98 l 
Georgia 6 .. 99 2.'l l 
Hawaii 4 .66 15.38 
Idaho 2 .33 5.56 
Illinois 28 4.60 5. 17 4 
Indiana 11 1. 81 6.36 2 
Iowa 3 .49 2.75 
Kansas 12 1. 97 11 . 01 
Kentucky 5 . 82 4. 81 
Louisiana 12 l. 97 6.56 2 
Maine l . 16 2.22 
Maryland 3 .49 l.36 
Massachusetts 8 l. 31 2.63 
Michigan 15 2.46 3.55 
Minnesota 5 . 82 3. 01 
Mississippi 7 1.15 7.07 
Missouri 25 3.94 8.62 2 
Montana 3 . 49 10. 0 
Nebraska 4 .66 7.69 
Nevada 2 .33 4.08 
New Hampshire 2 .33 6.25 1 
New Jersey 14 2.30 3.20 1 
New Mexico 3 .49 7.69 
New York 20 3.28 2.62 2 
North Carolina 16 2.63 5.61 l 
North Dakota l . 16 7. 14 
Ohio 10 l. 64 2.00 
Oklahoma 3 .49 2.40 2 
Oregon 6 .99 4.03 
Pennsylvania 17 2.79 2.85 l 
Rhode Island 
South Carolina 4 .66 2.74 
South Dakota 
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Kansas City Royals (Continued) 
Percent Percent 
Number of of Club's of Area's Number of 
State or First-Year First-Year First-Year Major League 
Foreign Country Pl ayers Pl ayers Pl ayers P 1 ayers 
Tennessee 7 1. 15 3.83 
Texas 20 
Utah 1 . 16 1.89 
Vermont 1 .16 9.09 
Virginia 34 5.58 12.78 l 
Washington 9 l.48 3. 83 
West Virginia 4 .66 5.88 
Wisconsin 8 l. 31 5.00 l 
Wyoming 
(U.S. Total) 568 93.27 4.53 40 
Aruba 
Australia l . 16 20.00 
Bahamas 
Canada 4 .66 1. 89 
Canal Zone 
Columbia 
Costa Rica 
Cuba 
Dominican Rep. 15 2. 46 . 2.74 l 
Guatemala 
Holl and 
Japan 
Mexico 
Nicaragua 
Panama 
Puerto Rico 12 l. 97 3.72 
South Africa 
Taiwan 
Venezuela 9 l. 48 4.41 
Virgin Islands 
(Foreign Total) 41 6.73 2.85 1 
Total 608 100.00 4.35 41 
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Milwaukee Brewers 
Percent Percent 
Number of of Club's of Area's !~umber of 
State or First-Year Fi rs t-Year First-Year Major League 
Foreign Country Pl ayers Pl ayers Players Pl ayers 
Alabama 6 l.86 2.49 
Alaska 
Arizona 7 2. 17 3.91 
Arkansas 
California 55 17.08 l. 79 9 
Colorado 2 .62 2. 17 
Connecticut 2 .62 3.23 
Delaware 2 .62 5.41 
Dist. of Columbia 1 . 31 7. 14 
Florida 14 4.35 2.06 l. 
Georgia 5 l. 55 l. 75 
Hawaii l • 31 3.85 
Idaho 
Illinois 4 l. 24 .74 
Indiana l . 31 .58 
Iowa 2 .62 l.83 
Kansas 
Kentucky l . 31 .96 
Louisiana 
Maine 2 .62 4.44 
Maryland 5 l. 55 2.26 l 
Massachusetts 18 5.59 5.92 l 
Michigan 7 2. 17 l. 66 l 
Minnesota 2 .62 l. 20 l 
Mississippi 2 .62 2.02 
Missouri 2 .62 .69 l 
Montana 
Nebraska l . 31 l. 92 
Nevada l .'31 2.04 l 
New Hampshire 
New Jersey 6 l. 86 l.37 
New Mexico l . 31 2.56 
New York 33 10. 25 4.33 2 
North Carolina 4 l. 24 l.40 l 
North Dakota 1 . 31 7. 14 
Ohio 4 l. 24 .80 
Oklahoma 9 2.80 4. 79 2 
Ore9on 3 .93 2.01 
Pennsylvania 6 l. 86 l. 01 
Rhode Island 
South Carolina 10 3. 11 6.85 
South Di.I ko ta 
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Milwaukee Brewers (Continued) 
Percent Percent 
Number of of Club's of Area's Number of 
State or First-Year First-Year First-Year Major League 
Foreign Country Players Players Players Pl ayers 
Tennessee 2 . 62 1.09 l 
Texas 17 5.28 3. 12 
Utah 
Vermont 
Virginia 5 1. 55 1. 88 
Washington 11 3.42 4.68 l 
\~est Virginia l . 31 1.47 
Wisconsin 9 2.80 5.63 3 
Wyoming 
( U . S . To ta l ) 264 81.99 2. 10 30 
Aruba l . 31 33.33 
Australia 
Bahamas 
Canada 4 1. 24 1. 89 
Canal Zone 
Columbia . 31 14. 29 
Cos ta Rica 
Cuba 
Dominican Rep. 16 4.97 2.92 2 
Guatemala 
1-Jol land 
Japan 
Mexico 
Nicaragua 
Panama 
Puerto Rico 35 l 0. 87 10.84 6 
South Africa 
Taiwan 
Venezuela l . 31 .49 
Virgin Islands 
(Foreign Tota 1 ) 58 18. 01 4.02 8 
Total 322 100.00 2.30 38 
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Minnesota Twins 
Percent Percent 
Number of of Club 1 s of Area 1 s !~umber of 
State or First-Year Fi rs t-Year First-Year Major League 
Foreign Country Pl ayers Players Players Pl ayers 
Alabama 6 . 82 2.49 
Al as ka 
Arizona 7 .96 3.91 
Arkansas l . 14 
California 242 33. 15 l. 37 26 
Colorado 9 l. 23 9.78 
Connecticut 5 .68 2.73 
Delaware l . 14 2.70 
Dist. of Columbia 
Florida 36 4.93 5. 31 5 
Georgia 13 l. 78 4."56 
Hawaii 
Idaho 
Illinois 32 4.38 5.90 l 
Indiana 6 .82 3.47 l 
Iowa 14 l. 91 12.84 l 
Kansas 4 . 55 3.67 
Kentucky 6 . 82 5. 77 
Louisiana 7 .96 3.83 
Maine 2 .28 4.44 
Maryland 16 2. 19 7.24 
Massachusetts 6 .82 l. 97 
Michigan 11 l. 51 2.61 l 
Minnesota 78 10.68 46.99 6 
Mississippi l . 14 l. Ol l 
Missouri 15 2.05 5. 17 l 
Montana 2 .28 6.67 
Nebraska 6 . 82 11. 54 
Nevada 3 . 41 6. 12 
New Hampshire 3 . 41 9.38 
New Jersey 24 3.29 5.48 3 
New Mexico l . 14 2.56 
New York 28 3.84 3.67 l 
North Carolina 16 2. 19 5.61 
North Dakota l . 14 7. 14 
Ohio 7 • 96 1.40 
Oklahoma 4 .55 2.40 2 
Oregon 7 .96 4.70 
Pennsylvania 16 2. 19 2.68 2 
Rhode Island 4 . 55 11. 11 
South Carolina 4 . 55 2.74 
South Dakota 4 .55 25.00 
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Minnesota Twins (Continued) 
Percent Percent 
Number of of Club's of Area's Number of 
State or Fi rs t- Year First-Year First-Year Major League 
Foreign Country Players Pl ayers Players Pl ayers 
Tennessee 9 2. 19 4.92 
Texas 7 .96 1. 28 
Utah 2 .28 3. 77 
Vermont 
Virginia 15 2.05 5.64 
Washington 5 .68 2. 13 
West Virginia 2 .28 2.94 
Wisconsin 31 4.25 19. 38 
Wyoming 
( U. S . To ta 1 ) 721 98. 77 5.-79 53 
Aruba 
Australia 
Bahamas 1 . 14 3.33 
Canada 5 .68 2.36 1 
Canal Zone 
Columbia 
Cos ta Rica 
Cuba 
Dominican Rep. 
Guatemala 
Holland 
Japan 
Mexico 
Nicaragua 
Panama 
Puerto Rico 
South Africa l . 14 100.00 
Taiwan 
Venezuela 2 .28 .98 
Virgin Islands 
(Foreign Total) 9 1. 23 .62 1 
Total 730 100.00 5.22 54 
-------
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New York Yankees 
Percent Percent 
Number of of Club's of Area's lfomber of 
State or First-Year Fi rs t-Year First-Year Major League 
Foreign Country Players Players Players Pl ayers 
Alabama 3 . 51 l. 24 
Alaska 
Arizona 4 .68 2.23 
Arkansas 5 .85 6.85 
California 81 13. 75 2.64 8 
Colorado 5 .85 5.43 l 
Connecticut 12 2.04 6.56 2 
Delaware 2 .34 5. 41 
Dist. of Columbia 1 . 17 7. 14 
Florida 26 4.41 3.83 2 
Georgia 9 1. 53 3. 16 1 
Hawaii 
Idaho 6 1.02 16.67 
Illinois 20 3.40 3.69 3 
Indiana 4 .68 2.31 
Iowa 15 2.55 13. 76 1 
Kansas 11 1.87 10.09 
Kentucky 5 . 85 4. 81 1 
Louisiana 9 1. 53 4.92 2 
Maine 7 1. 19 15. 56 2 
Maryl and 4 .68 1. 81 
Massachusetts 14 2.38 4.61 1 
Michigan 6 1.02 1. 42 
Minnesota 7 1. 19 4. 22· 
Mississippi 7 1. 19 7.07 1 
Missouri 18 3.06 6.21 
Montana 
Nebraska 1 . 17 1. 92 
Nevada 
New Hampshire 1 . 17 3. 13 
New Jersey 35 5.94 7.99 
New Mexico 1 . 17 2.56 
New York 53 9.00 6. 96 5 
North Carolina 9 1. 53 3. 16 l 
North Dakota 
Ohio 17 2.89 3.39 2 
Oklahoma 9 1. 53 5.39 1 
Oregon 16 2. 72 10.74 2 
Pennsylvania 26 4.41 4.36 2 
Rhode Island 2 .34 5.56 
South Carolina 6 1. 02 4. 11 
South Dakota l . 17 6.25 
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New York Yankees (Continued) 
Percent Percent 
Number of of Club's of Area's Number of 
State or First-Year Fi'rst-Year Fi rs t-Year Major League 
Foreign Country Players Pl ayers Players Pl ayers 
Tennessee 8 l. 36 4.37 
Texas 17 2.89 3. 12 3 
Utah 2 . 34 3. 77 l 
Vermont 
Virginia 8 l. 36 3.01 l 
Washington 35 5.94 14. 89 3 
West Virginia 2 .34 2.94 
Wisconsin 4 .68 2.50 
Wyoming 
(U.S. Total) 535 90.83 4.26 46 
Aruba 
Australia 
Bahamas 
Canada 12 2.04 5.66 
Canal Zone l . 17 5.88 
Columbia 
Cos ta Rica 
Cuba 
Dominican Rep. 26 4.41 4.74 5 
Guatemala 
Holland 
Japan 
Mexico 
Nicaragua 
Panama 
Puerto Rico 11 l.87 3.41 l 
South Africa 
Taiwan 
Venezuela 3 . 51 l. 47 
Virgin Islands l . 17 7. 14 
(Foreign Total) 54 9.17 3.75 6 
Total 589 100.00 4. 21 52 
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Oakland Athletics 
Percent Percent 
Number of of Club's of Area's lfomber of 
State or First-Year First-Year Fi rs t-Year Major League 
Foreign Country Pl ayers Players Players Pl ayers 
Alabama 10 2.10 4. 15 
A 1 as ka 
Arizona 7 l. 47 3.91 l 
Arkansas 4 . 84 5.48 l 
California 183 38.45 5.84 24 
Colorado l . 21 l. 09 
Connecticut 8 l. 71 4.37 
Delaware 2 . 42 5.41 
Dist. of Columbia 
Florida 14 2.94 2.06 
Georgia 6 l. 26 2. 11 
Hawaii l . 21 3.85 
Idaho l . 21 2.78 
Illinois 12 2.52 2.03 3 
Indiana 2 .42 l. 16 
Iowa 3 .63 2.75 
Kansas 2 .42 l.83 
Kentucky 2 . 42 l. 92 
Louisiana 3 .63 l. 64 l 
Maine 2 . 42 4.44 
Maryl and 3 .63 l.36 
Massachusetts 15 3. 15 4.93 l 
Michigan 8 1. 68 l. 90 l 
Minnesota 2 .42 l. 20 
Mississippi 3 .63 3.03 
Missouri 16 3.36 5.52 
Montana l . 21 3.33 
Nebraska 3 .63 5. 77 
Nevada 4 . 84 8. 16 
New Hampshire 1 . 21 3. 13 
New Jersey 16 3.36 3.65 
New Mexico l . 21 2.56 
New York 21 4.41 2.62 2 
North Carolina 9 1. 89 3. 16 l 
North Dakota l . 21 7. 14 
Ohio 10 2. 10 2.00 l Oklahoma 5 1. 05 2.99 
Oregon 2 . 42 1. 34 
Pennsylvania 19 3.99 3.02 2 
Rhode Island 1 . 21 2.78 
South Carolina 2 . 42 1. 37 
South Dakota 2 . 42 12.50 
l 9i 
Oakland Athletics (Continued) 
Percent Percent 
Number of of Club's of Area's Number of 
State or Fi rs t-Year First-Year First-Year Major League 
Foreign Country Pl ayers Pl ayers Players Pl ayers 
Tennessee 4 .84 2. 19 l 
Texas 5 1.05 . 92 
Utah 
Vermont l . 21 9.09 
Virginia 5 1.05 1.88 
Washington 17 3.57 6.88 2 
West Virginia l . 21 1. 47 
Wisconsin l .21 .63 
Wyoming 
(U.S. Total) 443 93.07 3.47 42 
· Aruba 
Australia 
Bahamas 1 . 21 3.33 
Canada 8 1.68 3. 77 
Canal Zone 
Columbia 
Cos ta Rica 
Cuba 
Dominican Rep. 
Guatemala 
Holl and 
Japan 
Mexico 
Nicaragua l . 21 3.33 
Panama 
Puerto Rico 15 3. 15 4.64 
South Africa 
Taiwan 
Venezuela 8 1. 68 3.92 1 
Virgin Islands 
(Foreign Total) 33 6.93 2.29 1 
Total 476 100. 0 3.35 43 
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Texas Rangers 
Percent Percent 
Number· of of Club 1 s of Area 1 s !~umber of 
State or Fi rs t-Year Fi rs t-Year First-Year Major League 
Foreign Country Pl ayers Players Pl ayers Players 
Alabama 1 .23 . 41 
Alaska 
Arizona 6 1. 37 3.35 
Arkansas 
California 46 lo. 53 l. 50 11 
Colorado l . 23 l. 09 
Connecticut 4 .92 2. 19 
Delaware l . 23 2.70 1 
Dist. of Columbia 4 .92 28.57 
Florida 37 8.47 5.46 4 
Georgia 3 .. 69 l. 05 2 
Hawaii 
Idaho 
Illinois 39 8.92 7.20 5 
Indiana 5 l. 14 2.89 
Iowa 3 .69 2.75 2 
Kansas 6 l. 37 5.50 
Kentucky 2 .46 l. 92 l 
Louisiana 14 3.21 7.65 l Maine l .23 2.22 l 
Maryl and 29 6.64 13. 12 l 
Massachusetts 7 l.60 2.30 2 
Michigan 11 2.52 2. 61 5 
Minnesota 7 l. 60 4.22 l 
Mississippi 3 .69 3.03 2 
Missouri 2 . 46 . 69 
Montana l .23 3.33 
Nebraska 2 .46 3.85 l 
Nevada 2 .46 4.08 
New Hampshire 
New Jersey 11 2.52 2. 51 
Nevi Mexico l .23 2.56 
New York 20 4.58 2.62 
North Carolina 29 6.64 l 0. 18 2 
North Dakota l . 23 7. 14 
Ohio 23 5.26 4.59 
Oklahoma 6 l.37 3.59 
Oregon 2 .46 l. 34 
Pennsylvania 16 3.66 2.68 2 
Rhode Island 
South Carolina 11 2.52 7.53 
South Dakota 
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Texas Rangers (Continued) 
Percent Percent 
Number of of Club 1 s of Area 1 s Number of 
State or First-Year First-Year First-Year Major League 
Foreign Country P 1 ayers Players Players Pl ayers 
Tennessee 2 .46 l. 09 
Texas 34 7.78 6.24 8 
Utah 
Vermont l .23 9.09 
Virginia 18 4. 12 6. 77 2 
Washington 
l~est Virginia 5 l. 14 7.35 
Wisconsin 17 3.89 10.63 3 
Wyoming 
(U.S. Total) 434 99.31 3.46 61 
Aruba 
Australia 
Bahamas 
Canada 
Canal Zone 
Columbia 
Cos ta Rica 
Cuba 
Dominican Rep. 
Guatemala 
Holl and 
Japan 
Mexico 
Nicaragua 
Panama 
Puerto Rico l .23 . 31 
South Africa 
Taiwan 
Venezuela 2 .46 .98 
Virgin Islands 
(Foreign Total) 3 .69 . 21 
Tota 1 437 100.00 3. 12 61 
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Seattle Mariners 
Percent Percent 
Number of of Club's of Area's !~umber of 
State or First-Year Fi rs t-Year First-Year Major League 
Foreign Country Pl ayers Players Players Pl ayers 
Alabama 
Alaska 
Arizona 2 4.26 1. 12 
Arkansas 
California 9 19. 15 .29 
Colorado 
Connecticut 1 2. 13 .55 
Delaware 
Dist. of Columbia 
Florida 8 17.02 1. 18 
Georgia 
Hawaii 
Idaho 
Illinois l 2. 13 . 18 
Indiana l 2. 13 .58 
Iowa 
Kansas 
Kentucky 
Louisiana 2 4.26 l. 09 
Maine 
Maryland l 2. 13 .45 
Massachusetts 1 2. 13 .33 
Michigan 1 2. 13 .24 
Minnesota 
Mississippi 
Missouri 
Montana 
Nebraska 
Nevada 
New Hampshire 
NevJ Jersey l 2. 13 .23 
New Mexico 
New York l 2. 13 . 13 
North Carolina 1 2. 13 .35 
North Dakota 
Ohio 
Oklahoma 
Oregon 1 2. 13 .67 
Pennsylvania 
Rhode Island 
South Carolina 
South Dakota 
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Seattle Mariners (Continued) 
Percent Percent 
Number of of Club's of Area's Number of 
State or First-Year Fi rs t-Year First-Year Major League 
Foreign Country Pl ayers Players Players Pl ayers 
Tennessee 
Texas 1 2. 13 . 18 
Utah 
Vermont 
Virginia 
Washington 9 19. 15 3.83 
West Virginia 
Wisconsin 
Wyoming 
(U.S. Total) 41 87.23 .33 
Aruba 
Australia 
Bahamas 
Canada 1 2. 13 .47 
Canal Zone 
Columbia 
Costa Rica 
Cuba 
Dominican Rep. 2 4.26 .36 
Guatemala 
Ho 11 and 
Japan 
Mexico 
Nicaragua 
Panama 
Puerto Rico 2. 13 .31 
South Africa 
Taiwan 
Venezuela 2 4.26 .98 
Virgin Islands 
(Foreign Total) 6 12. 77 .42 
Total 47 100. 00 .34 
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Toronto Blue Jays 
Percent Percent 
Number of of Club 1 s of Area 1 s lfomber of 
State or First-Year Fi rs t-Year First-Year Major League 
Foreign Country Pl ayers Players Players Pl ayers 
Alabama l 3.70 .41 
Alaska 
Arizona 
Arkansas 
California 6 22.22 .20 
Colorado 
Connecticut 
Delaware 
Dist. of Columbia 
Florida 
Georgia 
Hawaii 
Idaho 
Illinois 2 7.41 .37 
Indiana 
Iowa 
Kansas 
Kentucky 
Louisiana 
Maine 
Maryl and 
Massachusetts 
Michigan 
Minnesota 
Mississippi 
Missouri 
Montana 
Nebraska 
Nevada 
New Hampshire 
New Jersey 
New Mexico 
New York 
North Carolina 
North Dakota 
Ohio l 3.70 .20 
Oklahoma 
Oregon 2 7. 41 1.34 
Pennsylvania 
Rhode Island 
South Carolina 
South Dakota 
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Toronto Blue Jays (Continued) 
Percent Percent 
Number of of Club's of Area's Number of 
State or First-Year Fi rs t-Year First-Year Major League 
Foreign Country Pl ayers Players Players Players 
Tennessee 
Texas l 3.70 . 18 
Utah 
Vermont 
Virginia 
Washington 
West Virginia 
Wisconsin 
Wyoming 
(U.S. Total) 13 48. 15 . 10 
Aruba 
Austra 1 i a 
Bahamas 
Canada 7 25.93 3.30 
Canal Zone 
Columbia 
Cos ta Rica 
Cuba 
Dominican Rep. 7 25.93 1. 28 
Guatemala 
Holland 
Japan 
Mexico 
Nicaragua 
Panama 
Puerto Rico 
South Africa 
Taiwan 
Venezuela 
Virgin Islands 
(Foreign Total) 14 51.85 . 98 
Total 27 100.00 . 19 
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Atlanta Braves 
Percent Percent 
Number· of of Club's of Area's lfomber of 
State or First-Year First-Year First-Year Major League 
Foreign Country Pl ayers Players Players Pl ayers 
Alabama 27 4.88 11. 20 
Alaska 
Arizona 
Arkansas 3 .54 4. 11 1 
Ca 1 i forni a 81 14. 65 2.64 12 
Colorado 
Connecticut 4 . 72 2. 19 
Delaware 
Dist. of Columbia 1 . 18 7. 14 
Florida 23 4. 16 3.39 3 
Georgia 44 7. 96 15. 44 4 
Hawaii 
Idaho 1 . 18 2.78 
Illinois 20 3.62 3.69 2 
Indiana 4 .72 2. 31 1 
Iowa 2 .36 1.83 
Kansas 3 .54 2.75 1 
Kentucky 6 1. 08 5. 77 1 
Louisiana 19 3.44 10. 38 3 
Maine 3 . 54 6.67 
Maryl and 4 . 72 1.81 
Massachusetts 4 .72 1. 32 
Michigan 4 .72 .95 
Minnesota 6 1. 08 3. 61 
Mississippi 5 .90 5.05 l 
Missouri 10 1. 81 3.45 2 
Montana 
Nebraska 5 .90 9.62 2 
Nevada 1 . 18 2.04 
New Hampshire 1 . 18 3.13 
New Jersey 35 6.33 7.99 2 
New Mexico 
New York 27 4.88 3.54 
North Caro 1 i na 13 2.35 4.56 l 
North Dakota 
Ohio 13 2.35 2.59 1 
Oklahoma 8 l.45 4.79 2 
Oregon 2 . 36 1. 34 1 
Pennsylvania 13 2.35 2. 18 
Rhode Island 1 . 18 2.78 
South Carolina 10 l. 81 6.85 
South Dakota 
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Atlanta Braves (Continued) 
Percent Percent 
Number of of Club's of Area's Number of 
State or Fi rs t-Year First-Year First-Year Major League 
Foreign Country Pl ayers Pl ayers Pl ayers Pl ayers 
Tennessee 15 2. 71 8.20 1 
Texas 40 7. 23 7. 34 9 
Utah 3 . 54 5.66 1 
Vermont 
Virginia 8 1.45 3.01 1 
Washington 7 1. 27 2.98 1 
West Virginia 
Wisconsin 2 .36 1.25 
Wyoming 
(U.S. Total) 477 86.44 3. 81 53 
Aruba 
Australia 
Bahamas 2 .36 6.67 
Canada 2 .36 .94 
Canal Zone 
Columbia 
Costa Rica 
Cuba 
Dominican Rep. 30 5.42 5.47 
Guatemala 
Holland 
Japan 
Mexico 
Nicaragua 3 .54 l 0. 0 
Panama 
Puerto Rico 18 3.25 5.57 
South Africa 
Taiwan 
Venezuela 19 3.44 9.31 2 
Virgin Islands 1 . 18 7. 14 
(Foreign Total) 75 13.56 5.20 2 
Total 552 100. 00 3.95 55 
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Chicago Cubs 
Percent Percent 
Number of of Club's of Area's lfornber of 
State or First-Year First-Year First-Year Major League 
Foreign Country Pl ayers Players Players Pl ayers 
Alabama 12 2.33 4.98 4 
Alaska 
Arizona 14 2. 72 7.82 l 
Arkansas 2 .39 2.74 
California 83 16. 15 2.71 16 
Colorado 2 .39 2. 17 
Connecticut 5 . 97 2.73 
Delaware 
Dist. of Columbia l . 19 7. 14 
Florida 27 5.25 3.98 l 
Georgia 13 z. 53 4.56 
Hawaii 
Idaho 3 .58 8.33 l 
I 11 i no is 48 9.34 8.86 5 
Indiana 9 l. 75 5.20 
Iowa 6 l. 17 5.50 
Kansas 3 .58 2.79 
Kentucky 3 . 58 2.88 
Louisiana 10 l. 95 5.46 1 
Maine 4 .78 8.89 
Maryland 8 l.56 3.62 2 
Massachusetts 12 2.33 3.95 2 
Michigan 5 . 97 l. 18 
Minnesota 1 . 19 .60 
Mississippi 2 .39 2.02 
Missouri 15 2.92 5. 17 3 
Montana 
Nebraska 
Nevada 2 .39 4.08 
NevJ Hampshire l . 19 3. 13 
New Jersey 30 5.84 6.85 
New Mexico 2 .39 5. 13 
New York 21 4.09 2.76 1 
North Carolina 10 1. 95 3. 51 2 
North Dakota 
Ohio 12 2.33 2.40 2 Oklahoma 10 1. 95 5.99 2 
Oregon 10 1. 95 6.71 
Pennsylvania 34 6. 61 5.70 4 
Rhode Island 2 .39 5.56 
South Carolina 2 .39 l. 37 1 
South Dakota 1 . 19 6.25 
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Chicago Cubs (Continued) 
Percent Percent 
Number of of Club's of Area's Number of 
State or First-Year First-Year First-Year Major League 
Foreign Country Players Players Players Pl ayers 
Tennessee 5 .97 2.73 
Texas 27 5.25 4.95 4 
Utah 
Vermont 
Virginia 5 .97 l.88 
Washington 12 2.33 5. 11 2 
West Virginia 8 l. 56 11. 76 
Wisconsin 4 .78 2.50 
Wyoming 
( U. S. To ta l ) 487 9.4. 7 5 3.-88 55 
Aruba 
Australia 
Ba llamas 
Canada l . 19 . 47 
Canal Zone 
Columbia 
Cos ta Rica 
Cuba 
Dami n·i can Rep. 
Guatemala 
Holland 
Japan 
Mexico 
Nicaragua 
Panama l . 19 3. 13 
Puerto Rico 16 3. 11 4.95 3 
South Africa 
Taiwan 
Venezuela 9 1.75 4.41 
Virgin Islands 
(Foreign Total) 27 5.25 1.87 3 
Total 514 100. 00 3.68 58 
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Cincinnati Reds 
Percent Percent 
Number of of Club 1 s of Area 1 s !~umber of 
State or First-Year First-Year First-Year Major League 
Foreign Country Pl ayers Players Pl ayers Pl ayers 
Alabama 17 2.73 7.05 
Alaska 
Arizona 6 .96 3.35 l 
Arkansas l . 16 . 56 
California 60 9.65 l. 96 8 
Colorado 9 l. 45 9.78 
Connecticut 11 l. 77 6.01 
Delaware 
Dist. of Columbia 
Florida 52 8.36 7.67 3 
Georgia 8 l. 29 2. '81 2 
Hawaii l . 16 3.85 
Idaho 
Illinois 19 3.05 3. 51 
Indiana 17 2.73 9.83 2 
Iowa 7 l.13 6.42 
Kansas 5 .80 4.59 
Kentucky 13 2.09 12. 50 2 
Louisiana 10 l. 61 5.46 
Maine l . 16 2.22 
Maryland 7 l. 13 3. 17 
Massachusetts 5 .80 l. 64 1 
Michigan 10 l. 61 2.37 2 
Minnesota 7 l. 13 4.22 
Mississippi 6 .96 6.06 
Missouri 21 3.38 7.24 1 
Montana 1 . 16 3.33 
Nebraska 8 l. 29 15. 38 1 
Nevada 3 .48 6. 12 
New Hampshire 1 16 3. 13 
Nevi Jersey 17 2.73 3.88 1 
Nevi Mexico 6 . 96 15. 38 
New York 28 4.50 3.67 
North Carolina 19 3.05 6.67 l 
North Dakota 3 .48 21.43 
Ohio 40 6.43 7.98 3 
Oklahoma 8 l. 29 4.79 2 
Oregon 3 .48 2. 01 
Pennsylvania 37 5.95 6.20 3 
Rhode Island 
South Carolina 5 .80 3.42 
South Dakota 3 .48 18. 75 
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Cincinnati Reds (Continued) 
Percent Percent 
Number of of Club's of Area's Number of 
State or Fi rs t-Year First-Year First-Year Major League 
Foreign Country Pl ayers Pl ayers Players Pl ayers 
Tennessee 7 1. 13 3.83 l 
Texas 52 8.36 9.54 3 
Utah 8 1. 29 15. 09 l 
Vermont 
Virginia 8 l. 29 3.01 
\fas hi ngton 4 .64 l. 70 
West Virginia 6 • 96 8.82 
Wisconsin 8 1. 29 5.00 l 
Wyoming l . 16 11. 11 
(U.S. Total) 570 91. 64 4 .. 54 40 
Aruba 
Australia 3 .48 l 0. 00 
Bahamas l . 16 3.33 
Canada 2 .32 .94 
Canal Zone l . 16 5.88 
Columbia 
Cos ta Rica 
Cuba 
Dominican Rep. 21 3.38 3.83 4 
Guatemala 
Holland 
Japan 
Mexico 
Nicaragua 
Panama 2 .32 6.25 
Puerto Rico 5 .80 l. 55 
South Africa 
Taiwan 3 . 48 75.00 
Venezuela 14 2.25 6.86 2 
Virgin Islands 
(Foreign Total) 52 8.36 3.61 6 
Total 622 100.00 4.45 46 
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Houston Astros 
Percent Percent 
Number· of of Club's of Area's !~umber of 
State or Fi rs t-Year Fi rs t-Year First-Year Major League 
Foreign Country Pl ayers Players Players Players 
Alabama 8 l. 57 3.32 l 
Alaska 
Arizona 17 3.33 9.50 4 
Arkansas 6 1. 18 8.22 
California 85 16. 67 2. 77 12 
Colorado 3 . 59 3.26 
Connecticut l . 20 . 55 
Delaware 6 l. 18 16.21 
Dist. of Columbia 
Florida 29 5.69 4.28 4 
Georgia 3 '. 59 l. 05 
Hawaii 
Idaho 2 . 39 5.56 
Illinois 11 2. 16 2.03 l 
Indiana 4 .78 2.31 
Iowa 3 . 59 2. 75 
Kansas l .20 .92 
Kentucky 6 1. 18 5. 77 
Louisiana 9 l. 76 4.92 l 
Maine 2 .39 4.44 
Maryland 9 l. 76 4.07 
Massachusetts 10 l. 96 3.29 l 
Michigan 12 2.35 2.84 3 
Minnesota 1 . 20 .60 l 
Mississippi 2 .39 2.02 l 
Missouri 6 l.18 2.07 
Montana 
Nebraska 2 .39 3.85 
Nevada l .20 2.04 
New Hampshire l . 20 3. 13 
New Jersey 15 2.94 3.42 
New Mexico 6 l.18 15. 38 
New York 11 2. 16 1.44 1 
North Carolina 6 1. 18 2. 11 
North Dakota 
Ohio 6 1. 18 l. 20 2 
Oklahoma 12 2.35 7. 19 
Oregon 6 .98 3.36 2 
Pennsylvania 19 3.73 3. 18 2 
Rhode Island 
South Carolina 3 . 59 2.05 
South Dakota l .20 6.25 
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Houston Astros (Continued) 
Percent Percent 
Number of of Club's of Area's Number of 
State or Fi rs t-Year Fi rs t-Year Fi rs t-Year Major League 
Foreign Country Pl ayers Players Players Pl ayers 
Tennessee 8 l. 57 4.37 
Texas 50 9.80 9. 17 2 
Utah 2 .39 3. 77 
Vermont 2 .39 18. 18 
Vi rgi ni a 9 1. 76 3.38 
Washington 7 l. 37 2.98 l 
West Virginia l .20 1.47 
Wisconsin 
Wyoming 
(U.S. Total) 403 79. 17 3.22 39 
Aruba 1 .20 33.33 
Australia 
Bahamas 6 1.18 20.00 l 
Canada 9 1. 76 4. 25 1 
Canal Zone l .20 5.88 
Columbia 
Costa Rica 
Cuba 1 .20 100.00 
Dami ni can Rep. 53 9.67 9.67 4 
Guatemala 
Holland 
Japan 
Mexico 1 .20 100. 00 
Nicaragua 1 .20 3.33 
Panama 3 . 59 9.38 
Puerto Rico 11 2. 16 3.41 
South Africa 
Taiwan 
Venezuela 19 3.73 9.31 1 
Virgin Islands 
(Foreign Total) 106 20. 83 7.36 7 
Total 509 100. 00 3.65 46 
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Los Angeles Dodgers 
Percent Percent 
Number of of Club's of Area's lfomber of 
State or First-Year First-Year First-Year Major League 
Foreign Country Pl ayers Players Pl ayers Pl ayers 
Alabama 7 1. 24 2.90 
Alaska l . 18 33.33 
Arizona 12 2. 12 6.70 
Arkansas 5 .88 6.85 
California 177 31. 33 5.78 23 
Colorado 2 .35 2. 17 
Connecticut 5 . 88 2.73 1 
Delaware 
Dist. of Columbia 
Florida 32 5.66 4. 72 5 
Georgia 16 2.83 5. 61 2 
Hawaii 1 . 18 3.85 
Idaho 
Illinois 22 3.89 4.06 
Indiana 6 l. 06 3.47 l 
Iowa 1 . 18 . 92 
Kansas 13 2.30 11. 93 3 
Kentucky 3 .53 2.89 
Louisiana 9 l. 59 4.92 
Maine 
Maryl and 3 .53 l. 36 
Massachusetts 4 . 71 l. 32 
Michigan 10 l. 77 2.37 4 
Minnesota 3 . 53 l. 81 1 
Mississippi 2 .35 2.02 
Missouri 10 l. 77 3.45 2 
Montana 
Nebraska l . 18 l. 92 
Nevada 6 l. 06 12.24 1 
New Hampshire l . 18 3. 13 
New Jersey 13 2.30 2.97 
New Mexico 5 . 88 12.82 
New York 33 5.84 4.33 2 
North Carolina 6 l. 06 2. 11 
North Dakota l 18 7. 14 
Ohio 8 l.42 l. 60 1 
Oklahoma 15 2.65 8.98 3 
Oregon 3 . 53 2.01 
Pennsylvania 23 4.07 3.85 2 
Rhode Island l . 18 2.78 
South Carolina 4 .71 2.74 
South Dakota 
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Los Angeles Dodgers (Continued) 
Percent Percent 
Number of of Club 1 s of Area 1 s Number of 
State or First-Year Fi rs t- Year Fi rs t- Year Major League 
Foreign Country P 1 ayers Pl ayers Players P 1 ayers 
Tennessee 3 .53 1. 64 
Texas 20 3.54 3.67 3 
Utah 3 . 53 5.66 
Vermont 1 . 18 9.09 
Virginia 5 . 88 1. 88 
Washington 7 1. 24 2.98 1 
West Virginia 1 . 18 1. 47 
Wisconsin 4 . 71 2.50 
Wyoming 
( U. S . To ta 1 ) 508 89.91 4.05 56 
Aruba 
Australia 
Bahamas l . 18 3.33 
Canada 1 . 18 .47 
Canal Zone 
Columbia 
Cos ta Rica 
Cuba 
Dominican Rep. 32 5.66 5.84 2 
Guatemala 
Holl and 
Japan 
Mexico 
Nicaragua 
Panama 
Puerto Rico 11 1. 95 3.41 3 
South Africa 
Taiwan 
Venezuela 11 1. 95 5.39 
Virgin Islands l . 18 7. 14 l 
(Foreign Total) 57 10.09 3.96 6 
Total 565 100.00 4.04 62 
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Montreal Expos 
Percent Percent 
Number· of of Club's of Area's lfornber of 
State or Fi rs t-Year First-Year First-Year Major League 
Foreign Country Pl ayers Players Players Pl ayers 
A 1 abarna 6 l. 41 2.49 
Alaska 
Arizona 3 . 70 l. 68 
Arkansas 3 .70 4. 11 1 
California 68 15. 96 2.22 11 
Colorado 1 . 23 1. 09 
Connecticut 6 l. 41 3.28 
Delaware 1 .23 2.70 
Dist. of Columbia 
Florida 19 4.46 2.80 4 
Georgia 12 2.82 4.21 
Hawaii 1 . 23 3.85 
Idaho 
Illinois 15 3.52 2. 77 3 
Indiana 
Iowa 8 l. 88 7.34 
Kansas 3 .70 2.75 
Kentucky 7 1. 64 6.73 
Louisiana 1 .23 .55 
Maine 
Maryl and 4 .94 1. 81 
Massachusetts 4 .94 1. 32 
Michigan 16 3.76 3.79 1 
Minnesota 5 1. 17 3. 01 1 
Mississippi 5 l. 17 5.05 
Missouri 5 1. 17 1. 72 1 
Montana 
Nebraska 3 .70 5. 77 1 
Nevada 
New Hampshire 1 .23 3. 13 
New Jersey 19 4.46 4.34 
New Mexico 1 .23 2.56 
New York 21 4.93 2.76 1 
North Carolina 3 .70 1. 06 1 
North Dakota 
Ohio 33 7.75 6.59 l 
Oklahoma 7 1. 64 4. 19 
Oregon 5 1. 17 3.36 
Pennsyl van-i a 12 2.82 2. 01 2 
Rhode Island 
South Carolina 
South Dakota 
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Montreal Expos (Continued) 
Percent Percent 
Nun1ber of of Club's of Area's Number of 
State or Fi rs t- Year First-Year First-Year Major League 
Foreign Country Pl ayers Pl ayers Players Players 
Tennessee 5 l. 17 2.73 
Texas 33 7.75 6.06 4 
Utah 
Vermont 2 .47 18. 18 
Virginia 7 l. 64 2.63 
Washington 4 .94 l. 70 
West Virginia l . 23 l.47 
Wisconsin 2 .47 l. 25 l 
Wyoming 
(U.S. Total) 353 82.86 2. 81 34 
Aruba 
Australia 
Bahamas l .23 3.33 
Canada 32 7. 51 15. 09 2 
Canal Zone l • 23 5.89 
Columbia 
Cos ta Rica 
Cuba 
Dominican Rep. 9 2. 11 l.64 
Guatemala 
Holland 
Japan 
Mexico 
Nicaragua 
Panama 
Puerto Rico 25 5.87 7. 74 2 
South Afr·i ca 
Taiwan 
Venezuela 4 .94 l. 96 
Virgin Islands l .23 7. 14 
(Foreign Total) 73 17. 14 5.07 4 
Tota 1 426 100.00 3.05 38 
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New York Mets 
Percent Percent 
Number ·of of Club 1 s of Area 1 s !~umber of 
State or First-Year Fi rs t-Year First-Year Major League 
Foreign Country Pl ayers Players Players Players 
Alabama 7 l. 01 2.90 2 
Alaska 
Arizona 14 2. 01 7.82 4 
Arkansas 2 . 29 2.74 
California 124 4.08 4.08 13 
Colorado 4 .58 4.35 
Connecticut 17 2.45 9.29 l 
Delaware l . 14 2.70 
Dist. of Columbia 
Florida 32 4.60 4.72 l 
Georgia 29 4. 17 10. 18 2 
Ha\'/a ii 
Idaho 
Illinois 21 3.02 3.87 2 
Indiana 11 l. 58 6.36 
Iowa 3 . 43 2.75 2 
Kansas 11 l. 58 10.09 2 
Kentucky 5 . 72 4. 81 0 
Louisiana 8 1.15 4.37 3 
Maine 
Maryland 10 l.44 4.52 
Massachusetts 9 1. 29 2. 96 
Michigan 8 l. 15 1. 90 
Minnesota 6 . 86 3. 61 
Mississippi 5 . 72 5.05 1 
Missouri 15 2. 16 5. 17 1 
Montana 2 .29 6.67 1 
Nebraska 2 .29 3.85 
Nevada l . 14 2.04 
New Hampshire 
New Jersey 10 l. 44 2.28 l 
New Mexico l . 14 2.56 
New York 65 9.35 8.53 8 
North Carolina 18 2.59 6.32 2 
North Dakota 
Ohio 26 3.74 5. 19 
Oklahoma 8 l. 15 4.79 3 
Oregon 7 l. 01 4. 70 1 
Pennsylvania 32 4.60 5.36 2 
Rhode Island 2 .29 5.56 
South Carolina 11 l. 58 7.53 1 
South Dakota 
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New York Mets (Continued) 
Percent Percent 
Number of of Club's of Area's Number of 
State or First-Year Fi rs t- Year First-Year Major League 
Foreign Country Pl ayers Players Players P 1 ayers 
Tennessee 8 l. 15 4.37 
Texas 30 4.32 5.50 3 
Utah 5 .72 9.43 l 
Vermont 
Vi rg·i ni a 13 l. 87 4.89 l 
Washington 9 l. 29 3.83 
West Virginia 6 .86 8.82 
Wisconsin 7 l. 01 4.38 
Wyoming l . 14 11. 11 
( U .S . To ta l ) 608 87.63 4;85 58 
Aruba l . 14 33.33 
Australia 
Bahamas 3 . 43 l 0. 00 
Canada 10 l.44 4.72 l 
Canal Zone 1 . 14 5.88 
Columbia 
Cos ta Rica l . 14 100.00 
Cuba 
Dominican Rep. 33 4. 75 6.02 l 
Guatemala l . 14 100.00 
Ho 11 and 
Japan 
Mexico 
Nicaragua 
Panama 1 . 14 3. 13 1 
Puerto Rico 25 3.60 7.74 5 
South Africa 
Taiwan 
Venezuela 10 l.44 4.90 
Virgin Islands 
(Foreign Total) 86 12.37 5.97 8 
Total 694 100. 00 4.97 66 
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Philadelphia Phillies 
Percent Percent 
Number of of Club's of Area's lfomber of 
State or First-Year First-Year First-Year Major League 
Foreign Country Pl ayers Players Pl ayers Pl ayers 
Alabama 1 . 16 . 41 
Alaska 1 . 16 33.33 
Arizona 5 .78 2.79 
Arkansas 2 . 31 2. 7 4 
Cal ·i forni a 131 20.47 4.27 17 
Colorado 3 . 47 3.26 2 
Connecticut 15 2.34 8.20 2 
Delaware 7 1. 09 18. 92 
Dist. of Columbia 
Florida 32 5.00 4.72 3 
Georgia 14 2. 19 4.91 
Hawaii 
Idaho 1 . 16 2. 78 
Illinois 22 3.44 4.06 2 
Indiana 11 1. 72 6.36 2 
Iowa 2 . 31 1. 83 
Kansas 2 . 31 1.83 
Kentucky 5 .78 4.81 1 
Louisiana 1 . 16 .55 
Maine 1 . 16 2.22 
Maryland 7 1.09 3. 17 
Massachusetts 5 .78 1. 64 
Michigan 19 2.97 4.50 3 
Minnesota 1 . 16 .60 
Mississippi 2 . 31 2.02 
Missouri 6 . 94 2.07 
Montana 2 . 31 6.67 
Nebraska 
Nevada 3 .47 6. 12 New Hampshire 1 . 16 3. 13 New Jersey 30 New Mexico 4.69 6.85 
Nevi York 26 4.06 3.41 North Carolina 17 2.66 5.96 North Dakota 1 . 16 7. 14 Ohio 34 5. 31 6.79 7 Oklahoma 7 1. 09 4. 19 Oregon 13 2.03 8.72 1 
Pennsylvania 38 6.37 6.37 2 
Rhode Island 1 . 16 2.78 
South Carolina 20 3. 13 13.70 2 
South Dakota 
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Philadelphia Phillies (Continued) 
Percent Percent 
Number of of Club 1 s of Area's Number of 
State or First-Year First-Year Fi rs t- Year Major League 
Foreign Country Pl ayers Pl ayers Players Pl ayers 
Tennessee 11 1. 72 6.01 
Texas 24 3.75 4.40 1 
Utah 2 . 31 3.78 1 
Vermont 
Virginia 10 1. 56 3.76 2 
Washington 6 .94 2.55 1 
West Virginia 1 . 16 1. 47 
Wisconsin 5 .78 3. 13 
Wyoming 2 .31 22.22 
( U. S. To ta 1 ) 550 85.94 4.38 51 
Aruba 
Australia 1 . 16 20.00 
Bahamas 
Canada 10 l. 56 4. 72 
Canal Zone 1 . 16 5.88 
Columbia 
Cos ta Rica 
Cuba 
Dominican Rep. 32 5.00 5.84 
Guatemala 
Holland 
Japan 
Mexico 
Nicaragua 1 . 16 3.33 
Panama 5 . 78 15. 63 
Puerto Rico 22 3.44 6.81 
South Africa 
Taiwan 
Venezuela 17 2.66 8.33 
Virgin Islands 1 . 16 7. 14 
(Foreign Total) 90 14. 06 6.25 2 
Total 640 100.00 4.58 53 
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Pittsburgh Pirates 
Percent Percent 
Number of of Club's of Area's lfomber of 
State or First-Year Fi rs t-Year First-Year Major League 
Foreign Country Pl ayers Players Pl ayers Pl ayers 
Alabama 13 l. 47 5.39 l 
Al a ska 
Arizona 
Arkansas 
California 83 9.36 2.71 9 
Colorado 13 l. 47 14. 13 
Connecticut 9 l. 01 4.92 
Del a1vare 5 . 56 13. 51 
Dist. of Columbia 2 .23 14.29 
Florida 33 3. 72 4.87 4 
Georgia 21 2.37 7.37 l 
Ha1va ii 3 . 34. 11.54 
Idaho 5 .56 13.89 
Illinois 14 l. 58 2.58 l 
Indiana 17 l. 92 9.83 
Iowa 2 .23 l. 83 
Kansas l . 11 .92 
Kentucky 13 l. 47 12. 50 2 
Louisiana 7 .79 3.83 
Maine 4 .45 8.89 
Maryl and 26 2.93 11.76 l 
Massachusetts 33 3.72 10.86 l 
Michigan 24 2.71 5.69 l 
Minnesota 2 . 23 l. 20 
Mississippi 4 .45 4.04 
Missouri 12 l. 35 4. 14 
Montana 4 .45 13. 33 
Nebraska l . 11 l. 92 
Nevada 3 .34 6. 12 
New Hampshire l . 11 3. 13 
Ne1v Jersey 18 2.03 4. 11 3 
Ne1v Mexico 
New York 49 5.52 6.43 4 
North Carolina 11 l. 24 3.86 l 
North Dakota l 11 7. 14 l 
Ohio 46 5. 19 9. 18 5 
Oklahoma 2 .23 l. 20 
Oregon 5 . 56 3.36 
Pennsylvania 96 l 0. 82 16. 08 8 
Rhode Island 
South Carolina 10 l. 13 6.85 l 
South Dakota 
--------
- -
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Pittsburgh Pirates (Continued) 
Percent Percent 
Number of of Club's of Area's Number of 
State or First-Year First-Year First-Year Major League 
Foreign Country Pl ayers Pl ayers Players Pl ayers 
Tennessee 17 1. 92 9.29 l 
Texas 10 1. 13 1. 83 2 
Utah 
Vermont 
Virginia 22 2.48 8.27 l 
Washington 24 2.71 l 0. 21 l 
West Virginia 11 l. 24 16. 18 1 
Wisconsin 3 .34 1.88 
Wyoming 3 .34 33.33 
( U .S . To ta l ) 686 77. 34 5.47 50 
Aruba 
Australia 
Bahamas 5 .56 16. 67 
Canada 31 3.49 14.67 
Canal Zone 7 .79 41. 18 1 
Columbia 1 . 11 14.29 
Cos ta Rica 
Cuba 
Dominican Rep. 100 11.27 18. 25 5 
Guatemala 
Holland 
Japan 
Mexico 
Nicaragua 11 l. 24 36.67 
Panama 8 . 90 25.00 2 
Puerto Rico 16 1. 80 4.95 1 
Sou th Africa 
Taiwan 
Venezuela 19 2. 14 9. 31 1 
Virgin Islands 3 .34 21.43 
(Foreign Total) 201 22.66 13.95 10 
Total 887 100.00 6.34 60 
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St. Louis Cardinals 
Percent Percent 
Number of of Club's of Area's lfomber of 
State or Fi rs t-Year First-Year First-Year Major League 
Foreign Country Pl ayers Players Players Players 
Alabama 23 2.93 9.54 
Alaska 
Arizona 9 1. 15 5.03 3 
Arkansas 20 2.55 27. 40 
Ca 1 i forni a 164 20.89 5.35 18 
Colorado 5 . 64 5.43 
Connecticut 15 1. 91 8.20 
Delaware 1 . 13 2. 13 
Dist. of Columbia 
Florida 33 4.20 4.87 5 
Georgia 12 ·1. 53 4. 21 
Hawaii 6 .76 23.08 
Idaho 
Illinois 52 6.62 9.59 5 
Indiana 2 . 25 1. 16 1 
Iowa 11 1.40 10.09 
Kansas 4 . 51 3.67 1 
Kentucky 5 .64 4.81 1 
Louisiana 8 1.02 4.37 
Maine 2 . 25 4.44 1 
Maryl and 2 . 25 .90 
Massachusetts 34 4.33 11. 18 1 
Michigan 6 .76 1.42 l 
Minnesota 7 .89 4.22 
Mississippi 7 .89 7.07 
Missouri 47 5.99 16. 21 3 
Montana 1 . 13 3.33 
Nebraska 3 .38 5. 77 
Nevada 1 . 13 2.04 
New Hampshire 1 . 13 3. 13 
New Jersey 20 2.55 4.57 
New Mexico 2 .25 5. 13 
New York 41 5.22 5.38 2 
North Carolina 7 .89 2.46 l 
North Dakota 
Ohio 10 1. 27 2.00 
Oklahoma 14 1. 78 8.38 
Oregon 5 .64 3.36 
Pennsylvania 15 1. 91 2. 51 
Rhode Island 1 . 13 2.78 
South Carolina 4 . 51 2.74 
South Dakota 
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St. Louis Cardinals (Continued) 
Percent Percent 
Number of of Club's of Area's Number of 
State or First-Year First-Year Fi rs t- Year Major League 
Foreign Country Players Pl ayers Players Pl ayers 
Tennessee 21 2.68 11. 48 l 
Texas 20 2.55 3.67 3 
Utah 3 .38 5.66 
Vermont 2 .25 18. 18 
Virginia 8 l .02 3.01 l 
vJas hi ngton 7 .89 . 43 l 
West Virginia 2 .25 2.94 
Wisconsin 4 . 51 2.50 l 
Wyoming 
(U.S. Total) 668 85.10 5.·33 50 
Aruba 
Australia 
Bahamas 
Canada 21 2.68 9.91 2 
Canal Zone 
Columbia 
Cos ta Rica 
Cuba 
Dominican Rep. 67 8.54 12.23 3 
Guatemala 
Holland 
Japan 
Mexico 
Nicaragua 5 .64 16.67 
Panama 5 .64 15.63 
Puerto Rico 15 l. 91 4.64 6 
South Africa 
Taiwan 
Venezuela 4 . 51 l. 96 
Virgin Islands 
(Foreign Total) 117 14.90 8. 12 ll 
Total 785 100.00 5. 61 61 
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San Diego Padres 
Percent Percent 
Number of of Club 1 s of Area 1 s lfomber of 
State or First-Year Fi rs t-Year First-Year Major League 
Foreign Country Pl ayers Players Pl ayers Pl ayers 
Alabama 3 1. 05 1. 24 
A 1 as ka 
Arizona 4 1. 40 2.23 1 
Arkansas 1 .35 1.37 
California 110 38.46 3.59 18 
Colorado l .35 1. 09 
Connecticut l .35 . 55 
Delaware l .35 2.70 
Dist. of Columbia 
Florida 18 6.29 2.65 
Georgia 11 3.85 3.86 l 
Hawaii l .35 3.85 
Idaho 2 .70 5.56 
Illinois 7 2.45 1. 29 l 
Indiana 2 .70 1. 16 
Iowa 2 .70 1. 83 
Kansas 2 .70 1. 83 l 
Kentucky l .35 .96 
Louisiana 4 1. 40 2. 19 l 
Maine l .35 2.22 
Maryl and 3 1. 05 1. 36 
Massachusetts 3 1. 05 .99 
Michigan 3 1. 05 .71 l 
Minnesota l . 35 . 60' l 
Mississippi ·3 1. 05 3.03 
Missouri 3 1. 03 1.03 
Montana 2 .70 6.67 l 
Nebraska 
Nevada 
New Hampshire 
New Jersey 7 2.45 1. 60 
Ne1.v Mexico 
New York 20 6.99 2.62 
North Carolina 2 .70 .70 l 
North Dakota 
Ohio 7 2.45 1.40 
Oklahoma 5 l. 75 2.99 l 
Oregon 4 1.40 2.68 l 
Pennsylvania 6 2. 10 1. 01 l 
Rhode Island 3 l. 05 8.33 1 
South Carolina 2 .70 l. 37 1 
South Dakota 
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San Diego Padres (Continued) 
Percent Percent 
Number of of Club 1 s of Area 1 s Number of 
State or Fi rs t-Year First-Year First-Year Major League 
Foreign Country Players Pl ayers Pl ayers Pl ayers 
Tennessee 7 2.45 3.83 l 
Texas 11 3.85 2.02 2 
Utah 
Vermont 
Virginia 3 l. 05 l. 13 2 
Washington 7 2.45 2.98 2 
West Virginia l .35 l. 47 l 
Wisconsin 2 .70 l. 25 
Wyoming 
( U. S. To ta 1) 283 98.95 2.26 40 
Aruba 
Australia 
Bahamas 
Canada 
Canal Zone 
Columbia 
Cos ta Rica 
Cuba 
Dominican Rep. 2 .70 . 36 
Guatemala 
Holl and 
Japan 
Mexico 
Nicaragua 
Panama 
Puerto Rico l .35 . 31 
South Africa 
Taiwan 
Venezuela 
Virgin Islands 
(Foreign Total) 3 l.05 . 21 
Total 286 100.00 2.05 40 
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San Francisco Giants 
Percent Percent 
Number-of of Club's of Area 1 s lfomber of 
State or First-Year First-Year First-Year Major League 
Foreign Country Pl ayers Players Players Pl ayers 
Alabama 12 l. 65 4.98 
Alaska l Arizona 24 3.30 13. 41 
Arkansas 7 .96 9.59 
California 254 34.94 8.28 30 
Colorado 4 . 55 4.35 
Connecticut 10 l.38 5.46 l 
Delaware l . 14 2.70 
Dist. of Columbia l . 14 7. 14 
Florida 20 2. 75 2.95 l 
Georgia 5 .69 l. 72 
Hawaii 2 .28 7.69 l 
Idaho 6 . 83 16. 67 l 
Illinois 31 4.26 5. 72 2 
Indiana 4 .55 2.31 
Iowa 2 .28 l. 83 
Kansas 6 .83 5.50 l 
Kentucky 3 . 41 2.88 l 
Louisiana 8 l.10 4.37 
Maine l . 14 2.22 
Maryland 2 . 28 .90 
Massachusetts 6 . 83 l. 97 
Michigan 12 l. 65 2.84 
Minnesota 6 . 83 3. 61 2 
Mississippi 7 .96 7.07 1 
Missouri 5 . 69 l. 72 
Montana 3 . 41 l 0. 00 
Nebraska 1 . 14 l. 92 
Nevada 6 .83 12.24 
Ne1\I Hamps hi re 1 . 14 3. 13 
New Jersey 16 2.20 3.65 3 
Ne1v Mexico 1 . 14 2.56 
New York 32 4.40 4.20 2 
North Carolina 8 l.10 2. 81 
North Dakota 
Ohio 12 l. 65 2.40 
Oklahoma 4 . 55 2.40 
Oregon 29 3.99 19. 46 2 
Pennsylvania 10 l. 38 l. 68 l 
Rhode Island 
South Carolina l . 14 . 68 
South Dakota 
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San Francisco Giants (Continued) 
Percent Percent 
Number of of Club's of Area's Number of 
State or First-Year First-Year First-Year Major League 
Foreign Country Players Pl ayers Players Pl ayers 
Tennessee 5 . 69 2.73 
Texas 27 3. 71 4.95 2 
Utah 3 . 41 5.66 
Vermont 
Virginia 4 . 55 1. 50 
Washington 22 3.03 9.36 2 
West Virginia 
Wisconsin 6 .83 3.75 
Wyoming 
( U . S . To ta 1 ) 631 86.80 5.03 56 
Aruba 
Austra 1 i a 
Bahamas 1 . 14 3.33 
Canada 5 .69 2.36 
Canal Zone 4 .55 23.53 
Columbia 1 . 14 14.29 
Cos ta Rica 
Cuba 
Dominican Rep. 45 6. 19 8.21 3 
Guatemala 
Holland 
Japan 6 .83 100.00 
Mexico 
Nicaragua 
Panama 3 . 41 9.38 
Puerto Rico 16 2.20 4.95 
South Africa 
Taiwan 1 . 14 25.00 
Venezuela 12 1. 65 5.88 
Virgin Islands 
(Foreign Total) 96 13.20 6.66 3 
Total 727 100.00 5.20 59 
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